

# 极地国际问题研究通讯



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Bulletin of International Studies on the Polar Regions (Quarterly)



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## 【专题报道】

## 中美北极社会科学论坛论文摘要

## Impacts of Climate Changes on Arctic: Chinese Perspectives

Xia Liping

## Outline

With the warming of the Arctic Region, which speed has been faster than what people expected before, the ice sheet of the Arctic Region has been melting. The sea lanes of the Arctic Region will be open and the environmental change of the Arctic Region has been under way. The change will have important impacts on the global security. The Arctic Region will become one of the new strategic competing arenas in the world. The countries of the Arctic Region have been competing for the sovereignty and natural resources of the Arctic Region. The global ecological security has been faced with serious challenges. The impacts of the environmental change of the Arctic Region on national security of China will be very complicated. The melting of the ice sheet of the Arctic Region will cause more adverse weather in China, which may lead to more natural disasters, having negative impacts on the ecological security and food security of China. The openness of the sea lanes of the Arctic Region will benefit the international transportation and foreign trade of China. China has been also faced with the opportunity of exploitation of the natural resources in the Arctic Region. The environmental change of the Arctic Region is of importance to future existence and development of the human beings, and also of importance to the national security of China. China, as a country near the Arctic Region, must pay the attention on the environmental change of the Arctic Region and its impacts on the common interests of human beings and national security of China. China should have proper policy towards the environmental change of the Arctic Region and its impacts.

## Potential significant Environmental Changes of the Arctic Region

First of All, the ice sheet of the Arctic Region has been melting quite fast. the Arctic Region refers to the area north the Arctic Pole, covering 21 millions square kilometers. During the last 20 years, the ice sheet of the Arctic Region had been shrinking about 1500 kilometers every winter. Some scientists have come to the conclusion that the speed of global warming in Arctic Region has doubled that of other regions. In some areas of the Arctic Region the temperature has

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increased 2.5 degree centigrade. If the carbon emission continues to increase as its current speed, the temperature in the Arctic Region will increase more than 10 degree centigrade by 2100. The increase of the temperature will speed up the melting of the ice sheet of the Arctic Region and the Arctic Ocean.

### Impacts of Environmental Change of the Arctic Region on Global Security

1. The Arctic Region will become one of the key strategic competing arenas in the world.
2. The competition between countries around the Arctic Pole for sovereignty and natural resources.

There are three major disputed issues between countries around the Arctic Pole:

- Sovereignty for territory and territory sea.
  - Ownership for sea lanes.
  - Right for fishing.
3. Global ecological security has been faced with serious challenges.

### Impacts of Environmental Change of the Arctic Region on National Security of China

Melting of the ice sheet of the Arctic Region has led to some abnormal weather changes, which cause the increase of natural disasters.

Form the long term view, there are the dangers that costal islands and coastal lines of China will be inundated by sea water.

Production of food in China will be negatively influenced, but China will also be faced with the opportunity to use the fishing resources in Arctic Region if China can have right and capability to get them.

China is facing the opportunity to make use of sea lanes of Arctic Region, but it will be not easy.

China is facing the opportunity to make use of natural mine resources in the Arctic Region.

**The concept of Harmonious Arctic Region should become the fundamental thinking. There are three levels of the concept of Harmonious Arctic Region, including:**

- Harmony between human beings and nature.
- Harmony between countries concerned.
- Harmony between people and people in the Arctic Region.

### Improvement of Governance in the Arctic Region

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To improve the international mechanisms related to the Arctic Region will be very important in terms of governance in the Arctic Region.

There are three levels of the mechanisms of international governance related to the Arctic Region:

### **On the global level of the mechanisms of international governance related to the Arctic Region:**

#### 1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

According to the Article 234 (in SECTION 8. ICE-COVERED) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed in 1982, "Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance."

#### 2. The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

#### 3. The International Maritime Organization (IMO).

### **On the regional level of the mechanisms of international governance related to the Arctic Region:**

The Arctic Council. The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum which addresses issues faced by the eight Arctic States and its indigenous peoples. On the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council held on the 12th of May in Nuuk, Greenland, Ministers of the eight Arctic States recognized that the importance of maintaining peace, stability and constructive cooperation in the Arctic.

China is a full Observer States of the Arctic Council.

On the bilateral level of the mechanisms of international governance related to the Arctic Region.

**Julienne Stroeve**

### **Outline**

Since the late 1970s, multichannel passive microwave satellite sensors have provided a continuous record of the spatial extent of the Arctic sea ice cover. These data reveal a decline in

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total sea ice extent, with the largest and most widespread losses at the end of the melt season in September. The current trend in September sea ice extent from 1979 to 2014 is  $-87,200 \text{ km}^2 \text{ yr}^{-1}$ , or a rate of  $-13.7\% \text{ dec}^{-1}$ , and the 8 lowest September have all occurred within the past 8 years. These large reductions are in part a result of pronounced thinning of the ice cover that has made the ice cover more vulnerable to melting out in summer.

The increase in open water area during summer has already attracted substantial attention and generated speculation of increased economic activities in the Arctic. Depending on the future evolution of atmospheric  $\text{CO}_2$  concentration, global climate models project a possible seasonally ice-free Arctic before the end of this century. Such substantial ice loss will have profound ecological, climatic, economic and societal consequences, including the extinction of marine species, substantial shifts in the prevailing livelihood of indigenous population, large-scale climate feedbacks and increased economic activity. Such changes obviously have important ramifications for public policy and decision making at all levels of government.

To quantify the changes that the loss of Arctic sea ice might cause, we need to better understand the possible future evolution of Arctic sea ice, on both the short-term and long-term time-scales. On short time-scales, increased socio-economic activities in the Arctic, such as resource extraction and ship traffic has already lead to a growing interest in developing reliable methods to predict sea ice conditions a few months in advance. While perfect model studies suggest skillful forecasts should be possible 2 years ahead, in reality when these models are used to predict observed sea ice conditions, they show significant degradation of skill, offering skillful forecasts for only 2 to 5 months during summer. This reduced predictive skill may originate from limitations of the forecast systems, such as insufficient or poor quality initial conditions for data assimilation, insufficient or inadequate model physics, and climate model drift, while it is ultimately possible that inherent predictability in nature may be lower than in dynamical models. Another issue is the lack of knowledge about how the intrinsic predictability may be affected by a change in the climate's mean state. This is particularly relevant given the fast pace of change in the Arctic.

Projections of longer-term sea ice conditions are generally based on extrapolation of the observed decline in sea ice extent and/or modeled projections of future ice extent under different greenhouse gas warming scenarios. However, while the timing of when the Arctic may become seasonally ice-free has important political, economic and climate implications, there is a large spread in model projections and thus, large uncertainty about the future state of the ice cover. Part of the large spread in model projections is caused by the uncertainty of the future emissions

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pathway, but it is also caused by internal variability of the climate system and challenges of modeling the complex coupled ice-ocean-atmosphere system. These uncertainties all limit our ability to provide concrete predictions useful for informing policy. While model evaluation helps to identify shortcomings of our models in simulating the key processes that govern the functioning of the coupled ice-ocean-atmosphere system, such evaluation of model skills is insufficient in narrowing down future uncertainty.

## The Institutional Mechanisms For Sino-US Cooperation on the Climate Change in the Arctic

WANG Hanling

### Outline

This paper discusses the existing institutional mechanisms for Sino-US cooperation on the climate change in the Arctic at the global, regional and bilateral levels, analyze their deficiencies, and finally make some proposals on their improvement.

### I. Sino-US cooperation on the Climate Change in the Arctic: The theme and international legal framework

China and the US should cooperate on the Climate Change in the Arctic under the UN Framework Convention on the Climate Change and other international mechanisms. Understanding the Climate Change in the Arctic is fundamental for decision making and actions for addressing it. One of the principal objectives of the U.S. Arctic policy is to strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations. However, the US policy on international cooperation with non-member states of the Arctic Council such as China in the Arctic, including the Climate Change in the Arctic is not clear.

### II. Institutional Framework and Mechanisms

1. The global mechanism. As the basic international legal framework for international cooperation on the climate change, the UNFCCC applies to Sino-US cooperation on the climate change in the Arctic.
2. Regional mechanisms. The regional mechanisms that can be used for Sino – US cooperation on the climate change in the Arctic include the APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Arctic Council, especially its working groups in charge of the Arctic environment and climate change.

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3. Bilateral mechanisms. The bilateral mechanisms that can be used for Sino - US cooperation on the climate change in the Arctic mainly include:

- 1) SOA-NOAA Protocol on Marine and Fisheries Science and Technology Cooperation 1979 as well as the SOA-NOAA Marine and Fisheries Science and Technology Cooperation Joint Working Group and Marine Science Forum.
- 2) The Sino - U.S. Climate Change Working Group which was established in April 2013.
- 3) The Sino - U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue. During the 5th Dialogue in 2014, experts from Chinese and U.S. foreign affairs and maritime agencies exchanged views on a wide range of topics related to oceans, the law of the sea, and the polar regions.
- 4) The mechanisms under the Sino - U.S. Joint Announcement on Climate Change (Beijing, Nov. 2014).

### III. Deficiencies of the existing mechanisms

1. No specific, legally binding Sino-US agreement on the Arctic / climate change cooperation between China and the US;
2. No specific Sino-US governmental mechanism and forum on the Arctic /climate change;
3. Lack of Chinese participation and Sino-US cooperation on climate change and other relevant issues in the Arctic Council;
4. Lack of academic cooperation and exchanges as well as track 2 dialogues.
- 5.

### IV. Proposals / Questions for Discussions

1. A legally binding Sino-US agreement on the Arctic /climate change cooperation?
2. A specific Sino-US governmental mechanism / forum on the Arctic / climate change?
3. More Chinese participation and Sino-US cooperation on climate change and other relevant issues in the Arctic Council, especially working groups.
4. More Sino-US academic cooperation and exchanges as well as track 2 dialogues.

## Environmental Security Challenges and Economic Opportunities

### in the New Maritime Arctic

Lawson W. Brigham

#### Outline

Globalization and climate change are changing the maritime Arctic in extraordinary ways early in the 21st century. The Arctic is being increasingly linked to future global markets by the

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development of its offshore and onshore natural resources. These long-term initiatives require Arctic marine transportation systems that are safe and reliable. Notably most of the maritime Arctic requires a host of marine infrastructure improvements to ensure an adequate safety net and enhance efficiency of marine operations. Simultaneous to the increases in Arctic marine traffic driven by these economic interests, Arctic sea ice has been undergoing profound changes in thickness, extent and character in an era of anthropogenic warming. These changes in sea ice provide greater Arctic marine access and potentially longer seasons of navigation throughout the maritime Arctic. Broad areas of the coastal Arctic Ocean have become ice-free during longer summer periods when Arctic sea ice is at its minimum extent. However, the Arctic Ocean remains fully or partially ice-covered for much of the winter, spring and autumn. From the perspectives of maritime safety and marine environmental protection, it is an ice-covered ocean, not an ice-free environment, a key, practical factor since future ships operating in Arctic waters will likely be required to have some level of polar or ice-class capability.

One of the critical challenges and deep concerns is that marine operations in the 'new' maritime Arctic are evolving at a time when there are no international, mandatory shipping rules and regulations: there are no binding International Maritime Organization (IMO) provisions specific to the Arctic or polar waters. This will change in May 2015 when the IMO initiates the implementation phase for a new Polar Code for ships operating in polar waters. The Polar Code establishes mandatory international standards for new and existing commercial carriers and passenger ships operating on Arctic and Antarctic waters. The Code covers: ship structural standards; required marine safety equipment; training and experience standards for the ship's officers and crew; and, environmental rules regarding the discharge of oil, noxious liquids, sewage, and garbage. The carriers and passenger vessels under the Polar Code will be required to obtain a Polar Ship Certificate from the flag state; this Certificate will classify a ship for operation in polar waters as one of three ship types. All maritime states will have the challenge of implementing the Polar Code in their national legal systems by 1 January 2017 (when the Polar Code will enter into force). The Polar Code, amendments to the IMO SOLAS and MARPOL conventions, will be an historic milestone as a new regime for marine safety and the protection of Arctic people and the marine environment.

The Arctic states and the Arctic Council have also provided a framework and policy for addressing these new maritime Arctic challenges. During 2004 to 2009 the Council under its technical working group Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) conducted a far-reaching study, the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) that focused on marine safety

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and environmental protection issues, consistent with the Council's mandates of environmental protection and sustainable development. AMSA was led by Canada, Finland, and the United States with more than 200 experts contributing. Thirteen major workshops were held on such major topics as: future scenarios of Arctic marine navigation; environmental impacts; marine infrastructure; governance; indigenous marine use; marine insurance; and, Arctic marine incidents and response. Fourteen AMSA town-hall meetings were held in Arctic coastal communities (in Alaska, Canada, Norway and Iceland to gain insights in to the concerns and shared interests of indigenous and non-indigenous residents. Ninety-six AMSA findings were presented in the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, and the entire AMSA effort can be viewed in three important perspectives: first, as a baseline assessment and snapshot of Arctic marine use early in the 21st century (data collected from the Arctic states); second, as a strategic guide to a host of states, Arctic residents, users, and stakeholders involved in current and future Arctic marine operations; and, third as a policy framework document of the Arctic Council. The key aspect of the AMSA 2009 Report is that its 17 recommendations were negotiated by the Arctic states and consensus was reached so that the Arctic Ministers could approve the report in April 2009 in Tromso at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting. The AMSA recommendations focus on three interrelated themes: I. Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety; II. Protecting Arctic People and the Environment; and, III.

Building the Arctic Marine Infrastructure. The work of AMSA continues as three AMSA implementation status reports have been issued by PAME and the Arctic Ministers in May 2011, May 2013 and May 2015. Two binding agreements (called for in AMSA) among the Arctic states have already been reached on Arctic search and rescue, and on Arctic oil spill preparedness and response. The AMSA effort will continue to influence the work of the Arctic Council on issues related to stewardship of the Arctic Ocean in an era of unprecedented growth of marine use.

To further stewardship of the Arctic Ocean, as a non-Arctic state observer to the Arctic Council, China can contribute to the work of PAME and the Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) Working Group. All of the AMSA recommendations are components to the work of PAME and EPPR, and China could provide experts to address these key issues. There is a critical need for work on the infrastructure gaps indentified in AMSA by both the Arctic states and non-Arctic observer states. Potential opportunities exist for China-U.S. areas of collaboration on many of the Arctic marine infrastructure challenges. China can be a visible leader within the global maritime enterprise in implementation of the IMO Polar Code during May 2015 to 1 January 2017 (when the Code will come into force). China can also provide support to future

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Arctic work at IMO, as well as be actively involved in Arctic initiatives within such bodies as the International Hydrographic Organization, World Meteorological Organization, and the International Arctic Science Committee. Arctic climate change and stewardship of the Arctic Ocean are two of the areas of focus for the U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and it is under these two themes that China-U.S. Arctic cooperation should be fully explored.

## On Arctic governance paradigms and role of China

Zhao Long

### Outline

During the long history of human exploration of the Earth's north most region, the nature of Arctic issues has constantly varied with the changing external environment. Broadly speaking, Arctic governance has developed from total disorganization to gradual building of order, demonstrating the three steps *from competition to disputes, and to cooperation*. Such development is basically a function of the advancement of science and technologies, the changing natural environment as well as the strategic adjustments of related countries. The understanding of Arctic issues has shifted from a *sensitive topic to discuss* at the time of the Cold War to a *new platform for multilateral cooperation* today. With the growing number of diversified actors, the increasing trans-border challenges and ever more options for cooperation, the international society is taking strenuous efforts to explore various approaches of Arctic governance and foster new opportunities.

As the initial stage of Arctic governance, regional governance emphasizes the building of common values as well as positive interaction and integration of different parties within the region.

Regional Arctic governance is evaluated by three criteria, namely objective commonality and deliberate construction of values, the actual interaction and potential platforms as well as external challenges and the maneuvers of related parties throughout their cooperation. With regard to the framework of governance, various institutions have been designed to promote common identity and ensure exclusive interests, with growing efforts to shape favorable environment for *self-governance* within the region. As a typical example, Arctic fishery governance not only manifests the importance of institution designing and environmental shaping, but also reflects a lack of institutions on collective actions and cross-regional interaction up to the present.

The intermediate stage of Arctic governance is multilateral governance, which is characterized by *three levels of actors and selective compromise*. With a reference to the principle

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of *separation of rights* constituted by The Svalbard Treaty, multilateral governance underscores the significance of such principle in promoting collective actions of multiple actors; it also features selective compromise that is conducive to the construction of universal norms. As a typical example, the governance of Arctic sea routes demonstrates the driving forces of multiple actors behind multilateral mechanisms and highlights the key role of selective compromise in maintaining the willingness of multiple actors in their interaction.

As the advanced stage of Arctic governance, co-evaluation governance, which is composed of co-evaluation units and co-evaluation patterns, remains largely in conceptual discussion and theoretical hypotheses. Co-evaluation units have been fostered upon co-evaluation actors, challenges and responsibilities. Following the path of co-evaluation governance, a symbiotic pattern may be developed that features *oriented intervention* and *complementary competition*, and the ultimate goal of symbiotic development and co-evolution can be achieved. For now, co-evaluation Arctic governance is only an idealistic tendency and can be seen occasionally in such public issues as environmental protection and climate governance; more empirical evidence is yet to be found to enrich related theories.

In general, the three approaches of Arctic governance have demonstrated a *staged progression*. Due to its institutional deficiencies and inertia, the traditional approach of regional Arctic governance cannot meet the demands of the Arctic today that has transformed from a strategically low-tension region to one with global impacts in many non-traditional issues. With the growing internalization of core ideas by related actors and with the changes of physical variables in the region, Arctic governance is developing from regional to multilateral approaches, showing a tendency toward an even higher stage of co-evaluation governance. Thus, the changing relationships among different units, together with the necessary conditions that drive those relationships, are key to observing the mechanism of *staged progression*.

Nevertheless, such *staged progression* in Arctic governance does not always appear as linear advancement, but it may fluctuate or even regress depending on the level of internalization of core ideas, norms of behaviors of various actors and the changing physical environment. In other words, the future of Arctic issues and governance approaches may unfold different pictures; whether co-evaluation governance or regional governance will dominate is mainly a function of those variables that influence the *staged progression*. How different countries enhance their own ideas and promote the internalization of core ideas of other actors, as well as how they help shape a more favorable physical environments, are key to the successful *staged progression* in Arctic governance.

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On Arctic governance, importance should be attached to the role of countries outside the region and emerging economies. As an important signatory of international treaties, China is entitled to multiple rights and interests in the Arctic. As a biggest developing country, China closely related with globalization process. The economic exploitation of the Arctic region will facilitate the formation of an industry chain and a profit chain and the Arctic environmental protection will form a responsibility chain and a contribution chain going beyond the Arctic region, all of which will concern China's interests. Development of new shipping routes also brings new opportunities for China's trade and shipping interests. From Chinese official statements clearly have formulated its attitude towards to existing legal and governance structures in the Arctic. In the speech of the assistant minister of MFA of China Mr. Liu Zhenmin has clarified that, Arctic has a clear territorial jurisdiction and legal status is to tally different from the Antarctic. Therefore, although the Antarctic Treaty system of scientific cooperation and environmental protection can be used as the specific reference to cooperation in the Arctic, but to freeze the territorial claim as the cornerstone of the Antarctic Treaty system does not apply to the North Pole. Respect for national sovereignty in the Arctic is the primary legal basis for dealing with Arctic Affairs.

Arctic governance includes not only *high-politic topics*, but also covers low-politicized agenda such like climate change and environment protection, which requires the provision of public goods and the contributions made by competent actors. Above-mentioned tasks cannot be reached by limited players of global governance and by unilateral or even untransformed multilateral institutions, which imposes restrictions on some important regional or global players. China does not trying to formulate a new regional governance structure to replace existent ones, as equal signatories of the Spitsbergen Treaty and the UNCLOS, China is entitled to multiple interests and rights in the Arctic region, while shouldering mandated obligations. As an observer of Arctic Council, China would be more engaged in Arctic affairs, contributes more public goods in development of environment protection and wellbeing of indigenous people by scientific cooperation with arctic states, also can be an constructive player to enhance ideas and promote the internalization of core ideas of arctic governance by different actors, which promotes construction of common value of arctic governance.

## One Arctic, Common Responsibilities: New Testing Ground for New-Type of Major Power Relations between US and China

Kai Sun

### Outline

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In this globalized world, the Arctic is no longer a distant, pristine “far north”, it is increasing woven into things happening around the globe. Potential business, transportation and strategic opportunities are opening up with increasingly diminishing sea-ice in the Arctic. The region was rediscovered by leaders in the Arctic States, and by leaders from outside the region. This is most evident from the expanding list of Arctic Council observers, the ‘race’ to Arctic resources from oil companies, and the increased interest on Arctic issues by researchers and policy makers. Major issues in the Arctic are global in nature, and global efforts are called for in effective response to those opportunities and challenges. Such as climate change, environmental protection, Arctic transportation, and scientific research in the Arctic in order to better understand the region, all have an international dimension, which have global impacts or is dealt with by global impacts.

### A Brand New Agenda?

As the most influential platform for the Arctic, the Arctic Council is evolving from day one in responding to new issues in the Arctic and beyond. Most notably it is changing from policy shaping towards policy making. Chairing the Arctic Council for the second time, the United States’ efforts to keep the Arctic as a “peaceful, stable, and conflict-free region” deserve applause. The US agenda in the Arctic is quite different from its predecessor in three ways: (1) from “developing for the people of the North” to “One Arctic”, which means the US agenda put Arctic into global perspectives and not only for the people of the North, but for the people of the Arctic states, even for the whole world; (2) from economic development to climate change, which mean top priorities was shifted from economic development to dealing with climate change issues; (3) from international “exclusion” to international “inclusion”, this does not really mean Canadian agenda excludes outsiders, but mean the US agenda is more open and emphasize more on international collective efforts in responding to issues happening in the Arctic.

### Opportunity for US-China cooperation?

China in recent years is increasingly engaging in the Arctic mainly because of climate change and its potential impacts; the opening of Arctic passages and potential commercial use of the passages; increased scientific research is needed to understand the Arctic; and the potential use of Arctic resources. So, because of the previous mentioned connections, as an outsider to the Arctic, China of course is a stakeholder. Thus, China is engaging in the Arctic through different ways: scientific research expeditions, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and business connections, etc.

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Under the new backdrop with US as the chairman of the Arctic Council, a lot of opportunities for China to further engage in the Arctic. (1) Climate change can only be effectively responded through international efforts, as big emitters of green house gases, China and the US share common responsibility in responding to this issue, within the Arctic Council and beyond. (2) The US is trying to push more meaningful participation from observers, and China as an observer to the Arctic Council, is also looking for opportunities to further contribute to the Arctic Council. (3) Maintaining the Arctic as a peaceful, stable and conflict free region is clearly stated in Obama's Arctic strategy, which is also in China's best interest in keeping the Arctic as a conflict free region. Potential conflicts should be managed effectively.

### The Way Forward

Under the new initiative of building new type of big power relations, the relationship between China and US is getting on pretty well though there are some differences between these two countries. Joining hands to manage global issues and providing global public goods according to each side's ability is one of the basic principles for building new type big power relations. As for the Arctic, the US is an Arctic nation, which of course has fundamental stakes in the Arctic, China, as an emerging power on the world's stage, and for the above mentioned connections with the Arctic, is bound to and capable of contributing more according to China's ability in the good governance of the Arctic.

## 2014 ICJ Antarctic Whaling Case and the International Law on the Regulation of Commercial Whaling

Dan LIU  
Outline

Japan and other whaling States have continuously engaged in the "scientific whaling" (especially when JARPA II was preceded by the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic) after the 1985/186 whaling moratorium issued by the International Whaling Commission. This led to the 2010 ICJ whaling case brought up by Australia. The first part of this paper provides an introduction on the fact of "Antarctic Whaling" case, including Australia's sovereign claim on the Antarctic continent, a related case in Australia- the 2008 Kyodo case (Humane Soc'y Int'l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd), and the two JARPA programs conducted by Japan adjacent to the Antarctic area.

The second part focuses on the procedural issue of the case, especially the connection between the identification of "maritime areas" (Antarctic area) and the determination ICJ's

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jurisdiction on the case.

The third part will analyze the regulation on commercial whaling in the regime of ICRW/IWC, and the legal claims from both Australia and Japan. This author will mainly focus on the key issue of the case, especially Article VIII of ICRW, including whether Japan has been in breach of its bona fide obligation as to the implementation of ICRW"? Are there any "abuse of right" for the Japanese commercial whaling? Can Japan resort to the Preamble and Art. 8 of the ICRW as its argument ?

In the end, this paper probes the loopholes of the management on commercial whaling within the ICRW/IWC framework, more importantly, the inspiration of the judgment of the Whaling case on the conservation and management of marine mammals on polar regimes.

## Global Governance and Arctic Environmental Protection

QIU Huafei

### Outline

The Arctic countries are strengthening cooperation on the basis of existing international environmental governance mechanism, such as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). The major countries should abandon "cold war thinking" and "unilateralism". They should take priority to the agenda of the Arctic environmental protection. The Arctic environment governance should be strengthened beyond the Arctic community. The Arctic environmental issues are not only Arctic countries activities, but also other activities outside of the Arctic Circle, such as air pollution, climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion in the Arctic region and other issues.

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) is a multilateral, non-binding agreement among Arctic states aimed at Arctic environment protection. Discussions began in 1989, with the AEPS adopted in June 1991 by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the USSR, and the United States. The AEPS deals with monitoring, assessment, protection, emergency preparedness/response, and conservation of the Arctic zone. It has been called a major political accomplishment of the post-Cold War-era. The Arctic has rapidly transformed from a "frozen desert" into a theater for high-level politics. This paper focuses on the Arctic environmental governance

The Arctic countries are also aware of the source of arctic environmental problems are cross-border in nature. Only further cooperation with countries outside of the Arctic Circle, the Arctic environmental issues can be resolved. In order to protect the Arctic environment, international actors have to pay attention to the environmental rights of future generations,

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consider the Aboriginal environmental rights, and urge the Arctic policymakers to pay attention to the North in making domestic policies.

The current Arctic environment cooperation is mostly dispersed, especially for specific problem. If the Arctic Council takes action based on international agreement and reaches an integrated item and has bound Arctic environmental protection to international treaty, and considers the Aboriginal needs, it will greatly upgrade Arctic environment problem in States agenda in the priority degrees. It can also effectively address the challenge of Arctic environment issues, and this will be the future direction of Arctic environment governance.

## OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC

David J. Hayes

### Outline

#### Potential Economic Development Opportunities: Overview

- Physical changes in the Arctic are providing potential economic opportunities.
  - Dramatic loss of sea ice is opening up shipping lanes (Northwest route through Russia; Northwest Passage through Canada/U.S.).
  - Previously uneconomic oil and gas and mineral resources in the Arctic potentially are becoming more accessible and, therefore, more economically attractive.
  - Current fishing in the Arctic is subsistence-based and limited, but northward-moving fishing stocks could attract commercial fishing interest.
  - Curiosity about the Arctic could fuel eco-tourism, bringing more attention to its resources and sensitivities.
  - Science is big business in the Arctic.
- The Arctic provides a potentially solid basis for business investment due to the traditional political stability of Arctic region, the history of cooperation among Arctic nations (Arctic Council), and relatively few border or other disputes.
- Significant barriers to robust development in the Arctic, however, remain:
  - Maritime-related constraints include:
    - Harsh climate during most of the year makes much of the Arctic inaccessible and/or extremely dangerous by sea.
    - U.S./Canada have no deep water ports in the Arctic; near-total lack of marine infrastructure in

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- much of the Arctic.
- Severe erosion is impacting many Arctic coastal villages.
- Limited search and rescue capabilities in the Arctic.
- Land-based constraints include:
  - Melting permafrost is destabilizing onshore infrastructure, and warmer, shorter winters are reducing winter construction opportunities (ice roads).
  - Land-based transportation links are very limited (e.g., few roads).
  - Air transport is limited, expensive, and seasonally challenged.
  - Climate change factors are triggering severe wildfires.
  - Limited search and rescue capabilities in the Arctic.
- Human capital constraints include:
  - The Arctic has limited human capital/capacity to support large-scale economic development.
  - Many Arctic communities are either ambivalent toward, or oppose, potentially disruptive economic development.
- Indigenous populations have a deeply-rooted subsistence culture; development-related environmental impacts on marine and terrestrial ecosystems pose potentially serious threats to culture, way of life.
  - Note, however, that close consultation and coordination with affected communities can provide the basis for new investments.

### Sector-Based Considerations

- Energy development: Oil and gas
  - Offshore oil and gas drilling activity in Arctic Ocean presents serious economic and environmental risks.
    - Harsh Arctic environment poses special risks for oil and gas development
- Need on-scene capability to address accidents.
  - U.S. is promulgating Arctic-specific drilling requirements with expensive minimum requirements. (Capping stack; on-site containment ship/resources; access to relief well).
- Uncontrolled spill would be devastating both to the environment and to the investment climate.
  - Bringing oil/gas to market can present significant challenge.
- Energy development: Renewable energy
  - Remote Communities Renewable Energy Partnership holds promise for isolated Arctic communities.

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- Commercial shipping
  - Significant constraints that may slow the ramp-up of commercial shipping activities in the Arctic include: limited mapping; limited communications; weather-related risks; lack of deep water ports; limited search and rescue capability.
- Commercial fishing
  - Moratorium due to lack of science regarding Arctic Ocean fish stocks and ocean conditions; strong subsistence-based concerns by indigenous peoples; limited or no search and rescue capability.
- Mining
  - Lack of infrastructure and environmental sensitivities pose high entry costs for potential mining operations in the Arctic.

### Su Ping

#### Outline

This presentation intends to provide a framework of understanding the emerging importance of the Arctic region that both represents a huge economic asset and geostrategic position, and entails a potential prospect of climate change, ecological challenge, political conflict and military competition. Given by the alarming warning that the Arctic ice might be melting but industries and stakeholders are weighing the return on their current and future investments, especially in face of the current drop of oil prices, decreasing shipping numbers, rising tension between Russia and the US. This presentation aims to explore the uncertainties and risks which are largely neglected in the studies of Arctic affairs in general, and impact on China's Arctic policy-making in particular. The conclusion of the presentation posits that the importance of the Arctic, given by its varieties of potentials – geopolitics, energy, resource, transportation, should not be over-emphasized or even exaggerated in the overall studies of China's global interest.

### The Aftermaths of Ukrainian Crisis: U.S. – Russian Arctic Relations and its implication for China

DENG Beixi

#### Outline

In the post-Cold War era, despite a lack in Arctic security framework, Arctic states manage not to risk ruining the relatively well-functioning regional governance mechanism, the favorable investment environment and considerable potential economic returns. However, the existing mechanism could not resist interstate conflicts of global dynamics from spilling over onto the

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Arctic, as US-EU sanctions on investment and technological transfer to the Russian Arctic oil industries re-evoked the “East-West” tension in the Arctic. The containment of U.S. and its allies to China from the south and east, and to Russia from the west, compel the two states to realign and strategically approach closer. The presentation will include the following sessions:

Session I aims to offer an overview on the U.S. – Russian relations in the Arctic from historic perspectives and assumes that U.S.-Russia relations as core to Arctic geopolitics. Session II evaluates the role of “Arctic Council” as firewall to prevent U.S. – Russian relations from aggravation in the Arctic. Session III analyses the U.S. factors in the China-Russia Arctic strategic approaching, which has started, but in limited scale. Session IV looks forwards to the prospects for China – U.S. Arctic cooperation in institutionalization of trans-regional Arctic governance, Coordination of position and policies on the Arctic shipping issues and Tentative approaches in Alaska investment projects.



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## “第一届中美北极社科研讨会”观点综述

夏立平、唐尧、吉如

2015年5月16日至17日,由同济大学国际与公共事务研究院、同济大学极地与海洋国际问题研究中心、美国战略与国际研究中心(CSIS)共同主办的“第一届中美北极社科研讨会”在上海同济大学举行。研讨会由国家海洋局极地考察办公室协办。同济大学国际与公共事务研究院院长、同济大学极地与海洋国际问题研究中心主任夏立平教授主持开幕仪式,同济大学校长助理孙方霖、国家海洋局极地考察办公室书记秦为稼、美国战略与国际问题研究中心高级副总裁 Heather A. Conley 致开幕词。参加会议的有来自国家海洋局极地考察办公室、中国极地研究中心、国防大学、中国海洋大学、上海交通大学、武汉大学、上海海洋大学、复旦大学、上海国际问题研究院和同济大学的中国专家学者30余人,来自美国战略与国际问题研究中心、美国北极研究委员会、斯坦福大学、阿拉斯加大学费尔班克斯分校、美国国家雪冰数据中心等美国专家学者出席了研讨会。加拿大、挪威等国驻沪总领馆官员、同济大学的部分研究生等旁听了会议。

在会议期间,中美专家就围绕美国北极政策与美中在北极合作的可能性、北极环境变化对全球安全与中美安全的影响、北极地缘政治新变化与大国关系、北极航道开通及其对中国和美国的影响、北极治理与中美合作等专题进行了深入探讨。

会议决定将“中美北极社科研讨会”机制化。美国战略与国际问题研究中心高级副总裁 Heather A. Conley 表示,2016年美国战略与国际问题研究中心将在华盛顿与同济大学国际与公共事务研究院、同济大学极地与海洋国际问题研究中心共同主办“第二届中美北极社科研讨会”。

### 一、关于美国的北极政策与美中在北极合作的可能性

美国战略与国际问题研究中心高级副总裁 Heather A. Conley 认为,美国的北极政策主要包括三方面内容:

首先,是国家安全。大量的政府文件对于我们研究问题非常有利,它能使我们对美国有更深入的了解。美国有明确的法律和有效的行政力量来治理国家,这有利于国家安全。但我不自信的是,有时候也存在一些问题。所以我们需要采取一系列的措施来解决,通过增强国家安全来促进美国经济、商业等方面的发展。我们需要构想未来的安全画面,通过不断的努力来最终实现。

其次是科技。科学与合作也是非常重要的,我们都知道,美国是一个科技大国,国家的发展依靠的是科技力量,这是我们的资产。在过去四十年多年的时间里,美国一直主张

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科技发展,从而也促进了国家的经济发展。

再次是国际合作。国际合作在现今是非常重要的,它表现在很多方面,主要是科技领域,通过一起努力来解决问题。同时,我们可以通过科技方面的共同努力来改变环境。首先我们需要注意的是气候变

化,国家之间可以通过合作应对气候变化。例如华盛顿政府和北京政府就可以通过合作来解决现如今非常棘手的气候变化,应对紧急情况。

其中,美国在作为北极理事会主席时,有着三个目标:第一是解决气候问题,这不仅是地区性问题,还是一个重要的全球性议题,美国倡议全球国家重视气候问题,减少二氧化碳的排放量;第二是重视对北极海洋的保护,即保护北极的生态系统,包括北极鱼群生物链的保护、减缓北极海冰融化和保护生态环境等;第三是在研究和开发北极的同时,提高北极当地土著人的经济状况和生活条件,促进社会发展。

最后,我想提一些问题与建议来保护北极海洋安全。

首先,我们会遇到一些非常敏感的问题,例如现如今的北冰洋问题,我们需要提出一种新的方法来更好的解决这类问题,首先就是要促进中美之间的科技合作,通过科技合作而更好的促进问题的解决。

其次,除了科技领域,中美两国也要加强北极领域的安全合作,共同维护一个和平、和谐而稳定的北极地区环境,减少和避免冲突的发生。

最后,关于北极的未来发展,中美两国应在合作的基础上,积极的互动,使得北极能够得到良好、理性的发展。比如在北极地区的投资等问题上,保持良好而理性的行为和互动,将有助于双方的共同利益,也有益于未来北极更好的发展。

我将从三个方面进行总结。第一,我们非常需要开展中美之间的对话。比如战略与经济对话和 APEC 等。此外对气候变化议题的探讨也将使我们的联系更加紧密。我呼吁通过本次中美北极论坛,使我们的论坛机制化,从而推动中美两国政府对这一议题的关注。第二,对于科技方面的合作,各方有着极大的热情,比如数据共享,如何将中国纳入到我们在北极科技领域的合作之中,我认为有两种途径。一是北极理事会正在寻求制定新的具有法律约束力的科技协定,我们欢迎中国同事的参与,他们也很积极。在座的美国专家能够帮助大家来考虑如何更加积极地参与到北极事务之中,特别是 David 最后提到了清洁能源合作的问题,或许这是能够与中国学者进行进一步交流的话题。第三,从长期来看,对于北极地区,中国政府会做出什么样的正式声明?或许可以通过学者的研究成果做出判断。或许会制定中国的北极战略。这是我个人的看法,因为其他的北极国家也会继续发布他们的北极战略。

## 二、理解气候变化对北极的影响

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美国国家冰雪数据中心高级研究员 Julienne Stroeve 认为,自 20 世纪 70 年代末以来,多通道微波卫星传感器提供了北极海冰覆盖的空间范围的连续记录。这些数据揭示了一个总体的海冰面积减少的情况,其中最大和最广泛的海冰融化季节是在每年九月底。目前的北极海冰量变化的趋势,是从 1979 到 2014 年,每年在九月海冰减少的面积范围为 87200 平方公里,每年递减速度为 13.7%。其中 8 次最低记录则均是出现在最近的八年的九月份里。北极海冰这些大的减少,部分是由于表层的覆冰在经历了夏季变薄之后变得更容易融化。

夏季期间,开放水域面积的增加已经吸引了大量的关注和产生在北极增加经济活动的猜测。全球气候模式根据大气中 CO<sub>2</sub> 浓度的未来走势,预测北极的季节性无冰情况会出现在本世纪结束前。这样的海

冰大幅减少,会带来有严重的生态、气候、经济和社会影响,包括海洋物种的灭绝、土著人口变化、大规模的气候反常、普遍大幅度的改变经济活动以及社会民生发生转变。这种变化,显然是与世界各级政府的公共政策和决策有关。

无论是短期还是长期,我们都需要量化北极海冰的减少所可能产生的变化,以便更好地了解北极海冰的未来可能演变。在短时间尺度上,随着北极地区的社会经济活动的增加,如资源开采和船舶交通,已经使人们对开发出可靠方法来提前几个月预测到海冰条件产生了越来越大的兴趣。研究表明完美模型的可靠的预测是可以提前 2 年进行预测,但在现实中是,这些模型用来预测和观察海冰条件时,技能明显不足,大多仅提供了 2 至 5 个月的预测效果。这种预测能力的不足,可能起源于预测系统自身的局限性,如数据量化不足、不充分的物理模型、气候模型的自身漂移和质量差的初始条件不匹配,使得它的预测结果最终可能低于预期效果。另一个问题是知识的匮乏,如怎样解决内在的可预测性受到的气候平均状态的影响。鉴于北极快速变化的步伐,这些问题是特别重要并有待解决的。

长期以来,海洋冰情预测通常是基于对海冰减少数据的外推,即建模来预测未来在不同的温室气体排放导致气候变暖情景下,海冰的下降程度,一般算法是 FMP。不过,当北极真的会出现季节性无冰的具体时间,也会和重要的政治、经济 and 气候有关,不单单是温室气体排放,所以预测过程中有偏差,因此对北极海洋覆冰的未来状态预测存在着很大的不确定性。模型预测的一部分包含了对未来排放路径的不确定性,即气候系统内部复杂的耦合:海冰——海洋——大气系统。这些不确定性都限制了我们为外界进行具体的预测和提供有效政策建议的能力。

### 三、北极环境变化之下的安全挑战以及经济机遇

美国阿拉斯加费尔班克斯大学教授 Lawson Brigham 认为,从 1993 年到 2017 年这四分之一世纪,极地水域运营船舶安全规则 (polar code) 开始生效。地球的 68% 被水覆盖,

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其他则是陆地。北极是海洋区域,没有很多基础设施来应对环境的变化,所以出事故的话没办法进行援助活动,因而面临很多挑战。值得注意的是北极大部分的海洋需要大量的基础设施来保障安全,提高海上作业的效率。对于世界市场而言,那就和应对气候变化一样。

北极面临的一些挑战包括:旅游、安全、游轮行业。

北极地区的资源丰富,国际渔业资源占到10%;硬矿物:钨(40%),镍(22%),钻石(20%),铂(15%),锌(10%);估计北极碳氢化合物:未被发现的天然气(30%)和石油(13%),潜力:稀土(25%),煤与淡水。北极水资源丰富,可以为欧洲许多国家提供水源,比如将新鲜的水源送到世界各地。

美国、加拿大、芬兰等国家提供技术支持,进行分工合作,这是我所说的新北极时代。技术交换、国际投资、全球航运公司,很多的参与者,单独一个国家不能完成。尽管北极只是一个区域,可是它对全世界有重要的影响。最重要的问题是在北极有很多活动,比如贸易和旅游。人们在北极进行贸易活动,可是这些活动没有适用的共同的标准。譬如对于船只的保险没有一个较为固定的标准。2004至2009的委员会的技术工作组保护北极海洋环境下(PAME)进行了一项影响深远的研究。北极海运评估(AMSA),集中在海上安全和环境保护问题。安理会的授权环境保护与可持续发展相一致。AMSA是LED由加拿大,芬兰和美国的200多名专家的贡献,目标之一是如何保护土著人的环境。北极的自然能源比较多,可是北极海一年内9个月有冰,不能过去。如果一艘船沉没,汽油泄漏,国家很难解决这样的问题,因为基础设施不够完善。

北极理事会为应对这些新的挑战提供了一个框架和海上的北极政策。因此在投资和基础设施方面,必然需要国际合作。此外,需要制定一些标准,譬如船上的水手有多长时间的经验,船需要什么样的安全工具。我们估计这个季节性使用海洋的活动未来还是会保留的。大部分的北极活动就是一个季节内完成的。在投资方面,图表分析,科学研究这些步骤都是非常必要的,并且最好配合国家战略。北极的港口支持离岸出口资源。

在中美合作方面:作为一个非北极国家的北极理事会观察员,中国可以为它工作,可以为解决这些关键问题提供专家。中美合作在许多北极海洋基础设施的挑战领域存在潜在机会。中国也可以在IMO(国际海事组织)未来北极工作提供支持,以及积极参与北极的举措,这样的机构包括国际海道测量组织,世界气象组织,以及国际北极科学委员会。北极的气候变化与北极的海洋管理是美国主持的重点领域,正是这两个主题下,中美应进行充分的北极合作。中国可以主动参加工作小组的工作,承担更为积极的角色。中国可以在极地水域运营船舶安全规则(polar code)方面做出很大的贡献,因为中国的海运业很发达。中美可以合作的主要领域包括:基础设施、气候变化、北冰洋的管理。

#### 四、关于美国担任北极理事会主席期间的工作重点

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美国北极研究委员会主席、克里国务卿北极科学事务顾问 Fran Ulmer 认为, 北极理事会不是国际组织, 它不能提出强制性的规则或条约, 没有具体的权限。北极理事会是一个国际论坛, 在这里人们可以获得信息、提出意见、作出评价、写报告。目前权力仍集中在国家的手中, 未来可能发生变化, 但现在情况就是这样。

北极理事会重视的问题是科学, 关注的焦点有两个: 环境保护、可持续发展。从始至终都是这两个重点。

北极理事会的报告都是很有价值的文件。某国的学者如果有兴趣, 想要参加它的工作, 只有读完考察报告才能知道和谁可以进行合作。还有一些协议很重要, 比如在航空和海上的北极搜救合作协议, 对北极海洋油污污染应急合作协议, 北极科学研究国际合作的协议等。

北极理事会的建构: 部长会议是更正式的, 最重要的工作由工作小组来完成。美国出任北极理事会主席的目标是: 北极的海洋安全、改善土著人的经济和生活条件、应对气候变化的影响。

北极理事会的总体目标: 继续加强北极理事会这个政府间论坛, 引入新的长期的优先团体进入北极理事会, 提高国内和世界各地的气候变化意识。这说明在北极政策方面, 土著人和北极外的人的利益是平衡的。观察并了解北极需要国际合作。中国有能力也有兴趣参加。委员会成员国欢迎中国参加观察工作。可是中国需要主动地参加, 当然不止中国, 任何有能力的国家都应该主动迈出这一步, 因为其他的国家不会专门邀请你们参加。美国当北极理事会的主席的目标符合美国对北极的国家战略。2013年美国北极战略的目标是: 推进美国的安全利益、追求当负责任的北极地区管理者、加强国际合作。

北极理事会是否应制定一些规章制度, 这很难回答。北极理事会是一个志愿者和非正式讨论的框架。

美国 2014 年北极国家战略实施计划的指导原则: 维护和平与稳定、使用可以获得的最佳信息作出决定、追求创新的安排、咨询协调阿拉斯加土著人、培养与北极利益相关者的伙伴关系、协调整合联邦政府的活动。北极研究计划: 描述联邦机构怎么花他们自己的钱做研究。发展国家的北极政策研究、促进北极研究合作、审查联邦北极研究计划、推荐数据共享改进、促进与阿拉斯加及国际合作。如果某国想和他们合作应该参考我提到的这样的文件(网站推介)才能知道如何、和谁合作。对于决策制定者来说, 研究投资非常重要。在北极发生的变化很快, 所以各国要尽快了解北极。识别和评估潜在的资源, 确定发展的可持续性以及在本地及全球的后果, 提高发展降低风险的最佳做法, 预防灾害问题, 应对突发事件, 强调了北极居民从食品安全到气候影响、适应基础设施的需要。

最后, 我觉得美国和中国需要合作, 就像两只共舞的北极熊: 建立合作伙伴关系。中国的大学可以和美国的大学和研究所建立合作伙伴关系, 搭建这样一种“桥梁”, 一起了解北极。

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美国战略与国际问题研究中心高级副总裁 Heather A. Conley 认为,美国明确表示要在北极理事会中开展多边合作,但北极理事会的合作不该是分裂的,对安全议题的讨论将会遇到很多美国国内的压力,我们对此非常的谨慎,北极理事会目前还没有处理军事安全方面的问题。

美国北极研究委员会主席、克里国务卿北极科学事务顾问 Fran Ulmer 认为,对于北极理事会观察员国的地位和规则制定的问题,我认为北极理事会的高级官员目前正在讨论观察员国的地位问题,包括新观察员国的参与。我相信美国会澄清这一问题。

## 五、关于北极地区经济开发问题

斯坦福大学法学院客座教授、美国内政部前副部长 David J. Hayes 说,我将简要介绍北极经济开发的潜在机遇,这只是我的个人见解(特别是与我在阿拉斯加所做的工作有关)。气温上升给北极带来深刻的影响,也带来了经济机遇。夏季海冰大面积消退,当前楚科奇和波佛特海出现了无冰水面(大约在7月5日到11月1日),这在15年前是不会出现的,使得阿拉斯加近海的开发成为可能。我主要介绍美国,提别是在阿拉斯加北极地区经济开发的类型,然后探讨经济开发的限制性因素(这部分内容还没有引起足够的关注)。

很明显,通过白令海峡的航道运输有了显著的增长。西北航道也或将开通,由此带来了阿拉斯加近海油气资源的开发,在楚科奇海岸边已经出现了海洋油气的钻井开发,虽然波佛特海的油气蕴藏量不如楚科奇海,但也出现了相关的开发活动。阿拉斯加还存在渔业资源的开发问题,特别是不同种类的鱼向北方迁徙而进入北冰洋,使得白令海附近有更多的渔业资源,利益的显现也引发了未来北冰洋的商业捕鱼。

人们关注北极经济机遇的另一个原因,是北极是一个和平稳定的区域。大部分主权都得到了确立,《联合国海洋法公约》也有相关的规定,包括大陆架和专属经济区。虽然我们与加拿大在波佛特海有争端,但我们能够解决。我们在北极进行经济开发活动已具备了很多人条件。首先是科学,现阶段对北极已进行了巨大的科学投入(除了资金投入,还有科学家和社会的关注)。下面是北极经济开发的限制性因素,

一些外行人(不是来自北极的人)理所当然的谈论北极海运,包括假想那里有可利用的港口,但当你去阿拉斯加北部的时候,你会感到惊讶,因为那里根本没有港口。阿拉斯加北部水域的水非常浅。所以现实是,那里没有港口,将物品与服务从近海船舶转移到岸边的能力也极其有限。阿拉斯加北部的海蚀是另一个挑战。许多阿拉斯加的村庄是没有被开发的土地,它们或将消失或者完全转移到另外一个地方。另外,受海蚀的影响,有许多居民或将要搬到其他地方。人力资本方面也存在限制。

接下来是对一些与经济开发相关的具体问题的考虑。首先是油气,阿拉斯加已经开始了油气资源的供给。近海开发的限制性因素包括安全和在冰原水域开发的后勤问题。在冰

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区进行开发面临很多挑战,而在无冰的地方进行钻井也非常困难。美国支持近海油气资源的开发,但也正在制定非常严格的环境标准。如果在阿拉斯加北部的油气资源开发发生事故,那里没有相应的基础设施建设,壳牌公司需要做各方面的准备。一个更重要的问题是,即使壳牌集团投入巨额资金,问题是如何将这些油气资源运向市场。在不久的将来,或将会有来自阿拉斯加丰富的天然气能够出口给中国以及其他国家,现在的计划是修建管道将天然气运输到安克雷奇地区,这在近期可能会实现,也将使中美两国实现双赢。

美国北极研究委员会主席、克里国务卿北极科学事务顾问 Fran Ulmer 认为,美国支持在北极地区的国际投资,我不认为有必要为此担心。俄罗斯的科技实力无法满足在北冰洋近海开采资源,俄罗斯的天然气出口主要去欧洲。但如果中国与俄罗斯开展更多的合作,那么俄罗斯的出口或许会转向亚洲。我认为这将是一种很好的合作关系。同时,我不认为美国会通过再平衡战略做些什么,在跨太平洋区域贸易伙伴之间能够开展自由的贸易。

美国并没有限制中国在阿拉斯加的投资,挪威国家石油公司在楚科奇海和波弗特海已开展了至少一个项目的合作,因此阿拉斯加支持商业合作。中国与挪威发展良好的合作关系,其实美国也与挪威有着很好的关系,在近海灾难发生之后,美国第一时间通知的是挪威。美国与挪威举行双边的会议,以及与其他北极国家开展多边会议,来进行北极的油气开发。我们有着相同的意见,即共同应对潜在的油气资源开发带来的灾难。挪威没有防冰的问题,因为巴伦支海是未被冰覆盖的水域,但我相信挪威会像美国一样,制定非常高的环境要求。

我们之前谈到了中美之间潜在的油气资源合作,特别是油气管道的问题。有一点我想再强调一下,如果看一下美国在北极理事会制定的议程,一个有趣的事情是美国希望为北极原住民提供帮助,包括给那些小的村庄提供新资源。当前在阿拉斯加的一些偏远地区已开展了能源资源的投资项目,每一个项目都是为这些小村庄量身定做的,将能源运送到这些偏远的村庄费用很高,周期很长。与这些地区开展能源合作的想法是建立共同的标准。美国会关注油气管道建设的问题,帮助北极原住民发展将是很有趣且有意义的事情,同时,与中国之间的合作也将不断发展。

阿拉斯加土著居民对美国来讲非常重要,我的部门就有特别的法律来规制当地居民做出相关决定。当前有两种不同的利益,部分土著居民非常支持油气资源的开发,因为这将使他们的生活水平得到提高。然而很多人对此表示担忧,打猎或者其他经济开发活动将给当地人带来不利的影响。这是一个复杂的问题。

那么中国如何开展在阿拉斯加的油气资源合作?我认为有很多有利的条件,首先我们是市场经济,我们的投资是由私人企业来进行,经济开发来自私人企业而不是国有企业。中国企业参与到美国油气资源的开发不会是经济泡沫,阿拉斯加建立了完善的法律和税收

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法规,阿拉斯加财政百分之九十五来自油气资源税收,这就是阿拉斯加希望继续进行油气资源开发的原因之一。

关于阿拉斯加油气管道的问题,或许是一个经济上的挑战。中国是阿拉斯加油气资源开发的一个很好的潜在客户。

美国有一个很好的法律规制来应对像墨西哥湾事故造成的海洋污染。我以前的同事针对北极油气资源开发制定了特别的要求,因为我们需要确保有一个较高的标准,我们也希望所有北极国家能够制定最基本、最低限度的法律来规制北极可能出现的环境灾难。

美国阿拉斯加费尔班克斯大学教授 Lawson Brigham 提出,美国认为北方海航道是用于国际航行的海峡,而不是俄罗斯内水。他为中国可以很好的利用北方海航道。

美国北极研究委员会主席、克里国务卿北极科学事务顾问 Fran Ulmer 认为,关于输气管道,毫无疑问,油气资源存在于阿拉斯加的联邦土地和国有土地,阿拉斯加正在考虑建设输气管道,但至少需要 30 年。同时,还有很多限制性因素,比如投资的不足、基础设施的欠缺、国内国际油气价格的变动。以前是建设油气管道将资源输向美国,而现在则是从美国通过航运向其他国家输送,如中国或者潜在的其他国家。油气资源的开发的确带来了经济机遇。

## 六、关于北极变动中的地缘政治环境

美国战略与国际问题研究中心高级副总裁 Heather A. Conley 认为,由于乌克兰危机的影响,北极在地缘政治上的重要性上升。北极一直在地缘政治上扮演重要的角色。二战时期,西方联盟支持前苏联,美国防御来自日本的攻击。二战后又迎来了冷战,北极成为了进行防御的场所。美国在北极建立防御系统(在冰上和冰下)来应对与俄罗斯之间的紧张关系。1987 年戈尔巴乔夫的和平演讲开启了北极合作的时代,随后芬兰和加拿大开始关注环境问题,进而成立了北极理事会。

现在的问题是我们进入了一个新的阶段吗?近来俄罗斯与乌克兰之间的关系紧张,自从 2014 年 3 月以来,7 个北极理事会的成员对俄罗斯进行了制裁(在欧盟的制裁之前)。所有北极理事会成员停止了军事间的合作,这是北极合作进程中的一个新问题,制裁制度是我们面临的一个挑战。我们通过加拿大担任北极理事会主席来解决这个挑战,加拿大终止了一个原本在莫斯科进行的会议,俄外长拉夫罗夫也没有参加北极理事会的会议。建立北极海岸警卫队论坛并使其成为一个正式机制遇到了挑战,而俄罗斯官员反对建立北极海岸警卫队论坛。美国暂停了与俄罗斯在军事领域的合作。那么这对美国作为北极理事会主席意味着什么?这是另一个话题。有一点可以明确,就是美国希望开展多边合作,包括与俄罗斯在北极和北极理事会的合作。

问题是在接下来的两年中中国应该如何做?北极的安全环境发生了根本的改变,特别是

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俄罗斯不断加强在北极的军事存在,而我们需要稳定的北极,我们不能理解俄罗斯采取如此进取性行为的原因,现在也没有讨论北极安全问题的论坛,北极理事会避开对安全议题的讨论。那么我们可以在哪里开展军事安全方面的交流与沟通?我们需要建立一种正式机制来避免北极灾难性事件的发生。面对环北极的地缘政治挑战,各方都有责任将政策透明。但当我回顾过去12至16个月的情形时,我发现情况并不乐观,所以我认为这是一个机会,通过论坛来探讨建立一些规则来规制未来在北极的军事行动。

下面讨论地缘政治上的另一个驱动因素,即北极理事会新观察员国家的问题,我将其称为“北极的亚洲维度”。我们不了解中国政府在北极关注些什么,没有白皮书、没有战略,我们只能通过学者的看法和研究来理解越来越开放的中国为什么在北极领域建立很多的研究中心以及很多企业也参与到北极的开发活动之中,对这些行为的意图我们并不能做出很好的判断。因而需要中国的公开声明以及更加透明的说明中国在北极有哪些关注点。那么如何使各参与方开展合作,当前我们有很多讨论,比如在华盛顿的会议就很关注中国和俄罗斯在北极的合作。北极的公海区域的环境也面临诸多挑战,这需要开展更多对安全议题上的讨论,北极海岸警卫队论坛或者新的手册(这些目前都还没有)可以发挥作用。我担心的是俄罗斯会以采取军事行动的方式引发地区争端,这需要通过国际合作来应对。俄罗斯在北极活跃的军事行动还会影响到其对能源和航运开发利用的机遇。

我认为最好的假设是冲突能够被冻结,欧洲不再对俄罗斯进行制裁,如果继续制裁会孤立美国。毫无疑问,克里米亚冲突引发了军备竞赛,带来了挑战。我的判断是乌克兰局势会逐渐稳定。但将会产生非常严峻的经济形势,俄罗斯经济发展会变得更加困难。前苏联进行经济改革导致了苏联的解体,虽然俄罗斯不会重蹈覆辙,但仍面临非常严峻的经济环境。美国现在试图解决这个挑战,也不希望乌克兰危机对其他地区产生不利的影

响。北大西洋公约组织当前在北极没有正式的角色。由于俄罗斯在克里米亚和乌克兰问题上的做法,欧洲的安全环境发生了很大的改变。

美国军方在北极问题上有不同的声音,建立一个北极海岸警卫论坛是一个很好的办法,各方需要对北极地区的安全问题进行沟通,需要尽快找到一个开展沟通与交流的途径,问题是北极理事会现在不涉及军事安全,那么当前如何开展协商与沟通,需要寻求适当途径。

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## “中美北极社会科学论坛”媒体报道

中美专家商北极治理与合作

解放日报 2015年5月17日报道

本报讯 首届中美北极社会科学研讨会昨日在同济大学开幕。来自中美两国的专家学者将围绕中美北极政策的合作机遇、气候变化对北极的影响、航运与北冰洋管理、提升北极环境与科学的国际合作、北极经济开发的机遇与挑战、北极地缘政治环境的变化六个分论题进行交流和探讨。本次研讨会获得国家海洋局极地考察办公室的支持，由同济大学极地与海洋国际问题研究中心、国际与公共事务研究院与美国国际战略研究中心联合主办。



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## 第一届中美北极社会科学研讨会在沪举行

## 中美在北极有较大合作空间

文汇报 2015年5月18日报道

本报讯(见习记者 陆纾文)为期两天的第一届中美北极社会科学研讨会17日在同济大学中法中心落下帷幕。

本届研讨会的主题是“北极地区:利益、挑战和中美合作的可能性”。来自中美两国的极地问题专家就气候变化对北极地区的影响、北极渔业科研所面临的挑战、中美在北极地区的合作空间与障碍,以及乌克兰危机后美俄在北极地区的关系变化等议题进行了广泛的探讨。

同济大学极地与海洋研究中心主任夏立平在接受记者采访时表示,北极地区自然资源极为丰富,据最新科学评估,该地区的油气资源储量达到世界总量的四分之一,金属和渔业资源也相当丰富。此外,北极航道的开通对中国意义重大,将使我国到欧洲的航行距离缩短三分之一,不仅节省运输成本,还可以避免传统航线中可能面临的海盗威胁。夏立平指出,由于气候变暖,北极冰在融化,由此带来的恶劣天气、海平面上升等环境变化会对全球政治和经济均产生重大影响。因此,人类不应盲目地攫取北极资源,而要在保护环境的基础上,以科学的态度逐步开发。



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## 【极地政治】

China's Developing Arctic Policies: Myths and Misconceptions<sup>1</sup>Su Ping<sup>2</sup> and Marc Lanteigne<sup>3</sup>

**Abstract:** The Arctic and Far North regions of the world have grown in importance for China's international interests in recent years, and in 2013 China became an observer state in the Arctic Council. Beijing has sought to develop an Arctic policy based on scientific research and partnerships, including in the areas of environmental studies and climate change issues, as well as development and economic issues. As the Arctic gains more international attention due to the effects of ice melting and the possibility of the region becoming a new source of resources, concerns have been raised about a scramble for riches and economic advantages. China, as a rising political and economic power, has been subject to much scrutiny, especially from the West, about its emerging agenda in the Arctic region. Although China is not an Arctic state, the concerns are based on predictions that Beijing is seeking to play a stronger and perhaps even dominant role in the Arctic, and this has led to many misconceptions about China's Arctic policy. The result has been a 'clash of identities' between Chinese and Western perceptions, and in order to understand why these diverging views have appeared, it is necessary to first examine the origins of 'myths' about China's regional Arctic policies, and then examine their roles, using constructivist theory, before suggesting ways for both China and the international community to address this divergence.

**Keywords:** China, Arctic, identity politics, constructivism

## Introduction

Despite many decades of interest in the Arctic, only recently has Beijing sought to further enhance its Arctic policy. This is a result of polar ice melting, potential economic opportunities arising in the areas of raw material and energy development and increased use of Arctic maritime sea routes. Following years of negotiations, Beijing was also granted observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013 along with other Asian states, including India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea.<sup>1</sup>

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Compared to other non-Arctic states in Asia and elsewhere, Beijing has received much more international scrutiny, and occasional criticism, for its Arctic interests. The explanation may be a clash of identities, as described in the theory of constructivism, between China and Arctic governments, including the United States, concerning Beijing's longer-term interests and strategies. This has resulted in misunderstandings over several key aspects of China's emerging Arctic interests, as well as the sudden appearance of 'myths' surrounding Chinese diplomacy in the Far North. These misconceptions include issues surrounding China's diplomatic relationship with Iceland, its potential roles in developing energy and mining projects in the Arctic, including Greenland and its potential identities and policies as a new observer in the Arctic Council.

There is also the question of whether China views the Arctic as a strategic as well as an economic and diplomatic issue, especially in light of its evolving naval power projection capabilities, and its recent status (since about 2014) as the world's largest economy, specifically in terms of purchasing power parity (Fray, 2014; Wright, 2014). Also, there is the larger issue of how China has sought to build an Arctic identity while at the same time having to address the concerns of other states, including in the West, about what comprises Beijing's longer-term Arctic strategy. Greater communication between China and other Arctic and non-Arctic states, the writing of a Chinese government white paper on Arctic affairs, and the use of both governmental and non-government channels, are all potential avenues for China to further clarify its Arctic 'identity'.

## Myths and Misconceptions

### 1. *China's 'Super-Embassy' in Iceland*

Over the past five years, Beijing has increased its diplomatic ties with several Arctic states, recognizing the growing importance of developing links with Far North governments as one element of a greater Arctic strategy. For a variety of reasons, one of the most visible examples of this process has been the Sino-Icelandic relationship. In 2005, Beijing and Reykjavík signed a memorandum of understanding as a precursor to initiating talks on creating a free trade deal, the first such negotiations Beijing undertook with a European government. Since Iceland remains outside of the European Union, the negotiations provided Beijing the opportunity to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with a European state while both avoiding EU bureaucracy and addressing considerable differences within the Union over how to approach liberalized trade with China. Iceland agreed to designate China as having achieved market economy status, which was an early

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prerequisite stipulated by Beijing to permit negotiations to begin. The EU declined to do the same, arguing that Beijing had not reached the level of economic reform necessary for market economy status to be granted (Lanteigne 2010). As a result, China sought to develop European FTAs with non-EU European economies.

The FTA talks began in 2006, and despite a pause in the talks between 2009 and 2013 due to the Icelandic banking crisis and collapse of the Icelandic currency, as well as questions over whether Iceland would join the European Union (thus nullifying any bilateral FTAs signed) both sides expressed hopes that an agreement could be concluded. Also, in 2010 Beijing took the added step of agreeing to a currency swap with Reykjavík with a value of 3.5 billion yuan (US\$570 million), an agreement renewed in 2013 (Du and Chen, 2013). The Sino-Icelandic free trade agreement was completed in April 2013 and both sides expressed enthusiasm for the further improvement of diplomatic and economic relations.

During the final stages of the FTA negotiations, plans were initiated to open a new Chinese embassy in Reykjavík to permit Beijing to better represent its interests in Iceland. However, the large size of the new Embassy began to fuel speculation as to the number of personnel its offices would house. Reports in the Icelandic and Western press began to circulate that the number of potential Embassy staff ranged from hundreds to as many as five hundred, far more than other embassies within a country of only 303,000 people (Tatlow, 2012; Trotman, 2013; Eyjan.is, 2012; Ford, 2013; Stein, 2015). However, the reality of the situation was much more mundane. From the website of the *Diplomatic and Consular List of Department of Protocol of Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland* in June 2014, the latest version released (Iceland Protocol Department of Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2014), eight staff members were listed, but four of the personnel were based at the Economic and Commercial Office of the PRC, which is located in a different part of Reykjavík, and the Embassy offices themselves have only four full-time staff listed.

Information from the Protocol Department regarding the staff of the Chinese embassy in Iceland is authoritative, as one of the main responsibilities of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland is to issue identity cards and to publish the names of diplomats and honorary consuls in Iceland on the Ministry website (*Ibid.*). A new Ambassador, Mr. Zhang Weidong, arrived in Iceland on 25 September 2014 and met with acting Permanent Secretary of State and Chief of Protocol of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Mr. Jón Egill Egilsson, and presented his credentials one day later (Chinese Embassy of Iceland, 2014). Therefore, including the new ambassador, a total of five full-time staff maintains offices in this now well-known building.

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Speculation about the supposed “super-embassy” China was allegedly seeking to open took place at a time of much debate about a controversial potential land purchase in Iceland by a Chinese entrepreneur, a deal which critics argued might have strategic implications for Iceland and the entire Arctic region. In 2011, Mr Huang Nubo, head of Beijing Zhongkun Investment Group (*Beijing Zhongkuntouzijituan* 北京中坤投资集团), sought to purchase approximately 30,000 hectares of land at Gr ínssta ðir in north-eastern Iceland in order to develop tourist facilities worth an estimated US\$200 million. The bid was declined by the Icelandic government, amid much public concern, due to laws restricting land purchases by actors outside of the European Economic Area (EEA). The main concern was that the property in question could be used for potential military applications, an assertion flatly denied by Huang. However, the bid was reconstructed in 2012 as an application to lease a smaller amount of land for the same purposes (*BBC News*, 30 August 2011; Higgins, 2013). By the end of 2014, with the final decision on the proposed lease languishing in bureaucratic limbo, Huang began to look for investment prospects elsewhere in the Arctic region, including potentially in northern Norway and even in the islands of Svalbard (*AFP*, 17 August 2013; *Bloomberg*, 12 February 2014; Elliott 2014).

## 2. China's Relations with Greenland

Although discussions about the Arctic's economic value have frequently included the region's potential supplies of oil and gas, there was also much attention placed on other raw materials which could become accessible as a result of the retreating ice. Both Canada and Russia were viewed as potential beneficiaries of expanded mining of metals and minerals, with international attention also focused on Greenland. Local ice erosion from Greenland's coastal areas, despite presenting serious environmental consequences, has opened up greater possibilities for the mining of copper, diamonds, gold, iron, platinum, rubies, titanium and zinc, along with many other metals and minerals. The potential for a future mining boom in Greenland, however, has been a divisive issue politically.

Adding to the complexity of the mining debate is that at some sites, including Kvanefjeld in southwest Greenland, there are deposits of “rare earth elements” (REEs) which, due to their distinctive composition, are essential for development of high technology products including “green technologies” designed for more efficient energy usage. Elements found in Greenland include cerium, lanthanum, neodymium and yttrium. China is very much a player in the global market for REEs, since over ninety percent of REEs extracted worldwide are mined there (Du 2013), and this near-monopoly began to raise security concerns in the West due to the

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increasing value of these “elements” in developing and manufacturing advanced technologies. As a result, debate began, especially in Europe, about Greenland potentially becoming an alternative source to China for REEs once mining operations could be developed. While the political debates continued in Greenland, Chinese interests appeared to be preparing to propose joint mining ventures. In March 2014, the possibility for REE mining in Greenland involving China grew with a memorandum of understanding signed between Perth, Australia-based Greenland Minerals and Energy and Beijing-based China Non-Ferrous Metal Industry’s Foreign Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. (*Zhongguoyousejinshujianshegufenyouxiangongsi* 中国有色金属建设股份有限公司) to potentially extract REEs from Kvanefjeld (*Arctic Journal*, 24 March 2014). However, the start of the project remains unclear due to political uncertainty and the high start-up costs inherent in any mining operations.

China is only one of many countries, including Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, expressing interest in joint ventures in Greenland to develop the island’s mining capabilities. Beijing’s potential involvement in Greenland mining has received by far the majority of attention from Denmark, the European Union, and the international community as a whole due to awareness of China’s ongoing economic rise and resource diplomacy. China, with its overall economic power, has been considered one of the few countries in a position to provide all of these prerequisites. In 2009, two Chinese firms based in the Jiangxi province were engaged in prospecting in Greenland, including surveys for copper and gold and were the first Chinese mining interests to conduct such operations within the Arctic Circle (Pu, 2011; Pu, 2012).

Neither of these projects, however, received the same amount of international scrutiny as the potential iron mine at Isua, about 150km northeast of the capital, Nuuk. Despite no mining taking place, this project has been a prime example of China’s economic interests in the Arctic being subjected to misinterpretation and occasional alarmism. The iron ore deposit in question, measuring over one billion tonnes, of unusually high quality, about seventy percent “pure”, was discovered in the mid-1960s but was considered too costly to develop. The rights to the site, valued at approximately US\$2.35 billion, were frequently resold until the United Kingdom-based firm London Mining acquired the exploitation rights in 2005 and sought to take advantage of improved conditions due to ice erosion (*BBC News*, 24 October 2013).

What caused much controversy, however, was that in addition to the initial development costs, reports suggested London Mining would by necessity partner with a Chinese firm to provide extra material costs and labour, with one potential firm being the Sichuan Xinye Mining Investment Corporation (*Sichuan Xinyekuanyetouziyouxiangongsi* 四川鑫业矿业投资有限公

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司)(Hickey, 2013; Areddy, 2013). The mining rights for Isua were granted to London Mining by the Greenlandic government in October 2013, allowing for a thirty-year license, but the question of potential partner firms and the role of outside labor remained open for months afterwards. During 2012, media reports began to surface stating that the development of the Isua mine infrastructure would require an influx of between two and three thousand Chinese labourers, given the lack of qualified local workers in Greenland.

This led to questions and debates about immigration, minimum wage policies, the alteration of union regulations and the role of Denmark, if any, in a given potential agreement (*Arctic Journal*, 21 October 2013; Breum and Chimnitz, 2013). Some reports even went as far as to claim (in error) that “hundreds” of Chinese workers had already arrived in Greenland (Spillman, 2012). The debate began to be so visible internationally that in March 2013, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, HuaChunying, took the highly unusual step of formally addressing the controversy. Hua stated that many other foreign interests had also applied for fossil fuel exploration and mining permits in Greenland, and that no Chinese workers had yet been based there. She also criticised the “groundless hype about China ‘marching toward Greenland’,” and seeking to push other investors out of the region (Zhang 2013). What likely caused these assertions to spread, however, was the issue of China requiring an increasing number of raw materials in order to maintain its economic growth, and the requirement for imports has been a distinguishing factor in Beijing’s diplomacy in other resource-rich areas such as Africa and the Middle East.

Furthermore, there was the problem of poor timing, as under the Hammond government there was much debate about Greenland independence, raising concerns that the island was seeking non-European partners, including China, to better leverage itself away from Danish rule. In a March 2013 article in the *International Herald Tribune*, the then-international edition of the *New York Times*, Iceland’s former Ambassador to the United States, EinarBenediktsson, and former U.S. Undersecretary of State, Thomas Pickering, painted a picture of China “reaching out for a position in the Arctic” by using Greenland as a stepping stone to a stronger economic role in Iceland as well. The article then called for appropriate countermeasures to be taken by the American government, suggesting a soft balance of power contest was already underway in that part of the Arctic (Benediktsson and Pickering, 2013). As one Western Arctic specialist commented about the entire China-Greenland question, “Political developments in the region are shaped not necessarily on facts and figures but on looser perceptions of what might happen- and perceptions are very volatile since so many factors in the Arctic change so rapidly” (Breum, 2013).

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By 2014, much figurative cold water had been poured on both China's purported investment ambitions in Greenland, and on the entire concept of a mining bonanza there. London Mining's fortunes began to decline that year due to falling global iron prices caused by a market glut, decreasing demands from China, and the effects of a mass outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa on the firm's operations in Sierra Leone (Wilson, 2014; Martin, 2014). The company was in receivership by the end of the year and looking for a buyer, with no sign as to when or if any operations would begin at Isua.

In January 2015, the rights to the Isua site were sold again, this time to Hong Kong-based General Nice Group (*Jun An Jituan* 俊安集团), a deal which may lead to another round of speculation over Chinese interests there (Hornby *et al.* 2015). This agreement was the first time an Arctic development project came under exclusive ownership of a Chinese firm. However, there remains the problem of a lack of infrastructure and labour at the Isua site, as well as ongoing depressed iron prices, due largely to decreased demand as a result of a construction slowdown in China itself (Els 2015). These issues call into question the mine's viability, at least in the short term. Meanwhile, other mining ventures in Greenland have demonstrated greater progress including plans by True North Gems (Canada) to mine rubies and pink sapphires at Aappaluttoq on the west coast and south of Nuuk, and by Ironbark (Australia) to commence zinc mining operations at Citronen Fjord in the Greenlandic far north. These ventures have received far less notice in the international media.

### 3. The Arctic in China's Maritime Strategy

Shortly after the government of Hu Jintao took office in 2002-3, announcements were made concerning the modernization and expansion of China's naval power, in recognition of the country's growing overseas interests. For more than a decade, China has been developing stronger sea power with a greater "blue water" capability of operating further away from the country's shorelines. However, by 2009 the development of China's naval interests began to clash with some of Beijing's immediate neighbours, especially Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam over differing maritime boundaries in the East and South China Sea as well as islands in these regions claimed by China and other parties. Incidents involving Chinese and Philippine vessels in the disputed area of the Scarborough Shoal, also known as *Huangyan Dao* (黄岩岛), in the South China Sea during 2012 and the establishment of a Chinese oil rig in waters contested by Vietnam in the same waterway in mid-2014, led to increased international concerns about the expansion of Chinese naval interests possibly resulting in a deteriorating security situation in Southeast Asia

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(Perlez, 2014). Furthermore, a cooling of diplomatic relations between China and Japan after 2010 was partially caused by the revival of a dispute concerning the maritime demarcation line in the East China Sea and sovereignty over islands in the area referred to as the *Diaoyudao* (钓鱼岛) in China and the Senkakus in Japan (Hirano, 2014).

These issues contributed to speculation that China, recognizing the Arctic as being of growing importance for its security and economic interests, is also seeking to develop a strategic and perhaps even a military presence in the Far North as a response to the region's growing potential value to the Chinese economy. The misconception, which has developed out of China's maritime security policies, is that China does not recognize the rights of the Arctic states and that Beijing considers the Arctic to be a strictly international space. The disputes in the East and South China Seas have been explained in the Western media as a product of China trying to circumvent (or even violate) international law including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and there is a perception that Beijing is conducting the same sorts of policies in the Arctic (Wright, 2011). One piece suggests that despite the emphasis which China has placed on developing scientific capabilities and partnerships in the Arctic, "Beijing is eager to camouflage its true interests in the region with environmental monitoring," (Guschin, 2014). Another article suggests that Beijing was preparing to engage in "lawfare", meaning the selective interpretation of international law in order to achieve a unilateral strategic goal, in the Arctic in order to compensate for its overall weaker position in the region in relation to that of the Arctic states themselves (Rainwater, 2013).

These views, however, require much closer scrutiny. First, in the case of the East and South China Sea disputes, the problem is not that China is refusing to accept UNCLOS, but rather concerns over differing interpretations of UNCLOS between China and other claimants. Second, the East and South China Seas have been named by agencies in Beijing as constituting China's "core interests". Also, the issue of nationalism, which has affected the ability to address the disputes in both waterways, is not present in the Arctic neither from a Chinese viewpoint nor from the Arctic states themselves. In 2012, a comment from Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy caused diplomatic aftershocks when he reportedly described the Arctic as belonging "to all the peoples around the world", and not to any specific country. The full quote, however, was "According to UNCLOS, the North Pole and its surrounding areas do not belong to any single country, and the common riches in the area belong to all the people in the world," (*China News Network*, 5 March 2010; Chang 2010; Kai 2014). Thus, this was a comment not about the whole of the Arctic Ocean but rather the central part of the region outside of the

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exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the Arctic states.

The perception of the Arctic as a “global commons” was also voiced in 2009 by Hu Zhengyue, then-Assistant Foreign Affairs Minister, who noted that the Arctic region “occupies a unique position for all of us as humankind” (Kopra, 2013, 3). Both quotes were subsequently taken out of context, and since that time Beijing has attempted to place greater emphasis on developing regional scientific interests with the Chinese government remaining sensitive to suggestions that its far north interests are primarily resource-driven (*China Daily*, 1 February 2012). For example, at the first meeting of the China-Nordic Arctic Research Council (CNARC) in Shanghai in June 2013, Yang Huigen, head of the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC), noted that on the subject of Arctic resources, “we insist that those resources are not ours, and China’s partnership with Arctic countries in the sector will come naturally as it is part of the widening economic cooperation among countries under the context of globalization.”(Wang, 2013).

Still another study suggested that Beijing “elbowed” its way into the Arctic Council (all observers, including China, require unanimous support from the eight members of the Council) and points to China’s lone icebreaker, the *Snow Dragon* (*Xuelong* 雪龙) as potential evidence of China’s unilateral strategic aims in the Arctic (Kraska, 2011). However, while the *Xuelong*, purchased from Ukraine in 1993, has been active in the Far North for scientific studies, and a second, more modern icebreaker is to be deployed by China possibly in late 2015, it is important to note the number of icebreakers overseen by the Arctic states themselves, include more than forty such vessels (diesel and nuclear) operating in Russia, seven in Finland and five by the United States. Among non-Arctic states, Argentina, Australia, Estonia and South Africa maintain icebreakers as well as Japan and South Korea (USGC 2014).

Any discussion of unilateral military action by China in the Arctic also collides with the region’s geographic realities. For example, one paper suggested that Beijing was preparing to deploy military vessels and submarines to the region under the guise of exercises, and would be actively seeking polar bases (Robinson, 2013). These views are problematic for a few reasons. First, China is dependent upon the Arctic states for any economic use of the region. For example, for China or any other nation to use the Northern Sea Route, the permission of Russia and the escort of a Russian icebreaker is required.

Second, despite talk of China wanting to avoid the use of the Malacca Straits in Southeast Asia because of its potential as a choke point for Chinese shipping, the Bering Strait separating Siberia and Alaska is also very constricted, with a distance of 82 kilometers at its narrowest, so for

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China to be assertive in that part of the Arctic would not benefit Beijing. In addition, any Chinese ships using the NSR would have to pass by Siberia's Kuril Islands and the Kamchatka Peninsula, which also belong to Russia and are heavily patrolled by the Russian Navy. China's People's Liberation Army (Navy) has had limited experience with out of area operations, despite missions which included participation in the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the assisting of the PLA(N) frigate *Xuzhou* (徐州) in the withdrawal of Chinese workers off the coast of Libya in February 2011 due to that country's civil war (Lanteigne 2013). Third, Russia announced it would reopen military bases in the Arctic (RT, 21 October 2014), and although relations between China and Russia remain cordial, it is highly unlikely that Moscow is prepared to cede any of its Arctic sovereignty to another party, especially in light of increased international pressure on the Putin government in the wake of the 2014 Ukraine conflict. The current Sino-Russian partnership remains mainly economic, and Russia has been very concerned about international actors dominating the Arctic region. For example, Russia was originally very sceptical about allowing China into the Arctic Council as an observer.

Finally, even if China were to ignore the above restrictions and directly pursue unilateral military actions in the Arctic, the result would be a diplomatic cost to China far greater than any security benefit China would gain. According to interviews with Chinese, Russian and Norwegian scholars, China does not yet have an Arctic maritime strategy. Were China to send their ships to the Arctic, all Arctic states would become very concerned as China is constantly under scrutiny for its military strategy. In short, China's challenge in the Arctic is that since the country's power has risen so quickly, Beijing's foreign policy, including potential expansion of Arctic interests, is closely and constantly being observed, especially by the West.

#### 4. Is the Arctic a Priority of China?

With the growing international visibility of China in the Arctic region, there is also the temptation to draw a conclusion that the Far North has become a Chinese priority in its overall foreign policy, especially as China expands its international interests under the government of Xi Jinping, who unlike his immediate predecessors has been more open and direct about China as a great power and developing a foreign policy to match its strength. He has even spoken widely about the concept of a "Chinese Dream" (*Zhongguomeng* 中国梦) which further suggested that the country was becoming more comfortable with great power status.

Thus, Beijing has been very active in regional affairs beyond the Asia-Pacific, including in Africa, Latin America and South Asia. The Russian Far East and other regions of the former

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Soviet Union are factoring into Beijing's plans to link East Asia and Europe, including a "one belt and one road" (*yidaiyilu* 一带一路) strategy of developing new land and sea links with vital Western European markets. Central to these new links is the "Silk Road Economic Belt" (*silujingjidi* 丝路经济带), via Central Asia and the Caucasus, with links to Russia and Northern Europe (Xi, 2014; Tang, 2013). These overland routes, similar to the trade routes between Imperial China and Europe first established during the Han Dynasty more than two millennia ago, would be accompanied by a "Maritime Silk Road" (*haishangsilu* 海上丝路) (*Xinhua*, 16 April 2014; *Xinhua*, 16 September 2014). It is therefore tempting to suggest that China's Arctic policy, especially increased use of the NSR, would also factor into expanded Chinese trade policy and that the Arctic would rise in importance to China's overall strategic interests as a result (Humpert, 2013). In August-September 2013, Beijing celebrated the transit of the Chinese cargo vessel *Yongsheng* (永盛) owned by China Cosco Shipping Group, between the ports of Dalian and Rotterdam in thirty-three days via the Arctic route, saving approximately two weeks of transit time (MacDonald-Gibson, 2013). Yet, the idea of an "Ice Silk Road" (*bing silu* 冰丝路), and a promotion of the Arctic in China's economic security thinking, both require sober reconsideration.

The reality is that China's foreign priorities have become very diverse, and there are several foreign policy objectives which are of greater importance than the Arctic. These include China's political stability, sovereign security, territorial integrity, national unification and China's sustainable economic and social development (Dai 2010). Furthermore, China spends approximately US\$15 million on annual expeditions to the Antarctic and Arctic, in addition to National Social Science funding. The cost of base maintenance and running the Polar Research Institute of China and the China Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAAA) brings Beijing's annual spending on polar affairs to approximately US\$60 million. About twenty percent of its polar operations is allotted to the Arctic (the rest goes to the Antarctic, where China has four research bases and expects to open a fifth by 2017). The Arctic budget receives very little funding compared to China's budgeting elsewhere (Brady, 2012). As one study notes, the Arctic is not presently a priority of China's foreign policy officials and China's Arctic policies are still very much a work in progress as well (Jakobsen and Lee, 2013).

Another useful method of gauging the importance of the Arctic in China's expanded foreign policy would be to look at the role of international relations research in China. A cursory examination of the statistics of the China National Social Science Fund (*guojiashhekejijin* 国家社科基金), which is the most important funding agency on Social Sciences, suggests that the Chinese government funded between four and five thousand projects per year since 2011 ("National Social

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Science Funding of China” 2015). The types of projects that have been funded by this agency are strong indicators of Beijing’s priorities in area studies. However, only a very small number of grants, between zero and five, have been given to Arctic projects thus

Year	Social science projects funded by NSSFC	Arctic projects funded by NSSFC
2014	4633	5
2013	5126	5
2012	4828	3
2011	4258	0
2010	3387	0
2009	2388	0
2008	2152	2

(the National Social Science Funding of China, 12 January 2015)

While the number of Arctic-related projects is likely to rise as more institutes and academics in China look towards the Arctic region as a source of research, it is sometimes lost in the discussion that China is still very much a newcomer to the region as well as in Arctic affairs as a whole. While China’s scientific background in the Arctic has a long history, other areas, including sociology, economics and regional foreign policy, are still very much in development, both on a governmental and sub-governmental level in China.

### Dueling Identities in the Arctic

Constructivism and identity theories are highly useful in exploring the reasons for the many myths and misconceptions about China’s Arctic policy in relation to other non-Arctic states which have developed similar interests (scientific, economic and political) in the Arctic. While more traditional theories of international relations, realism and liberalism, concentrate on capabilities and preferences, respectively, constructivism is based on identity development from different sources (Moravcsik, 1997; Wendt, 1992). The identity of a given actor, such as a state, is constantly being created and changed not only by the actor itself (i.e., a given state seeks to create an identity in the international system), but also by other actors, such as other states, organisations and sub-state groups. For this case study, an “identity conflict” has persisted between Beijing’s attempts to build its Arctic identities and Western perceptions of Chinese

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interests in that region. These examples of “identity disconnect” have been the main contributors to the misconceptions of China’s Arctic policy as opposed to China’s rise in power on the international level.

Using constructivist theory, it is argued that identities are necessary to ensure a framework of predictability and order within international politics and discourse. Expectations of actions between states normally require “inter-subjective” identities that are sufficiently stable to ensure predictable patterns of behaviour. A world without identities is therefore viewed as a world of chaos and pervasive and irremediable uncertainty; a world much more dangerous than simply anarchy. As one study argued, identities perform three necessary functions in a society: they tell you who you are, tell others who you are and they tell you who others are. In telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors (Hopf 1998). Self-help systems, such as the international level where there is no global government to restrain state behaviour, evolve from cycles of interaction, in which each party acts in ways that the “other” views as threatening, creating expectations that the other is not to be trusted.

Competitive or egoistic identities are often caused by such insecurity since if the “other” is threatening, the self is forced to respond, sometimes by “mirroring” such behavior in its conception of the self’s relationship to that other (Wendt, 1992). Identity comes from a variety of sources, but in the case of a given state, there is one process whereby the state seeks to build its identity in the international system, while at the same time a country is also “branded” with aspects of an identity from other actors (such as other states, organisations, and other groups). This process is very much in evidence as Beijing seeks to develop an Arctic identity, while having to address international concerns about China’s motivations. Two sets of identities, often with little in common, are in competition.

For example, in order not to be excluded from Arctic development and governance, and to be accepted as an observer on the Arctic Council, China wished to establish its identity as a “near-Arctic state” (*jīnběijíguójia* 近北极国家) and an “Arctic stakeholder” (*beijilihaiguanxguo* 北极利害关系国). China expressed a desire to be involved in the evolution of Arctic affairs through cooperation with Arctic and non-Arctic states in the areas of scientific and economic cooperation as explained in the previous section. As a result, Chinese media reports and studies on the country’s Arctic interests have sought to brand China’s developing Arctic policies, and identity, using these two labels (Zhang, 2013; Yang *et al.* 2013; Wang, 2013, Xia, 2011). China’s rationale for developing an identity of a “near-Arctic state” was largely based on the argument that boreal

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climate change was having a specific set of effects on China's environment, ecosystem, agriculture and flooding threats. Ma Deyi, the chief scientist on China's fifth Arctic expedition in 2012, suggested that the increase of melting ice in September 2007 caused an unusually harsh storm in southern China with freezing temperatures in early 2008, according to relevant research (Ma, 2011). In that extreme weather case, many people died and thousands of train passengers were stranded on the way home for the Spring Festival, normally one of the busiest travel times of the year in China. In July 2012, Beijing was hit with record rainfall which then created massive flooding (BBC News, 23 July 2012). Radical climate shifts have the potential to cause social unrest, and therefore China sought greater legitimacy to strengthen its capacity to prepare appropriate responses to these effects through increased involvement in Arctic affairs (Jakobsen and Peng 2012).

However, there has been a tendency in Western reporting and analysis to paint China's developing Arctic interests as revisionist, meaning that despite the country's non-Arctic geography, China is seeking to challenge the status quo and unilaterally include itself in Arctic politics and regional relations. The term "near-Arctic state" received much attention in the Western press, and at times the term was offered as another piece of evidence that Beijing was seeking to "gate-crash" the Arctic Council despite its lack of an Arctic border. In other words, the term was used as an excuse for Beijing to gain legitimacy in the Arctic for improper reasons and to challenge the role of Arctic states (Rosenthal, 2012; Economy, 2014; Vanderklippe, 2014; Blank and Kim, 2013). As one analyst noted, China's arguments that its Arctic interests are still developing have divided some observers, with one group taking a conservative approach while another, including the so-called "Calgary School", suggesting that Beijing is seeking to mask its more revisionist intentions towards the Arctic (Chen, 2012; Lackenbauer and Manicom, 2013, 4). Thus, two separate identities have begun to form and compete with each other.

China's Arctic Identity: Western Point

China is a revisionist actor in the Arctic; seeks to challenge the status quo

China doesn't want to be excluded from the Arctic; seeks partnership with Arctic states

China's Arctic Identity: China's Point

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The idea of Beijing as a revisionist power in the Arctic and in the Arctic Council, however, does not take into account the current structure of the region's governance and regimes. For example, China, as with any potential candidate for observer status in the Council, had to first accept the "Nuuk Criteria" defined by the eight Council members, which included abiding by the rules and goals of the organisation, agreeing to recognise the Arctic states' "sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic" as well as the Law of the Sea and the cultures and interests of regional indigenous peoples (Arctic Council, 2011). China, in its bid for observer status, agreed to these requirements. Further, holders of formal observer status have the right to submit policy statements and put forward new agenda items, and to contribute to the Council's Working Groups (Hough, 2013).

Therefore, to gain observer status would augment China's Arctic interests and allow Beijing to play a more visible role in crafting Arctic policy, but with the caveat that Beijing, like other observers, could not vote. Although there was much reporting in international media about China gaining "permanent" observer status in the Council (*Telegraph / AFP*, 15 May 2013; McGrath, 2013; Mroczkowski, 2012), suggesting a perpetual situation, the reality is that the status of "permanent observer" does not exist within the Arctic Council rules, and any given observer can be asked to withdraw if it is decided by the eight members that said observer is in violation of rules or protocols. An observer can only retain that status as long as there is consensus among the eight member states, and every four years a given observer must specifically make a request to retain that status (Arctic Council Rules of Procedure).

It is noteworthy that China was hardly alone in seeking to develop an Arctic identity through the use of "branding". Several other observers on the Arctic Council, including France, Germany, Japan, Singapore and South Korea, have also made extensive use of Arctic sub-governmental meetings and in some cases have prepared policy papers to educate domestic and international communities about their interests in the Arctic region. The most visible example of this phenomenon is arguably not China but rather the United Kingdom. When the UK government released its Arctic White Paper in 2013, its introduction included the idea that the country "is not an Arctic State, but we are the Arctic's nearest neighbour." (UK Government, 2013). Technically, this is correct, given that the Shetland Islands of Scotland lie at 60° North, and are only about 640 kilometres from the Arctic Circle. However, the term "Arctic's nearest neighbour" has been used in a similar way as China's "near Arctic state" concept. During the October 2014 Arctic Circle conference in Reykjavik, Britain was represented by members of the UK Parliament, despite the annual event being largely a research and business forum, and the phrase was often used by

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British representatives. It is telling that the UK concept did not have the same impact on international thinking.

In international practice, a given state understands others according to the identities it attributes to them, while simultaneously developing and re-developing its own identity through daily social practices on the international level. The crucial observation here is that the producer of the identity is not always in control of what it ultimately “means” to others, and the inter-subjective structure is the final arbiter of the meaning and in turn, the overall identity of a state (Hopf, 1998). In observing the branding processes of China and the United Kingdom, the biggest difference between their developing Arctic policies is the “structure” affecting their Arctic identity formation. Both non-Arctic states seek to identify themselves conceding their distance from the Arctic but also via their dedication to Arctic governance, development and understanding. Yet Beijing is often identified as the “challenger” due both to its rising power status and to international perceptions that it is seeking to counter the status quo in the Arctic.

Therefore, China’s Arctic identity has been challenged in the international system more than that of Britain. Beijing is viewed as wanting to change international norms, unilaterally if necessary, to better promote its interests, just like previous great powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union. That perception of a “great power agenda” can be, and often has been, carried over to China’s foreign policy interest in the Arctic. Therefore, many current and future developments in China’s Arctic policy could be interpreted as a challenge or threat, and could be a factor in an increase in the number of myths and misconceptions about the country’s Arctic interests. The question therefore is how best can Beijing address these misconceptions and more effectively put forward an alternative identity.

### Conclusions and Recommendations

With China’s soft and hard power in the international system continuing to develop, it is becoming more difficult for China in comparison with other non-Arctic states, to be viewed as a regulation follower and partner in the Arctic itself. Beijing’s actions in the Arctic, unlike those of other regions, can be easily regarded as challenging the status quo and engaging in norm revisionism. However, there are still methods by which the misconceptions may be addressed.

For example, although China is a newcomer in the Arctic Council, the country has had a long history of cooperating with Arctic institutions. For instance, Beijing became a signatory to the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty in 1925, authorizing Chinese vessels to engage in fishing and

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commercial activities in the high Arctic region, although Chinese commercial and scientific endeavours in the region occurred only decades later (Gao 2012). China opened its Yellow River Station (*Huanghezhan* 黄河站) for scientific research at Ny-Ålesund on the Norwegian islands of Svalbard in July 2004 (*China Daily*, 29 July 2004). Then, the China Nordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC) was founded in 2013 acting as a bridge among Nordic institutions and universities and their Chinese counterparts for natural and social science exchange and cooperation.

China needs to develop an Arctic white paper in the short term to elaborate upon the country's current and future interests and policies in the region. Some of the other observer states, such as Germany and the UK have released such papers, while papers of other governments such as those of France, Japan and the Netherlands are in various stages of preparation. A polar or Arctic white paper from Beijing would provide two benefits. First, this would bring together the interests of many different organizations in China which address the Arctic. Secondly, the white paper would be useful to educate the international community on China's developing Arctic interests. A Chinese Arctic white paper would contribute to removing some of the misconceptions about China's goals.

Also, China must continue to build a presence at Track Two, (as well as semi-governmental, "Track 1.5"), networks and organizations, both to share information with Arctic and non-Arctic actors and also to stress its interest in becoming an Arctic partner rather than a competitor. Chinese representatives are already active at some of the major Track Two Arctic events, including the Arctic Circle conference in Reykjavik and the Arctic Frontiers panels in Tromsø. CNARC has created an effective platform for academic cooperation to increase awareness, understanding and knowledge of the Arctic and its global impacts; and promote cooperation for sustainable development of the Nordic Arctic and coherent development of China in a global context. Arctic researchers and specialists should continue to engage Track Two / "1.5" cooperation networks, ideally including four modes of activities: carrying out joint research projects, developing Arctic research networks and frontiers by providing opportunities for Chinese and Western scholars to conduct Arctic research through fellowships and scholarships, regularly convening the Arctic Cooperation Symposium and other workshops and facilitating information sharing and cultural exchange between China and Western countries on Arctic issues.

Using constructivist theory and the politics of identity, this article argues that a "clash of identities" has developed and persisted between China and the West over Beijing's role in the Arctic. In order to address this problem, both sides must increase communications concerning

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Arctic affairs, and Western actors need to better separate the myths about China's Arctic policies from the realities. At the same time, Beijing should continue to engage the West in mutual Arctic concerns, including scientific interests, and consider the development of a governmental "white paper" to further clarify Chinese Arctic interests for the benefit of both the growing Chinese policy community studying the various aspects of the Arctic, and for the international community.

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## 【极地政策】

## 机遇与风险：北极环境变化对中国能源安全的影响及对策分析

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**摘要:** 目前北极地区正经历着前所未有的环境变化, 这种变化使得北极油气资源的可获得性增强; 但同时也存在着巨大的风险, 如环境变化使北极地区环境风险加剧, 北极地区政治发展不稳定, 开采北极油气资源具有商业风险等。这些因素对中国的能源安全产生了一定的影响: 未来中国面临着与其他国家之间的激烈竞争, 同时还受到政治因素的干扰, 某些国家将中国日益增长的石油进口量和对海外油气资源的拓展视为威胁; 北极油气资源开采、运输技术要求高, 环境风险巨大。因此, 中国在战略上应该抓住环境变化带来的机遇并规避其风险, 在策略上提高自己的能源供给能力并积极主动参与到北极地区能源开发中, 以增强中国的能源安全。

**关键词:** 机遇 风险 北极环境变化 中国能源安全

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## Opportunities and Risks: the Arctic Environmental Changes on the Impact of China's Energy Security

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At the Present time, the Arctic is currently experiencing unprecedented environmental changes. These changes increase the availability of oil and gas resources in the Arctic. However, there are also significant risks in the exploitation oil and gas resources. For example, the environmental changes aggravate the environmental risks in the Arctic Area; the political development is unstable in the Arctic Area; it has a certain business risks in exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Arctic. These factors have had an impact on China's energy security. China

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will be facing fierce competition with other countries, especially with Japan, India, Korea and like these large consumption nations on oil and gas resources. Simultaneously, China is also interfered with the political factors. Some countries take the Chinese growing oil imports and the expanding overseas oil and gas resources as a threat. It needs high technique requirements for exploitation and transportation of oil and gas resources in the Arctic, and has huge environmental risks.

**Key Words:** opportunities; risks; the Arctic environmental changes; China's energy security

目前北极地区正经历着前所未有的环境变化, 这些变化为航运、旅游等许多行业提供了千年不遇的商机和无法估量的利润, 更为重要的是, 这里丰富的油气资源有可能解决人类迫在眉睫的能源安全问题。但是, 如果不能应对该地区巨大且独特的风险, 这些机遇就会沦为空谈。已有的研究往往过于强调机遇, 而忽视风险的存在。其实未来北极的发展具有相当大的不确定性, 这一不确定性不仅反映在生态环境方面, 而且还体现在能源安全和经济安全方面。本文以能源安全为例, 探讨北极环境变化对中国能源供给和运输所带来的机遇和风险。

### 一、北极油气资源的可获得性增强

早在两个世纪以前, 人类就发现北极地区存在着石油和天然气资源。1923年美国开始在阿拉斯加北坡开展地质调查工作, 美国海军在那里建立了石油储备基地。在之后的几十年里, 随着勘探开发技术的不断进步, 科学家们发现阿拉斯加北坡、西西伯利亚盆地北部、巴伦支海盆地等地区都储有丰富的油气资源。随之而来的是大规模的钻油活动。进入21世纪以来, 越来越多的国家开始对北极地区油气资源感兴趣, 甚至远离北极地区的印度也在寻求合作者, 以求共同开发这里的资源。北极地区正在进入资源开发与环境保护并重, 经济与环境持续协调发展的时代[ ]。

1973年的第一次石油危机使得美国一些石油公司担心可能会在世界其它石油储地遭受排斥, 纷纷将目光转向美国与加拿大的北极地区, 给这一地区带来了长达10年的石油开采繁荣期。1977年横贯阿拉斯加的管道投入使用, 10年后阿拉斯加北坡的产量达到了高峰。这一开采热潮于1976-1977年间延伸到格陵兰岛。在这段时间内, 美洲北极地区新钻了5个海上油井, 但现在都已接近枯竭。[ ]20世纪80年代早期, 挪威与俄罗斯的极地考察发现了丰富的油气资源储量, 包括斯诺赫维特(Snohvit)、什托克曼(Shtokman)和普里拉兹罗姆诺(Prirazlomnoye)。然而在20世纪90年代, 新能源的开拓使原油价格跌至10美元一桶。北极地区大规模的石油勘探开发停滞, 但阿拉斯加幸免于难, 因为横贯其中的油气管道使油气开采还有利可图, 因此能幸存下来。

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近几年来,环北极国家已在北极投资大规模的油气开发项目。北极是俄罗斯最具战略发展前景的地区之一,俄以油气开采等项目为突破口,掀起了新一轮北极开发的序幕。2008年9月18日,俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫签署法令,部署北极地区资源开发工作,下令俄罗斯国有企业开采北极石油;2011年1月,俄罗斯石油公司(Rosneft)与英国石油公司(BP)联手准备开发俄罗斯北极大陆油气资源,这一消息引发了各界的关注;2012年2月,俄罗斯第三大石油公司TNK-BP公司表示,该公司计划在今后的三年里投资大约40亿美元来开发北极地区的油气;什托科曼凝析气田开采工程是俄罗斯优先发展的项目。该气田位于摩尔曼斯克东北巴伦支海俄罗斯所属大陆架的中央部分,长达600公里。这里的海水深度在320-340米之间,天然气勘探储量排在世界前10名,约有4万亿吨天然气和约5600万吨天然气凝析油。什托科曼项目在2007年就已启动,并于2008年创建俄法挪三国合资企业——什托科曼开发股份公司(Shtokman Development AG)。如果北方航道通航,什托科曼的天然气将会被运到亚洲市场。

在俄罗斯政府部署北极地区资源开发工作的同时,荷兰皇家壳牌、英荷能源集团、埃克森美孚石油等国际能源巨头,也纷纷游说各自政府,为北极开发争取资金、技术和政策支持;挪威海德鲁公司同俄罗斯油气集团、美国主要公司在内的几大公司竞争参与开发Shtokman气田;格陵兰岛邀请世界各大石油公司开发其海域的油气资源。2010年,由比尔·盖梅尔掌控的苏格兰石油公司卖掉了其在印度拉贾斯坦邦的油田股份,将获得的数十亿英镑投资格陵兰的石油开采。同年8月,该公司宣布在格陵兰海域发现了天然气。同月,英国凯恩能源公司宣布,该公司在格陵兰岛西部海岸打下的两眼勘探井,已找到天然气资源。

目前北极油气的投资规模还不大,国际能源机构预计,在2011年至2035年间,石油天然气领域的投资总额将达到20万亿美元。气候变化给北极地区油气资源开采创造了前所未有的机遇。

气候变暖下的油气资源可获得性增强还体现在能源运输方面。气候变暖、海冰融化的一个重大看点是北极航道的开通。从探险时代开始,在北冰洋逐渐开辟了“西北航道”和“东北航道”,统称为北极航道,但冰山阻碍了这些航道的实际利用。近年来,随着北极气温的快速上升,海冰的加速融化,专家预计北极航道有望完全开通。许多科学家认为,北冰洋第一个无冰的夏季将会在5-50年内出现,这已是一个何时发生的问题,而非一个是否会发生的问题[ ]。无论如何,在未来几十年内,北极地区的无冰覆盖区域可能会继续扩大,无冰期也会延长,这样就可以从水路到达北冰洋沿岸各地,且不需要破冰船,这将大大降低航运费用,并延长离岸油气勘探钻井期。目前这些变化在大部分永冻冰海域已经非常明显,如格陵兰岛海岸、加拿大、阿拉斯加、特别是俄罗斯北部沿海。

2007年4月17-19日,在俄罗斯圣彼得堡召开的由俄罗斯、英国、美国、加拿大和挪

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威等国家代表参加的北极航运大会,详细讨论了有关北冰洋贸易航线国际协议和管理规划。大会指出,一旦天气变暖,北冰洋航道将会在2030年夏季畅通,俄罗斯西伯利亚和北极其它地区港口可以通过水路,用大吨位油气运输船源源不断向欧洲和北美输出油气,或者通过陆路管道向中国等亚洲国家输出油气。

北极航道一旦通航,便可成为北美洲、北欧地区和东北亚国家之间最快捷的黄金通道,三大洲之间的航线距离将大大缩短。当前的航运地理格局将会被打破,北极将会成为第一个真正地理意义上的北半球航运枢纽中心。

## 二、北极油气资源开采的不确定性与风险

### (一) 北极地区固有的环境风险

北极地区不同于地球上其他地区,即使气候变暖,仍然存在着独特的风险。首先是北极地区地理位置偏远。北极许多地区在地理上是孤立的,这会对这一地带的经济活动带来巨大的挑战和成本,而且还会放大风险事故的潜在后果;基础设施与处理事故的能力可能不能到位。2010年,皮尤环境信托基金(the Pew Environmental Trust)发布了一份报告,质疑北极地区目前的基础设施与处理北极漏油事故的技术能力,并认为在对海洋生态系统与漏油后果进行更充分的研究之前,这些地区应该禁止任何形式的资源开发活动[ ]。

其次是气候方面。北极的天气千变万化,气象站相对分散,加上卫星系统的局限,天气预报准确率较差;在一些地方,一年四季甚至一天之内温差都非常之大,这意味着基建需要特殊的材料,如脆性较弱的钢铁;北极漫长而寒冷的极夜也对机器提出了挑战,低温会使机器停止工作,寒风也会增加工作人员面临的风险。横贯阿拉斯加的管道系统自1977年以来,几乎一直在连续使用,但由于“异常天气”于2012年1月暂时关闭[ ]。

再次,北极地区的生态环境非常敏感。相对简单的生态系统结构与短暂的生长季节限制了北极地区自然环境的修复能力。一旦环境遭到破坏,将非常难以恢复,从而产生长期的影响。更为不幸的是,北极地区长期受到北极以外地区带来的污染,例如黑炭,它能够吸收额外的太阳辐射,这是造成北极地区快速变暖的原因之一;电子通信对北极地区的挑战也非常严重。北极磁场、太阳辐射、干扰以及地球同步卫星的几何角都意味着高频率广播和GPS在北纬70至72度上空难以使用,这给通讯、导航、搜索、救援带来了很大的难题。

北极地区环境复杂、危险,距离遥远、严寒、极夜,这些因素相互作用,将会对石油天然气开发和航运业产生明显的影响作用。这些因素综合在一起意味着不管气候有没有变化,北极地区仍然是一个环境恶劣、风险巨大的边缘地带。

### (二) 气候变化使北极环境风险加剧

气候变化是北极地区交通的双刃剑,一方面气候变化可能使北极地区海面上的交通更

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加通畅,但另一方面,也使不少内陆地区更难以进入。现存的基础设施如桥梁、铁路、管道等,是建在永久冻土层上,气候变暖使其维护费用大大增加,如阿拉斯加、加拿大、俄罗斯的北部冻土层变薄,已经面临着维护费用大幅度上涨的问题;气候变暖使冬季在冰雪上开凿的临时道路的使用期大大缩短,这已经对加拿大北部和阿拉斯加等地区的冬季交通提出了挑战,例如穿越北阿拉斯加苔原的冬季道路使用时间从20世纪70年代的200天下降到了21世纪的100天,目前尽管费用高昂,人和货物尚且能够通过空运进入该地区,但重型机器就望而却步了。鉴于自然环境的急速变化,北极的基础设施在使用期限内必须适应潜在多变的环境条件,这意味着,在北极不同的地区,未来的基础设施将不得不采用不同的技术规范,造价也有可能上涨,而且新的基础设施在设计上可能要求更高。

“北极海桥”(从加拿大北部延伸到俄罗斯北部 Murmansk)的一个端口丘吉尔(Churchill)港,能很好地说明气候变化对北极地区交通的双刃剑效应。通往丘吉尔港的海上运输近年来有所发展,扩大了粮食海运出口。但是通往丘吉尔港的单轨铁路因为永久冻土的周期性融化而扭曲变形,这增大了火车出轨几率,减慢了交通,甚至会使交通中断。每年投入的维修资金多达数百万美元,若要将交通线路永久性地升级换代,所需费用将会更多;北冰洋沿海地区也将面临挑战,阿拉斯加北部与加拿大北部的波弗特海的适航天数与海岸侵蚀的加剧息息相关。海冰的消融扩大了两地距离,进而加大了海浪的力度,使更广阔的海岸暴露在海水面前。在北极以及其它地区的低洼地带,海平面的任何上升都使沿岸基础设施遭受威胁。

最后,在陆地上,气候变化可能会增加极端天气的发生几率,如降水量剧增或北极夏季气温过高,从而加大洪水或森林火灾的风险。在海洋上,许多人认为温度升高会使极地风速加快,风暴次数增加,使北极航海更加困难,也对沿岸基础设施产生不利影响。

北极地区受到气候变化的影响,同时它也影响着全球环境的变化。欧洲、北美、东亚冬季的异常大雪都归因于北极冰层变化;导致“极地放大效应”的反馈循环往往加快了全球变暖,而陆地与海底永久冻土融化排放出的甲烷会增加空气中温室气体浓度。全球气候模式中的多种不确定因素都产生于北极的气候变化过程中。国际科研组织高度重视两极地区的科学研究。

### (三) 北极政治发展的不确定性

大体而言,北极地区政治较为稳定。北极理事会,包括八个北极国家、一些永久观察员,在北极治理和政治对话中扮演着关键性的角色。然而在这八个北极国家内部以及北极国家与非北极国家之间,不可避免地存在着一些分歧。在北极地缘政治中,一系列潜在变化隐隐可见,从北极原住民与各国政府之间的矛盾到非北极国家要求参与北极事务,再到北极军事活动可能引起的误解,这些因素中的任何一个都有可能影响到北极未来的政局,能否妥善处理这些分歧是问题的关键。

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分歧首先表现在领土主权方面, 北极环境变化导致环北极国家的北极主权纷争更加激烈。主要争端是北冰洋极点地区的归属问题。到目前为止, 还没有一部国际法明确规定北冰洋极点地区的归属问题。根据《联合国海洋法》, 没有证据表明任何一个国家的大陆架延伸至北极点, 所以北极点及附近地区不属于任何国家, 它属于国际海域, 由国际海底管理局监督管理。北冰洋周边国家俄罗斯、美国、加拿大、挪威、丹麦只拥有领海外 200 海里的专属经济区。但《联合国海洋法》又规定, 如果一个国家的大陆架超过 200 海里, 专属经济区可适当延伸。为解决这方面的争端, 2008 年 5 月, 加拿大、俄罗斯、美国、丹麦和挪威召开了环北极五国高峰会, 商定在现有国际公约基础上开始谈判北冰洋海底划分事宜, 同意通过科学研究提供证据来决定北极地区的主权问题, 同时决定不再为此通过任何类似于《南极条约》的新文件。俄罗斯、加拿大、丹麦等国在 2013 年 12 月向联合国有关机构提交了大陆架划界申请。

美国与俄罗斯在划分白令海经济区问题上存在分歧; 美国与加拿大在波弗特海边界划分上有较大分歧。美国认为, 其阿拉斯加与加拿大育空地区的领土分界线向北冰洋的延伸线, 并不能成其为两国之间直达北极点的领海分界线; 同时, 加拿大与丹麦就格陵兰与加东北的边界划分也有争议, 曾因一个名叫汉斯的北极小岛发生激烈争执; 加拿大与俄罗斯在谁拥有从北冰洋沿岸到北极点部分地区的主权上存在纷争。

此外, 领土主权分歧还表现在其它领域。例如挪威声称, 《斯瓦尔巴特条约》不适用于斯瓦尔巴特矿产资源丰富的大陆架, 可其它国家却不这么认为, 挪威请求国际法庭作出判决。俄罗斯与挪威长期以来对斯瓦尔巴特的捕鱼权力存在争议; 加拿大对于西北航道(它包括加拿大境内水域)的法律地位受到美国和其它国家的质疑; 英国认为, 西北航道和俄罗斯北海航道是国际水域。根据《联合国海洋法公约》沿岸国家有权监管冰川覆盖水域的航运, 这一规定可能会受到气候变化的挑战, 因为针对海冰覆盖水域的《联合国海洋法公约》特定条款可能不再适用。

其次, 北极环境变化促使环北极国家大力增加该国在北极地区的军事力量。早在冷战时期, 北大西洋公约组织和华沙条约组织, 沿北冰洋沿岸, 双方都建立了强大的包括高灵敏雷达网、截击导弹、战斗机群及侦察卫星的早期预警系统。前苏联将摩尔曼斯克建成世界上最大的海、空军基地, 美国也与之针锋相对, 在阿拉斯加和格陵兰岛建立了庞大的军事基地, 并与加拿大共同组建北美防空司令部。而目前北极环境的变化和冷战的结束, 使得环北极国家在新北极安全政策引导下, 开展了积极的军备扩张。主要体现在四个方面: 强化北极地区的军事观测系统、设立北极地区军事基地、发展舰船的破冰能力和战斗力、开展北极地区军事演习。随着北极环境的变化, 各国针对北极未来因资源、航道和领土的争夺而蕴藏的冲突风险, 积极展开军事备战。虽然北极国家呼吁合作、反对军事冲突, 但是也为未来可能发生的冲突做足充分准备。

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第三,政治风险还表现在北极国家之间与北极国家内部对北极开发政治态度差异很大,特别是采矿与石油天然气部门。格陵兰岛的政治支持度较高;在阿拉斯加与加拿大地区,由于矿产资源开发带来就业率和收入的增加,政治支持度普遍较高,但总体而言要比格陵兰岛低多了;在俄罗斯,为了创造税收,扩大石油天然气出口成为国家重要的战略目标;同世界其它地方一样,北极项目最终取决于它们运营地的国家与社区群体的支持。没有他们的支持,任何开发都不能进行。2006年,荷兰皇家壳牌集团顺利获得萨哈林二期工程的开采权,在俄属萨哈林岛钻井开采碳氢化合物。然而,俄罗斯监管机构随后声称发现对自然环境不利,要求暂停该项目。这使得壳牌公司不得不向俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司出售该项目的大部分股权,以“解决”环境问题,维持在该区的开采权[14]。

#### (四) 商业活动风险

尽管北极地区能源开采、北极航道开通前景看似远大,环北极国家已摩拳擦掌、蠢蠢欲动,但该地区未来经济的发展轨道与速度却依然不定。上述的自然环境,严重影响了北极地区油气资源的开采成本。研究表明,在北极地区每生产一桶石油的预算成本为35至100美元,而中东地区的生产成本低至5美元每桶。

北极油气资源开采依赖于全球供需状况和油气价格。有人预测,石油价格维持在80-120美元每桶的话,开采北极地区的石油将具有较大的诱惑力。然而目前全球石油需求已经达到顶峰,且产量还有增长余地,这将导致随之而来的石油市场衰落与油价下调。近期持续的油价上涨可能会加快石油降价。

对于大多数处于利益边缘的北极油气开发项目来说,税收制度就成了其生存与否的决定因素。各国政府从不同的北极工程项目中获取的利润有很大差异,这取决于政府机制、油价与生产成本。最近一份研究表明,当每桶原油售价80美元、生产成本25美元时,俄罗斯政府收取百分之百的利润(这一比例可能随时变化),格陵兰与加拿大政府收取百分之40至45的利润。如果国家对某一地区采取刺激开发的政策,则政府收取的份额就有可能发生变化。例如俄罗斯政府对亚马尔半岛天然气开发所实行的条例号称“世界最优惠”,而不像该国在其他地区征收百分之百的利润。

正是由于上述的一些风险存在,使北极地区一些已经计划的油气开采项目迟迟不能付诸实践,而已经开工的项目又裹足不前。例如在美国,壳牌、康菲石油公司、挪威国家石油公司、雷普索尔和埃尼集团2008年以26.6亿美元的价格赢得了勘探波福特和楚科奇海合约。然而随后的法律质疑以及墨西哥湾马康多油井泄漏事件后加拿大、美国海上钻井的暂停,勘探项目基本还处于审查阶段。

### 三、北极环境变化对中国能源安全的影响

北极环境变化对中国能源安全的影响主要表现在两大方面,一是能源供给,二是能源

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运输。

首先能源供给方面,一方面北极环境变化有利于改善中国能源供给,实现产地多元化。北极地区油气能源资源的可获得性增强,有利于稳定国际油气资源的供给量和价格,促进产地多元化;且环北极国家均为发达国家,政治经济局势稳定,技术条件好,与中东、非洲等政治经济局势不稳定的国家相比而言有着明显的优势;北极油气资源的开采能够缓解中东和非洲产地发生动荡时给国际能源市场带来的冲击;北极地区环境变化使得北极航道开通,因此使得运输成为可能,北极航道相对于波斯湾、马六甲海峡等常年受海盗影响的国际能源运输要道而言更具有安全性。如果中国能进一步参与北极国家的合作,参与北极油气资源的开发和利用无疑有利于改善中国油气能源的海外供给,有利于保障自身的能源安全。

目前中国与北极国家的合作也正在逐步深入和扩展,甚至是直接的能源领域内的合作。2012年4月20日,中国国家总理温家宝在雷克雅未克与冰岛总理西于尔扎多蒂举行会谈,会谈内容包括对北极事务中的磋商,参与北极地区的和平开发利用,冰方愿与中方在现有基础上加强合作。双方在会后还签订了《中华人民共和国政府与冰岛共和国政府关于北极合作的框架协议》。据2012年4月18日出版的《环球时报》报道,美联社16日引述中国外交部官员的话称,“中国在北极有经济和科学利益,将进一步加强与北极国家的合作,以促进该地区的稳定和发展”。

此外,中国与俄罗斯和加拿大有着能源合作的基础。俄罗斯和加拿大都是重要的北极国家,可能成为未来中国开发和利用北极能源资源的突破口。中国与俄罗斯近十多年来政治上的友好推动了两国在能源合作上的进展,两国在能源领域进行了一系列的合作。2006年6月20日,中石化公司宣布,该公司已成功收购俄英合资企业秋明-英国石油公司(TNK-BP)旗下的Udmurtneft子公司。之后开展了众多的合作项目,其中最为重要的是中俄天然气运输管道和石油运输管道,目前中国每年向俄罗斯大量进口石油和天然气。中国与加拿大的能源合作也由来已久。中国曾投资加拿大艾伯塔省北部地区,成立合营企业(Sino-Canadian Petroleum),当时获得加拿大北极之光油砂项目40%的股份;中方资本还致力于投资加拿大其他油气项目和石油运输管道项目[29]。

但另一方面,北极环境变化所引起的中国气候变化影响了中国国内电力的生产。大量的研究认为,北极的气候系统影响着中国大部分经济区域的旱涝风霜和季节交替。近年来中国冬季的异常低温,北方的连续干旱,冬春季节频生的沙尘暴,均被认为与北极的环境变化有很大的联系,在此基础上还会威胁中国的粮食安全和社会稳定等。中国气象科学研究院前学术委员会委员、极地气象研究室主任陆龙骅在接受《第一财经日报》专访时称,北极区域是我国冷空气的主要源地,2008年发生在中国南方的雪灾,与北极地区环境变化异常有密切的关系。此次雪灾,带来了巨大的蝴蝶效应,对中国国内二次能源的生产带来

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了重大的不利影响,严重威胁中国能源安全。雪灾首先大面积破坏了电力输电网,并进一步造成了公路和铁路交通的瘫痪,使得电煤运输中断和涨价,进而导致电煤供应紧张和破坏电力生产。电力不仅仅是经济产业,更是与人们的生产生活密切相关的公共事业,为其他行业的发展和人们生活提供基本的生产和生活资料,深刻地影响着社会稳定和经济发展。

更为重要的是,中国参与北极能源资源开发存在难度与风险。北极环境变化,使得各方对北极能源资源开发的预期大大加强,这种情况也大大加剧了各个利益相关方对北极地区的争夺,特别是环北极八国和其他一些能源消费国之间,这导致北极局势的不稳定,中国开发和利用北极能源资源存在难度和巨大的风险。一方面环北极八国增加在北极地区的军事存在,举行军事演习,加大了军事冲突的风险;另一方面北极八国可能形成对外排斥的“门罗主义”的策略,形成北极国家之间的内部瓜分。这使得中国即使有机会参与北极资源的开发和利用,也将面临着极大的经济和政治风险(如前文所述)。此外,对北极地区的开发还涉及环境保护和气候问题的治理问题,如果中国处置失当,极有可能陷入环境政治陷阱,而遭到国际社会的诟病,甚至会抛出“中国石油威胁论”,影响中国的国际声誉和国际地位。

其次,能源运输方面。北极航道的开通,使中国从北极获得能源具有运输经济性和安全性。近年来北极环境变化可能使得北极航道短期就能全面贯通,这对于中国国际贸易的商业价值十分明显。据专家研究,利用北极航道,中国沿海诸港到北美东岸的航程,比走巴拿马运河传统航线大约节省2000到3500海里;到欧洲各港口的航程更是大大缩短,上海以北港口到欧洲西部、北海、波罗的海等港口比传统航线航程短25%到55%。例如,从上海到德国汉堡间的航行距离将比途经苏伊士运河的航线缩短约6400公里。如果北极航道开通,将使中国现有东、西向两条主干远洋航线上增加两条更为便捷的到达欧洲和北美洲的航线,大大减少海上运输成本,降低途经马六甲海峡、巴拿马运河、索马里海域和苏伊士运河等安全高危险区或政治高敏感区所带来的风险。

此外,中国还可以更多地通过中俄石油运输管道进口北极地区的石油。该管道是俄罗斯向太平洋沿岸的输油干线,以伊尔库兹克州的泰舍特为起点,终点是滨海边疆区纳霍德卡港附近的佩列沃兹纳亚港,并有通往中国东北的支线。尽管目前,该管道的供油并非来自俄罗斯的北极地区,但可能可以作为分段运输通道。并且,如果未来俄罗斯大规模开采北极地区油气资源,中国则有与俄罗斯开展对该管道合作扩建的空间。

但是,如前文所述,北极航道运输存在着巨大的政治、技术和环境风险;而且环境变化还影响中俄石油运输管线,影响中国国内能源运输。2008年10月中俄两国签署了有关建设“斯科沃罗季诺至中国边境管道”(ESPO中国支线)的协议,中俄输油管道工程规划全长1035公里,其中中国境内管段965公里;北极地区气候变暖,海冰融化对中国东北地区的冻土层的影响也是显而易见的,这些影响可能威胁管道运行的安全和稳定。

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极地区被认为是北半球气候变化的一个重要的策动力,对中国气候有着重要的影响。北极地区气候异常可能直接导致中国发生极端气象,从而引发灾害,破坏能源安全。2008年初,南方冰雪天气大面积破坏了电网运行,同时,由于铁路运力紧张,导致电煤运输不及时,从而影响了中国电力的供应[ ]。京广、沪昆铁路因断电运输受阻,京珠高速公路等‘五纵七横’干线近2万公里瘫痪,大约22万公里普通公路交通受阻。2008年初雪灾期间,主要运煤通道受阻,导致发电总容量7795万千瓦的89座电厂电煤库存告急,其中半数以上的发电机组一度缺煤停机,被迫关停的发电机组占全国火电装机总容量的7%,19省市出现大面积拉闸限电,全国尖峰负荷最大电力缺口在4000万千瓦左右,影响了电力供应[34]。

与此同时,中国虽然可以称得上海运大国,但算不上强国。中国自身的船舶制造技术有待提高,针对北极环境对航运的影响的研究有待跟进,航运危机处理机制有待建立和完善。另外,“中国参与北极航道权益争取的最大外部环境威胁是‘与北极航道的地缘关系’和‘北极航道国际协调机制的利益倾向’”。就这两方面来讲,即使北极航道如期而至,那中国的参与也难以摆脱受制于人的局面。一方面,环北极圈国家已经占有北极的陆上土地,中国难有立锥之地;另一方面,北极圈国家历史上倡导的“扇形原则”和现行的国际法中的“大陆架制度”又可能使得北极航道完全处于环北极圈国家的掌控之内;再者中国在国际机制的建立和理论研究方面也处于弱势,在参与北极航道的国际管理的机制中处于不利地位,不利于保障自身利益;近来中国国力的上升也可能使得环北极圈国家对于中国的权益诉求感到耿耿于怀,极有可能利用“中国威胁论”来打压中国。如今北极国家纷纷增加在北极地区的军事存在,中国在北极地区能源运输的战略安全极易受到威胁。

#### 四、北极环境变化下的中国能源安全对策分析

目前种种迹象表明,在能源安全领域内,中国还未能从北极环境变化中获益,但其对自然灾害的影响已经给中国带来了不少麻烦。实际上,面对北极环境变化,中国处于战略被动的地位,即被迫采取措施应对环境变化,这是由于全球政治经济发展不平衡带来的广泛竞争以及地理位置上的差异造成的。当然,无论是从环境角度,还是从国际政治经济竞争角度讲,中国采取措施应对北极环境变化也是十分必要的。具体建议如下:

第一,加强国内能源资源的合理开发利用,推动经济增长方式转变与可持续发展。中国整体的能源资源十分丰富,开发潜力巨大,特别是煤炭资源的合理开发利用。对国内能源资源的合理开发有利于中国获得更多的空间去应对来自外部的影响自身的能源安全的因素。所以中国应积极加强国内能源资源的合理开发利用,推动经济增长方式的转变和可持续发展。在目前各国加大对北极地区的竞争,不稳定因素增加的情况下,这一措施能使中国的能源安全更加不易受到外界威胁,更具有弹性。

第二,加强政府保障能源安全的各项职能,建立更好地应对环境灾难的机制。中国长

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期以来实行计划经济体制,在能源领域内也同样如此,这使得政府保障能源安全的各项职能的发挥程度对中国国内的能源安全保障起着举足轻重的作用。但是近年来,多次能源安全事故与能源产业发展问题均不尽如人意。从08年的雪灾到更近的康菲石油公司漏油事件,再看新能源产业的发展,均不使民众感到满意。所以,政府在加强保障能源安全的各项职能,特别是建立更好地应对环境灾难的机制上应大大增加投入。这对保障中国的能源安全极为重要。

第三,加强北极经济活动的风险管理和风险评估工作。计划在北极投资的企业风险管理应该包括明确的风险识别、评估、分析、控制步骤和行动规划报告等;需考虑有可能发生的最坏情况,阻止最坏情况的发生,而且一旦发生应如何应对。这些计划应该包括明确有力的危机管理计划和应对损失的策略、方法,尽量缓解风险的危害。与此同时,风险管理战略还应考虑将部分风险通过保险转移给第三方。许多保险公司为极端条件(包括北极地区)提供保险。保险不应该只被视为一种财政保护。严格的保险程序能提高一个公司内部的风险管理水平,在事故发生之前降低风险概率,当事故真正发生时控制处理成本。海洋保险业在降低北极和其它地区航运公司风险中发挥着关键的作用。如果保险公司不能为北极航运的船只承保,或保险费用过高,那么北极航运业在经济上也许将丧失可行性。这将对其它依赖于海上物流的行业产生广泛影响——包括自然资源开发。

第四,如果在北极地区开发能源,需要准备充足的资金。因为:(1)需要投资北极地区的基础设施。北极地区基础设施薄弱,港口、道路、机场等,而且建设成本非常高,有学者评估,在加拿大魁北克的努纳维克地区修建1公里的道路需要100万美元;而且修建周期长,一年大约只有4个月的施工期;(2)需要提高北极原住民的生活水平。在北极开发能源成功与否,很大程度上取决于能否满足原住民的需求。因纽特环北极理事会于2011年公布了“资源开发原则宣言”:恰当的环境管理;保护因纽特社会与文化;因纽特人需要从开发中获得经济上的实惠;以及由因纽特人决定在哪里开发、如何开发。这要求,公司必须利用当地的劳动力资源,要为原住民解决就业问题,但原住民大多不是技术工人,公司需要事先培训;此外,还需要为因纽特人投资住房等基础设施。这都需要公司预先支付一定的资金;(3)由于前面两个原因,加之能源开发周期比较长,这导致了在北极地区投资开发能源时间非常长,这可能会面临国际能源价格的调整问题。例如努纳武特巴芬岛地区的铁矿石开发,就因为国际铁矿石价格的下调,使得投资削减到原计划的20%;而其它一些投资金矿的小公司由于经济实力较弱,不得不停止在北极地区的开发计划;(4)环境成本非常高。如前文所述,北极地区生态系统极其脆弱,在这里开发能源工程,一旦发生环境事故,其修复成本非常高。以MMG(Minerals and Metals Group,矿业金属集团)有限公司投资努纳武特伊萨克湖(Izok lake)工程为例。2009年该公司不幸发生了锌泄漏,被罚款4万澳元。但为缓解泄漏给环境带来的影响,也为了使政府满意,其后期的缓解成

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本远远超过罚款。公司制定了1000万澳元的预算来应对这次事故和以后的补救措施,包括用干净的土壤来更换被污染的部分;该公司还将致力于2016年(届时开采寿命到期)以后30年的环境修复工作,争取将该地区恢复到开采前的状态。2012年以来,其环境成本已达900万澳元(到2013年底),未来将要花费更多的资金来修复环境[35]。

总而言之,在战略上,中国应该抓住环境变化带来的机遇并规避其风险;在策略上,一方面提高自己的能源供给能力,另一方面在充分评估北极投资风险的基础上积极主动参与到能源开发中,以增强中国的能源安全。

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## 【极地翻译】

## 环北极因纽特民族北极主权宣言

潘敏 王薇 译

我们，因纽特民族聚居区（Inuit Nunaat）的因纽特人宣布：

## 1 因纽特人与北极

**1.1 因纽特人居住在北极。**因纽特人居住在环极地的广大陆地、海洋与冰原地区，即，北极。我们依赖北冰洋海岸地带、苔原与海冰地区的海洋与陆地动植物生存。北极是我们的家园。

**1.2 因纽特人从远古时代起就居住于北极地区。**自远古时代以来，因纽特人就居住在了北极。我们在环极地世界的家园从格陵兰一直延伸至加拿大、阿拉斯加、以及俄罗斯楚科奇的海岸地区。我们迁入此地与利用北极土地与水域的历史能追溯至有文字记载以前。我们独特的知识、北极经验与语言是我们生活方式与文化的基础。

**1.3 因纽特是一个民族。**虽然因纽特人居住在偏远的北极地区，但我们是一个完整的民族。因纽特人北极理事会（ICC）代表了丹麦/格陵兰、加拿大、美国与俄罗斯的因纽特人，促进了因纽特人的团结感。作为一个民族，我们享有所有民族所共有的权利，其中包括各种国际条约与机构所认可的各项权利，如，《联合国宪章》、《经济、社会、文化权利公约》、《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》、《维也纳宣言和行动纲领》、人权理事会、北极理事会以及美洲国家组织等。

**1.4 因纽特人是原住民。**因纽特人是原住民，享有所有原住民的权利与责任，包括国际法律、政治条约与机构所认可的各项权利，如原住民原住民问题常设论坛、联合国原住民权利问题专家机制、2007年联合国原住民权利宣言（UNDRIP）等。

我们作为一个民族的核心权利是自决权。我们有权自由决定我们的政治身份、自由追求我们的经济、社会、文化与语言发展、自由处理我们的自然财富与资源。国家有义务尊重并促进我们自决权的实现。（参照，如，《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》【ICCPR】，Art.1）

作为原住民，我们的权利包括以下《联合国原住民权利宣言》（UNDRIP）中承认的与北极主权和主权权利相关的权利：自决权，自由决定自己政治地位、自由追求经济、社会与文化，包括语言，发展的权利（Art.3）；内部自治的权利（Art.4）；承认、遵守与执行与国家间达成的条约、协议以及其它建设性协议的权利（Art.37）；维持与加强我们独特的政治、法律、经济、社会、文化组织，以及充分参与国家政治、经济、社会与文化生活的权利（Art.5）；

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参与可能影响到我们自身权利问题的事务的决议的权利, 以及保持与发展原住民自己的决议机构的权利(Art.18); 拥有、使用、开发与控制我们土地、领土、与资源的权利, 保证任何影响我们土地、领土或资源的项目都不会在未经我们许可的条件下通过的权利(Art.25-32); 和平与安全权利(Art.7); 以及保护我们的环境的权利(Art.29)。

**1.5 因纽特人是北极原住民。**我们作为世界众民族中的一员, 以及作为一个原住民族的地位、权利、与责任是在在北极独特的地理、环境、文化与政治背景下得以行使。北极理事会八国对此予以认可, 并根据因纽特人北极理事会设立永久参与方, 以此为因纽特人提供了直接参与的机会。

**1.6 因纽特人是北极国家公民。**作为北极国家(丹麦、加拿大、美国与俄罗斯)的公民, 根据这些国家的宪法、法律、政策与巩固项目, 我们享有公民的所有权利与义务。这些权利与义务不能消减因纽特人在国际法下作为一个民族的权利与义务。

**1.8 因纽特人是北极国家中各个主要的政治次单元(州、省、领地、地区)中的公民。**作为北极各州、省、领地、地区或其它政治此单元的公民, 依据这些次单元的宪法、法律、政策与巩固项目, 我们享有所有原住民的权利与义务。这些权利与义务不能消减因纽特人在国际法下作为一个民族的权利与义务。

## 2 北极主权不断变化的特性

**2.1 “主权”**一词常被用来描述某一社群或国家在内部与外部绝对、独立的权威。然而, 主权是一个值得争议的概念, 其含义并不固定。随着不同治理模式, 如欧盟, 的发展, 传统的主权概念正在被打破。在联邦内部, 主权以创新的方式重叠或不断分化, 来承认民族的权利。对于居住在俄罗斯、加拿大、美国与丹麦/格陵兰的因纽特人而言, 主权与主权权利问题, 必须置于我们争取承认的漫长历史背景中予以考量评估, 并尊重我们作为北极原住民对我们自己的生活、领土、文化与语言实行自治的权利。

**2.2** 在我们居住的北极国家中, 对我们自治权利的认可与尊重以不同的速度与方式得到发展。在2008年十一月的一次全民公决后, 格陵兰的自治面积有了很大的扩展, 此外, 格陵兰语(Kalaallisut)将成为格陵兰唯一的官方语言。在加拿大, 四份土地声明协议是因纽特人权利的重要基石; 虽然, 这些协议在实施过程中产生了一些争议, 但它们仍对自决、主权与主权权利至关重要。在阿拉斯加, 阐明并执行《阿拉斯加原住民权利法案》(ANCSA)与《阿拉斯加民族利益土地保护法案》(ANILCA)中所承认的权利, 还有许多工作要做。尤其是, 生计狩猎与自治权利需得到充分尊重, 妨碍这些权利的问题需要得到处理解决。在俄罗斯楚科塔, 出现了少量承认因纽特人权利的行政措施。这些发展都将为多元化的国家、地区与社区的创新治理与未来打下基础。

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2.3 在行使我们在环北极地区的自决权时,我们继续发展创新的管辖区划,来更好地平衡我们作为原住民的权利与责任、我们和其它居住在我们当中的民族所共有的权利与责任、以及国家的权利与责任。在寻求行使我们在北极地区的权利时,我们继续与周边邻居达成妥协,努力创造和谐。

2.4 国际与其它条约越来越意识到原住民的自决权与在政府间事务中代表自己的权利,这一问题不仅仅是内部治理问题,而发展成了一个国际关系问题(参见,如,ICCPR, Art.1; UNDRIP, Art.3; 挪威萨米人公约草案, Art.17, 19; 努纳武特土地声明协议, Art.59)。

2.5 因纽特人是北极理事会的永久参与方,并在讨论与协商时有着直接、重要的地位。(参见1997年渥太华北极理事会成立宣言)。

2.6 五个北冰洋沿岸国家(挪威、丹麦、加拿大、美国与俄罗斯)承认利用国际机制与国际法解决主权争端的必要性(参见2008年伊卢利萨特宣言),除此之外,这些国家在讨论北极主权问题时,并未提及已有的保护与促进原住民权利的国际条约。与北极理事会一样,他们有意识地将因纽特人排除在北极主权问题讨论之外。

### 3 因纽特人、北极与主权:展望未来

#### 行动基础

3.1 北极民族与国家行为、其之间的互动、以及国际关系活动必须依照法律规则。

3.2 北极民族与国家的行为、其之间的互动、以及国际关系活动必须首先考虑全球环境安全与和平解决争端的需要,以及北极主权与主权权利问题以及自决问题之间不可分割的联系。

#### 作为积极合作伙伴的因纽特人

3.3 北极主权问题与主权权利之间不可分割的联系,以及因纽特人自决权和其它权利需要国家承认因纽特人在北极国际关系活动中是作为合作伙伴的地位存在的。

3.4 许多其它因素,如,从因纽特人对北极生态系统独特的知识到考量资源开发提案时对可持续性的重视,都为在北极与因纽特人展开合作,发展国际关系提供了便利。

3.5 因纽特人的支持、专业知识、观点与视角都对推进各种关系到北极的国际问题至关重要,这些问题包括,全球环境安全、可持续发展、军事、商业捕鱼、航运、人类健康以及经济与社会发展等。

3.6 随着各国对北极及其资源的重视不断加强,以及气候变化使人类能够更容易地进入北极,因纽特人的作为积极的合作伙伴参与北极事务,对所有国家与国际上对北极主权及其相关问题的争议都是至关重要的,这些争议主要包括,谁拥有北极主权,谁应对北极不

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断增加的社会与环境问题负责等。我们能为这些问题的解决带来独特的知识与经验。因纽特人作为积极的合作伙伴参与未来北极主权的所有争议问题,将有利于因纽特人社区和整个国际社会。

3.7 全球、跨国与原住民政治层面上因纽特人的广泛参与需要同国家建立新型合作关系来保护与促进原住民经济、文化与传统。合作关系必须认同这样一条原则,即,北极自然资源的工业开发目前只能用来提高因纽特人的经济与福祉以及保护我们的环境安全。

### 对国际合作的需求

3.8 在北极问题上加强国际交流与合作的需求非常强烈,尤其是在气候变化的动态与影响以及可持续经济与社会发展方面。集合了北极国家与北极外国家的地区机构、以及北极原住民代表能对国际交流与合作发挥出积极作用。

3.9 追求环境安全这一目的,需要一个协调一致的应对气候变化挑战的全球性手段,一套严密的控制人类二氧化碳排放量的方案,以及一个使北极地区与社区适应气候变化的长远项目。

3.10 气候变化问题的严重程度使得北极国家及其人民全面参与到国际控制与建设温室气体排放的行动中来,并就此达成了一些国际议定书与条约。如果没有原住民的参与与合作,这些努力、议定书与条约就不能取得成功。

### 健康的北极社区

3.11 在一个不断变暖的北极追求经济机遇,各国必须遵守如下行为准则:(1)可持续地开展经济活动;(2)避免有害的资源开发;(3)使因纽特人的居住条件达到国际语国际最低标准;(4)避免在原住民地区发生突然性或大规模的人口迁移,以免给原住民造成过度压力或使其受到边缘化。

3.12 北极主权与主权利的基础、延伸和使用都需要健康可持续的北极社区作为基础,即所谓,“主权始于家乡”。

### 为了明天建设今天的机制

3.13 我们将通过建立一系列机构(如,因纽特人北极理事会、北极理事会)、针对北极的国际条约(如,《联合国海洋法公约》中关于冰冻水域的条款)以及北极相关的国际机制(如,联合国原住民问题永久论坛、《联合国原住民权利和基本自由特别报告》办公室、《联合国原住民权利宣言》)来行使我们在北极的自决权。

## 4 环北极因纽特人北极主权宣言

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4.1 2008年十一月份,在加拿大努纳维克库朱瓦克举办的首届因纽特领导人峰会上,来自格陵兰、加拿大与阿拉斯加的因纽特领导人聚集在一起,探讨北极主权问题。十一月七日,世界因纽特人日,我们就我们所关注的问题表达了我们在北极主权问题上的团结一致,审查了解决这些问题的各种可能,并积极致力于颁布正式的北极主权宣言。同时,我们指出,2008年北冰洋五国行政代表制订的《伊卢利萨特北极主权宣言》还不足以肯定因纽特人通过国际法、土地声明与自治过程得到的权利。

4.2 北极国际关系活动与北极国际争端的解决不仅仅是某些北极国家或其它国家的事务,它们还同时关系到北极原住民。北极国际机构的发展,如多层次治理体系与原住民组织,必须超越北极国家的主权与主权权利界限以及国家在国际事务领域的专断传统。

4.3 北极主权与主权问题不可避免地与北极自决问题相互关联。因此,因纽特人与北极国家必须,紧密合作共建北极未来。

我们,因纽特聚居区(Inuit Unaat)的因纽特人致力于本宣言的执行,与北极国家及其它多方一起共同努力,建立合作关系,使因纽特人的权利、地位和责任得到全面认同和接纳。



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## 【极地学术动态】

### 本中心人员学术活动

1. 2015年2月7日,国家领土主权与海洋权益协同创新中心在北京举行会议,会上聘请同济大学国际与公共事务研究院院长夏立平教授为该中心学术委员会委员。同时聘为该中心学术委员会委员的还有国际海洋法庭法官高之国教授、武汉大学副校长谈广鸣教授、国家海洋局海洋发展战略研究所书记兼副所长贾宇研究员、中国外交部朝鲜半岛事务代表徐步等28人。2014年10月,国家领土主权与海洋权益协同创新中心通过教育部认定,正式获批“2011计划协同创新中心”。该中心是在中央和国家多个部委的支持下,由武汉大学牵头联合该领域的主要力量,以中国边界与海洋研究院为主要依托平台,于2012年9月正式组建的。2014年1月,同济大学极地与海洋国际问题研究中心与武汉大学中国边界与海洋研究院签署合作建设国家领土主权与海洋权益协同创新中心协议。

2. 2015年5月21日下午,挪威南森研究所研究员、加拿大籍学者 Marc Lanteigne 在本院做了《美国的北极政策以及中国的应对》的讲座,同济大学国际与公共事务研究院院长夏立平教授主持讲座。讲座受到教师和研究生的欢迎。

3. 2015年3月26日,本中心主任夏立平教授访问美国战略与国际研究中心,会见该中心高级副总裁兼欧洲与北极项目主任 Heather Conley,就在上海举行“第一届中美北极社科研讨会”进行了交流。

4. 5月16日,本中心主任夏立平教授主持在上海同济大学举行、由同济大学国际与公共事务研究院、同济大学极地与海洋国际问题研究中心、美国战略与国际研究中心(CSIS)共同主办的“第一届中美北极社科研讨会”开幕仪式,并做专题发言。

5. 5月27日,本中心主任夏立平教授出席在上海举行的第三届“中国-北欧北极合作研讨会”。

6. 5月21日下午,本中心主任夏立平教授主持挪威南森研究所研究员、加拿大籍学者 Marc Lanteigne 在本院做了《美国的北极政策以及中国的应对》的讲座。

7. 6月24日,本中心主任夏立平教授参加在上海交大举行的 NPARC 上海会议。

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8. 2015年4月24-30日,本中心副主任潘敏副教授在日本富山参加“2015北极科学高峰论坛周”(ASSW2015),在大会上作了题为“The Impacts of Environmental Changes on Arctic Indigenous Economy”的学术报告;

9. 2015年5月9日,本中心副主任潘敏副教授在上海外国语大学参加“中国加拿大研究会”年会,作为专题评论人参与并作了题为“北极环境变化对因纽特人生活的影响”的学术报告;

10. 2015年5月15-17日,本中心副主任潘敏副教授参加《中美北极社会科学论坛》,并作了题为“北冰洋公海渔业治理”的学术报告;

11. 2015年5月25日,本中心副主任潘敏副教授作为评论人受邀参加“上海论坛-北极专题”。

12. 2015年5月30日,本中心副主任潘敏副教授接受东方卫视“环球交叉点”节目的采访。

13. 2015年5月26-30日,本中心副主任潘敏副教授参加“中国北欧北极合作第三次会议”,并在大会上作了题为“北极原住民与北极治理”的学术报告。

14. 2015年6月1日,本中心副主任潘敏副教授接受《中国海洋报》记者的采访  
<http://epaper.oceanol.com/shtml/zghyb/20150602/79850>.

15. 2015年5月15-17日,本中心研究人员苏平博士参加“中美北极社会科学论坛”,本次论坛由极地办出资赞助,同济大学与美国国际战略研究中心(CSIS)共同主办,将机制化为中美之间关于北极的年度论坛。苏平博士做了主题为《北极开发现状以及中国参与北极开发情况》的发言。

16. 2015年5月26-30日,本中心研究人员苏平博士参加“中国北欧北极合作第三次会议”,该会议由中国北欧研究中心与上海国际问题研究院共同主办。苏平博士与加拿大学者 Marc Lanteigne 共同做了主题为《中国的北极政策:错误知觉》的发言,探讨了参与北极事务面临的主要误解,以及产生误解的原因。

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17. 2015年3月, 苏平博士接受《人民日报》驻北欧记者采访, 探讨了北极投资机遇和风险并存, 由于北极地区特殊的地理环境, 北极开发一直面临着极端气候、环境脆弱、基础设施贫乏和能源市场变化等风险。北极开发没有快钱, 需要有战略眼光, 着眼于中长期的战略需求。

18. 2015年3月21日, 由上海市东方青年学社、复旦大学当代中国研究中心、华东政法大学科学研究院政治学研究所共同主办的“全球治理与世界秩序”学术研讨会, 本中心研究人员宋黎磊副教授做了“北极治理与中国参与情况”的大会发言。会议论文“北极治理与中国的北极政策”收在会议论文集中。



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## 极地动态

### 1. 第九届北极理事会部长会议 4 月 24 日召开

<http://arcticportal.org/news/25-other-news/1447--9th-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting-to-start-today->

北极理事会第九次部长级会议将在加拿大努纳瓦特地区首府努鲁伊特召开。美国在此次会议上将接替加拿大成北极理事会主席国。加拿大环境部部长、加拿大北部经济发展局长兼北极理事会部长利昂娜·阿卢卡克(Leona Aglukkaq)届时将欢迎各国参会代表。阿卢卡克在昨天发布的欢迎视频中回顾了加拿大任主席国期间的最重要成就。一是推动北极地区传统知识更有效地在理事会工作中发挥作用。二是成立北极经济理事会,以促进北极的商业发展和极地合作。阿卢卡克还提出,希望北极理事会的未来工作重点集中在北极地区的人类发展。

### 2. 欧盟加入北极理事会观察员国申请再次被拒

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/05/eu-bid-become-arctic-council-observer-deferred-again-04-05>

北极理事会第九次部长级会议上,理事会再次拒绝给予欧盟观察员国地位,并将对此问题进行为期两年的考察。在欧盟修复与加拿大的关系后,加拿大已对欧盟的申请表示支持,但因欧盟与俄罗斯关系持续恶化,将给欧盟获得观察员国地位增加诸多阻碍。欧盟也未被完全拒之门外,其成员国瑞典、丹麦和芬兰为北极理事会的永久成员国,另有六个成员国为观察员国。尽管如此,欧盟依旧需要获得观察员国地位,以确保其参与北极事务的公信力。

### 3. 奥巴马政府批准壳牌公司进行北冰洋油气开采引发环保争议

<http://ecowatch.com/2015/05/11/obama-shell-arctic-drilling/>

奥巴马政府有条件地批准了壳牌公司在北冰洋进行油气开采,相关工作将在今年夏天展开。但此举引发了环保人士的担忧,生物多样性研究中心亦认为政府的决定过于仓促。壳牌公司多年来一直致力于获取北冰洋开采批准,但曾于2012年获得批准后发生钻井平台事故。美国环保人士普遍认为政府应撤回此次决定,因为其将给北冰洋的生态环境造成严重威胁,并且与政府应对气候变化,未来向清洁能源转型的目标背道而驰,也背离了其作为北极理事会主席国的责任。

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#### 4. 俄罗斯与北约发起军演竞赛

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11629721/Russia-and-Nato-launch-rival-war-games-in-Arctic.html>

俄罗斯与北约的军演竞赛,是中东欧地区军事紧张升级的最新信号。俄罗斯于昨日发起了名为“大规模突击检查(massive surprise inspection)”的军事演习,目的是应对在同一天由北约所发起的名为“北极挑战(Arctic Challenge)”的军事演习。此次北约军演的起因是俄罗斯副总理罗戈津在全国性电视节目中的玩笑:“坦克不需要签证。”此语是针对美国和欧盟对被控牵涉乌克兰事件的俄罗斯政客和商人拒发签证的事件。

#### 5. 俄罗斯支持国际北极渔业协定

<http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/news/2015/06/01/russia-indicates-support-for-international-arctic-fisheries-accord>

近期,由于北极渔业协定的议题,俄罗斯与美国实现了外交关系缓和。美国、俄罗斯、挪威、加拿大和丹麦于去年同意在北极水域进行捕鱼管制,但由于克里米亚事件,俄罗斯与西方的关系陷入冰冻期,协议签署被推迟。在美国国务卿克里与俄罗斯总统普京会面的第二天,俄罗斯宣布将签署该协议。由于渔业协议保护的水域冰雪融化加快,五国在此拥有共同利益,因此将搁置关于克里米亚事件的意见冲突展开合作,以防止北极水域的滥捕行为并保护本国的渔业资源。

#### 6. 俄州长寻求北极航道发展

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/04/governors-want-better-northern-sea-route-16-04>

随着北极冰雪融化,北极航道成为了亚欧之间另一条可能的航运路线,对未来的航运意义重大。俄罗斯巴伦支海地区州长将发展北极航道作为地区的首要建设任务,该地区的两个州长均在俄罗斯北极委员会上强调了发展北极航道的相关事宜。州长奥尔洛夫认为阿尔汉格尔斯克可以为北极航道发展提供全面的基础设施和服务。依戈尔·科申也认为应该重点关注发展北极航道所需的基础建设,强调北极如今已成为国家发展的火车头。

#### 7. 挪前外交部长约纳斯将参加下届首相选举

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/04/unique-deal-arctic-borders-27-04>

2010年4月27日,俄罗斯与挪威签署了关于北极边界划分的特殊协议。经过四十年的协商,两国将有争议的175,000平方公里北极海域划分为两块相同大小的部分。如今,这一天也成为了俄挪关系发展的重要里程碑。谈判期间的挪威前外交部长约纳斯·加尔·斯特勒

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(Jonas GahrStøre)今天作为挪威工党领袖,将参加下届的首相选举。他认为,该协议体现了俄罗斯在北极地区内是按照规则行事的。另外,挪威要善加利用这段有建设性的战略伙伴关系。

## 8. 美国接任北极理事会主席国,优先关注环境问题

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/04/united-states-takes-charge-arctic-council-prioritizes-environment-29-04>

上周,美国国务卿约翰·克里接任加拿大环境部长利昂娜·阿卢卡克在北极理事会的职责,计划将理事会的议程集中于气候变化并保护北冰洋环境。美国作为主席国将以减少黑炭和温室气体来应对环境问题,第一步是减少北方居民对于柴油汽车和发动机的依赖,再是管制北冰洋的船舶运输,防止石油泄漏。美国也承诺不会放弃加拿大任期对经济的关注,将以气候变化、海洋安全和经济三方面作为北极理事会未来努力的方向。

## 9. 俄罗斯新建破冰船为其在北极开路

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/05/new-icebreakers-open-way-russia-arctic-05-05>

在北极有越大的雄心,就会建越多的破冰船,俄罗斯即是如此。俄至少拥有14艘在建的破冰船,以及更多的建船计划。另外,其他不同种类的破冰船也在建设当中,新船只的建设场地都集中在彼得堡附近。一系列的造船计划有:计划22220,计划22600,计划21180,鄂毕湾破冰船,计划21900以及破冰船R-70202。俄罗斯的破冰船计划造价也十分高昂,计划22600造价便高达9百万卢布。

## 10. 阿拉斯加和华盛顿州参议员提出法案:准许美国海军建造六艘破冰船

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/05/alaska-washington-senators-file-bill-build-arctic-icebreakers-22-05>

来自阿拉斯加的参议员丽莎·穆尔科斯基和华盛顿参议员玛丽亚·肯特沃提出了一项议案:美国海岸警卫队和海军需要破冰船来完成他们的任务,并以此赶上中国和俄罗斯日益增长的破冰舰队和北极活动。议员认为,建造破冰船将给华盛顿带来经济增长和就业,并保护美国的北极利益。几个月以来,两位议员持续向负责北极政策的军方官员施加压力。法案预计可以通过获得海岸警卫队的授权,并很快进入参议院。

## 11. 北极开发将大大促进芬兰发展

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/05/arctic-will-boost-finland-lippone-says-26-05>

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前芬兰总理帕沃·利波宁在他所著报告中提到:芬兰应抓住众多的北极发展机遇来缓解经济危机。这份文件名为《北极的战略眼光》,强调芬兰应该在欧盟的北极政策中扮演关键的角色。前总理自信北极的基础设施发展可以使芬兰成为全球物流和通讯中心,为达成该目的,则需要加强北欧合作,建设新基础设施以及铁路。建立一条从芬兰的北部通往挪威北极海岸的铁路是两国多年来在商讨的议程。基于与邻国瑞典和挪威的关系进展,报告也重申需要加强北欧合作。

## 12. 为什么北极石油短期内不会流入市场

<http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Energy-Voices/2015/0528/Arctic-drilling-Why-oil-won-t-be-flowing-anytime-soon?cmpid=TW>

壳牌公司的员工认为,直到2030年,石油巨头们都不会看到北极的石油出现在市场中。因为其开采难度很大,例如发现和勘探近海石油就要花费近十年的时间。北极更给石油开采带来了独特的挑战,例如在北极钻井的季节格外短,偏远的位置,以及缺乏基本的基础设施,注册审批也有难度。因此,要克服这些困难而获得盈利,就必须保证北极有大量的石油储量值得开采。这也意味着壳牌公司在2016年夏天的运作是否成功,将最终决定北极石油的开采是否将会被推迟。

## 13. 俄罗斯将于2015年在北极部署堡垒反导弹基地

<http://www.ibtimes.com/russian-military-deploy-bastion-anti-ship-missile-complexes-arctic-2015-1946156>

为了提高北方舰队的战备状态,俄罗斯将于2015年在北极部署新的堡垒反导弹基地。沿海的导弹防御系统用于摧毁敌人的船只。北方舰队的指挥官弗拉基米尔·科洛夫(Vladimir Korolev)说道,海岸部队将接收大量全新的装备和武器,俄罗斯北方舰队也希望获得新的舰队用以北极行动。俄罗斯已经积极地依靠其在北极的领土构建一个“自给自足”的长期军事力量。俄罗斯海军总司令维克托·契尔科夫(Viktor Chirkov)表示,俄罗斯将持续关注北方舰队的进一步发展。

## 14. 北方舰队于2015年计划大规模北极演习

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2015/06/northern-fleet-plans-large-arctic-exercise-2015-03-06>

海军指挥官弗拉基米尔·科罗廖夫(Vladimir Korolyov)说道,俄罗斯北方舰队正在计划为保护俄罗斯在北极的重要经济资产,在2015年发动一场大规模演习。北方舰队依旧计划于今年夏天沿北海航线进行演习。在演习中,北方舰队中的两支太平洋旅将会与空降部队

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与特别分队进行联合演习。俄罗斯在过去几年内增加了其在北极的活动，从2012年的一场大规模海军演习开始，北海舰队完成了俄罗斯首次登陆北极群岛的活动。

### 15. 中国将目光转向希尔克内斯的基础设施建设


<http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/06/china-eyes-stake-kirkenes-infrast-structure-10-06>

据多年参与巴伦支地区生意的鲁内·罗特(Rune Rautio)说，中国有兴趣投资希尔克内斯当地的基础设施建设，对于当地的海港以及计划修建到芬兰罗瓦涅米的一条铁路亦有投资兴趣。但在任何新设施开始建设之前，希尔克内斯当地的政客仍需要决定关于设施选址的争议，而中国也知道希尔克内斯当地的情况，中国公司对于该地区有着长期的关注，并且逐步在这里展开活动。

(编译苏平、倪雯婷)



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