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Bulletin of International Studies on the Polar Regions (Quarterly)

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
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极地政治

A Written Interview with Professor Arbakhan Magomedov

Professor Arbakhan Magomedov, Head of Public Relations Department, Ulyannovsk State University, Russia. On July, 2014, Professor Arbakhan Magomedov paid a visit to Center for Polar and Oceanic Studies (CPOS), Tongji University, Shanghai, China, and accepted a written interview by Professor Wang Chuanxing, CPOS deputy director, and editor-in-chief of *Bulletin of International Studies on the Polar Regions* (Quarterly). The following is the interview:

Professor Wang Chuanxing: In your talk, there are three important energy/resource regions in Russia, namely, the Caspian Sea Region, the Sahalin Island Region, and the Russian Arctic Region. Would you please define the status of the Russian Arctic Region in Russia's national strategy in the coming decades?

Professor Arbakhan Magomedov: In Northern Eurasia there is the most prominent energy/resources-related meso-regions: Caspian Sea, the Sakhalin Island and the Russian Arctic Area. Two regions—the Arctic and the Caspian provide a useful point of comparison on the issue of undefined maritime boundaries and petroleum deposits. In respect of Arctic territorial disputes have been solved successfully, as in the case of Russia and Norway, which peacefully delimited their maritime boundary in April 2010. With regard to the Caspian Sea territorial disputes remain unresolved and even lead to military build-ups and confrontations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenia, Azerbaijan--Iran. Today Arctic Region issue has become a national priority for Russia, especially Northern Sea Route project. The Arctic and sub-Arctic regions are responsible for producing 98% of Russia's diamonds and 90% of its oil, gas, nickel and platinum output nowadays. Access to the Arctic with its energy and natural resources and its shorter naval route between Europe and Asia could turn Russia into a major sea power. Russia's actions toward a set of energy/resources-related maritime disputes are driven by political and geoeconomic considerations and that financial benefits are a secondary concern in these disputes.

With respect of the status of the Russian Arctic Region in Russia's national strategy in the coming decades, the Arctic area is clearly vital to Russia's relevance in the world affairs. Russian Arctic strategy is mainly determined by two important documents. First, "The fundamentals of state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond" ("Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 goda i dalneishuiu perspektivu") which was published at the end of March 2009. Second, "Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020" ("Norskaya doctrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2020 goda"). These documents outline the country's strategy in the Polar region and indicate Russia's role as a "leading Arctic power". The fundamentals of Russian Arctic policy were designed under the auspices of the influential top centers of power in Russia.

National interests and respectively national strategy are based on two key elements—natural resources and maritime transport. According to the mentioned documents, Russia ultimate objective is to transform the Arctic into "leading strategic base for natural resources" by 2010. As a result, one of the main goals of the Russian Arctic policy is to increase extraction of the natural resources in the region and develop infrastructure and communication management of the Northern Sea Route. The particular importance is to defense of the riches of the Exclusive Economic Zone as well as the continental shelf. Military-trade aspect is consists in an easy

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access of the Russian fleet to the Atlantic, the decisive role of the Northern Fleet for defense, as well as the increasing importance of the Northern Sea Route for sustainable development of the Russia.

The recent activity, including military, indicates serious and growing Russian interests in the Arctic. At a different meeting of the State Council President Vladimir Putin set up inter-departmental working groups which coordinate development of the Russian Arctic zone.

Professor Wang Chuanxing: You tell us that the Russian Arctic oblasts/cities have been in competition for controlling/promoting Russia's national Arctic policy, would you please elaborate this topic? And considering the making of Russia's Arctic policy, does such a competition also imply that there is a gap between the central government in Moscow and the local communities? Is such a gap a commonality like that in other Arctic countries, such as in Canada, or a unique phenomenon in Russia?

Professor Arbakhan Magomedov: In fact, the depth of regional cooperation differs, depending on each region's political context, local authority's identity formation as a polar actor. Regional power elites establish their identity as an international actor through NSR development process. Following the change of the international political environment, they start to acquire a new recognition of themselves as international actors. At the first stage, actors get some "recognition" with regard particular issues. Then, the actors clearly set their agenda according to this recognition, and, after that, the "function" of the actor is defined at the second stage. At the third stage, aware of the issues in the international arena, the actors then start to play with their counterparts to maximize the actors' interests. Let's now move on to my model of local authority's identity formation as an international actor. I chose these two successful Polar gateway regions: Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. Until the end of 2012 took place the on-going disputes between Arkhangelsk and Murmansk about where the Northern Sea Route (NSR) administration would be located. In December 2012 Russian government announced important news for this region: the NSR main office will be located in Moscow and the office began working on January 28, 2013. Russian government also announced that auxiliary offices would be located in Arkhangelsk. Russian Transportation Ministership explained that it made sense to base the office in Moscow because Moscow is also the headquarters of the Emergency Situation Ministry, the Resque Service, and the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (RosHydromet). One consequence is that the old competition between Murmansk and Arkhangelsk for the office resulted in both of them losing out to the capital. The decision is a heavy blow to the political ambitions of the regional authorities in both cities because they had counted on becoming centers of Arctic policy in Russia. Just several days before the announcement was made, Arkhangelsk Governor Igor Orlov said that in Arkhangelsk, they were ready to open another office: which would deal with practical questions related to the Northern Sea Route. These questions included such important issues as accepting applications to use the Northern Sea Route, coordinating work with RosHydromet, and the use of polar aviation, among other issues. Thus, in Putin's Russia regional elites has less potential to serve as independent actors, even though local authorities there have already established initiatives in terms of governance in the region. What is more, all Russian Arctic cities are attempting to meet the challenge of transforming their economic profile from industrial to service, modernizing old industrial enterprises, and becoming innovation centers for the surrounding area. In addition, its potential importance as a gateway, especially for Northern Sea Route and natural resources makes its fortunes of great importance for the Russian economy as a whole.

Regarding a gap between the central government and the Arctic cities/regions this is unique Russian

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phenomenon, because Canada has not large cities in Polar area as well as particular interests of political elites of Arctic regions and communities. For example, in Russian Arctic zone there are 11 large cities with 200,000 citizens; in Canadian Arctic region there is just one city--Yellowknife where living almost half national north population. Additionally, in Canada there are also a few administrative centers in Polar area such as Whitehorse, Kuujuaq, Iqaluit, and Inuvik.

Professor Wang Chuanxing: As all of the AC8 countries except Russia are West countries--they are whether NATO countries or EU countries, the identity of Russia in the Arctic is really something "unique". And what/how do you think about the implication(s) of Russia's such "unique" identity in the Arctic region and in the Arctic affairs?

Professor Arbakhan Magomedov: First of all I provide short pre-history of development of Russia's Arctic identity. During last 25 years Russia crucially changed political identity. Since the collapse of USSR Russian political class has turned to the West with slogan: "Let's go to the Common European Home". As a result, the identity of Russia before Putin's Presidency was as "transit to democracy" and European institutes (Euro-Atlantic identity). Early Putin (2000-2005) also wanted to establish strong co-operation with Western countries and close relations with Western leaders. He has supported even doubtful so call "war against terrorism" which the West started since 9/11, 2001. Unfortunately, such policy was unsuccessful, especially since so called "orange revolutions" in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004). How Russia strategically changed its identity after globalization and the beginning of "new cold war" with the West under Putin? Since 2005 Russia turned from the Western (Euro-Atlantic) identity toward triple identity transition to: 1) "Energy superpower"; 2) Eurasian superpower; 3) Arctic superpower. That means Russia radically changed its identity. In context of changing nature of identity Russia started to recognize its own position in the world as an Arctic superpower. It is obvious that as a result of the collapse of the USSR Russia has become Northern country as a frontier Polar territory. The changing nature of identity and multiple identity formation of Russia especially in Arctic meso-area. The modern escalation of geopolitical struggle for the Arctic has changed the identity of Russia and also the identity of the polar regional political elites in order to maximize their own interests. Modern Russia changed its identity and take a lead in the Arctic co-ordination in order to secure and promote its interests. The Russian leaders changed their "function" in order to secure the profit for the country from the Arctic potential. It became necessary for the Russian government to negotiate with other polar countries regarding the profits from the Arctic resources. Obviously that Russia developed "unique" identity in the Arctic region and in the Arctic affairs.

Professor Wang Chuanxing: Let us come back to the local communities! Compared with the role of the local communities, the communities of aborigines in particular, in Canada, how do you think the role of Russian aborigines in its Arctic policy-making/governance?

Professor Arbakhan Magomedov: Russian and Canadian Arctic area is first and foremost the homeland of Indigenous communities. Attachment to the land and dependence on local resources for physical and spiritual sustenance are deeply rooted characteristics of their cultural heritage in both countries. The main difference between Russia and Canada with respect Aborigines is consists that in Russia there is much more Northern Ethnic tribes than in Canada. In Russia is living 41 Polar Ethnic tribes (Nenets, Komi, Chukchi, Khanty, Mansi, Yakuts, and so on) in Canada--just a few tribes: Inuits, so call First nations (Indians) and Metis. Canadian aborigines settled as strong communities, in some provinces as an ethnical majority. In Nunavut province, 85

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percent of the 25, 000 are Indigenous. In Nunavik and northern Labrador provinces, Inuit and First Nations make up a majority of the resident population. United by a common language, there are some 41,000 Inuit living in 53 communities across northern Canada. First Nations often make up the majority population in the other 46 communities. The most startling demographic feature of the Indigenous population is its youth - as many as 50 percent are under the age of 15 years - setting the stage for some important challenges in the near future that will be shaped by the needs of this very young society. In opposite to Canada Russian Arctic zone in much more urbanized and aborigines represents minority in each Russian Polar province.

Let's come back to Russia. As I noted above, the native peoples of Northern Russia belong to a great number of different tribes. Each of the Aboriginal groups identifies with a traditional territory, shaped by thousands of years of continuous occupation. Their communities are scattered over this immense region, located mainly on major rivers and along the coastline. Many are accessible only by air or seasonal sea and river transport. The most numerous are the Evenks, who live together with the Chukchi people in a region that extends from the Eastern Siberian Sea, the Chukchi Sea, the Bering Strait and along the Pacific Coast down to Sakhalin. In the old days they were reindeer herders and hunters. In the Soviet period they were settled and organized in large Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes (collective farms) where they could pursue their traditional occupations only to a limited extent. The industrialization of their territories in the 1930's and the development of mining and forest industries marked a decisive change, even more so as these were coupled with the construction of prison camps (GULAGs), and with intensive and polluting industrial and military activities in many areas. The Nenets and other Samoyed peoples live in northwest Russia and on the Kola Peninsula; their traditions are quite similar to those of the Evenks further east or the Saami in the west. To represent their interests vis-à-vis the state authorities, about 41 Russian indigenous groups formed the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON). They also used it to establish contacts with other peoples in the whole Polar region. Under a new law on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), however, the Russian Ministry of Justice in November 2012 ordered the closure of RAIPON for the short period. A dissolution of this indigenous association and other measures took place according Russia's new anti-treason legislation would have deprived the native peoples of the North of an important instrument of self-government. This policy was connected with criminal activity of former President of RAIPON Pavel Suliandziga--famous political and business activist. After cumbersome negotiating and amendments to the organization's statutes, RAIPON was able to resume its activities in 2013. New President of RAIPON was appointed Sergei Khariuchi--person who was supported by Kremlin. Russian government supports aboriginal communities and associations in their efforts to:

- improve social well-being and economic prosperity of Northern districts;
- develop healthier, more sustainable communities;
- participate more fully in Russia's political, social and economic development.

In respect to the role of Russian aborigines in its Arctic policy-making/governance partnership and capacity building with Indigenous peoples are cornerstones of the Government of Russia's sustainable development strategies in the North. The Government of Russia and Russian Polar regions support the early involvement of Indigenous peoples in decision-making process. Even then, this was a transient population engaged in government services, the military activities, and resource exploration and extraction. Today, more and more people are making the North their permanent home. The situation in Canadian North is similar. The Government of Canada is committed to building the foundations for sustainable development by working with Indigenous peoples as they create their own institutions and craft their own development models. The Canadian

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Polar Commission and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) is an especial staff for coordinate national Arctic issues. AANDC to develop healthier and more self-sufficient communities, and help Aboriginal peoples participate more fully in a Canadian economy.

Professor Wang Chuanxing: As we know, in the past years, Russia and Norway reached and signed some agreements about territorial disputes and fisheries. And if those agreements have not been carried out that smoothly, then, what do you think the biggest obstacles to making those agreement realized?

Professor Arbakhan Magomedov: In April 2010, Norway and Russia made surprising announcement that they had resolved their territorial dispute in Barents Sea by essentially dividing the disputed acreage in half. A large number of factors played a role in Russia's decision to strike a deal with Norway. A key motivator for both Norway and Russia was the concerns that their ongoing dispute would provide an opportunity for the EU or its member states and other outsiders to influence Arctic affairs and play a large role in defining how Arctic resources are developed and utilized. By resolving its overlapping claims with Norway Russian was able to focus on its other plans for development of the Arctic. Additionally, a desire to strengthen the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas as the framework for the resolution of other Arctic disputes could have been a plausible Russian interest.

However, the main obstacles to making those agreements are:

1) Modern turmoil in International affairs and potential economic and diplomatic isolation of Russia. This situation is raising one question more starkly than before: Could be able Russia particularly interested in preventing the formation of a join NATO front in the Arctic since the four other Arctic states are all NATO members. What Russia considers to be more important claims to delimiting the outer continental shelf, as well as exertions to develop extensive Arctic energy fields and regulate potentially lucrative shipping connecting Europe and Asia through the Arctic.

2) If Russia could be not able to find serious partners to complete such important and vital project as Northern Sea Route.

3) If in the Barents Sea, a drive toward the exploration of offshore oil and gas deposits will not a major consideration but militarization. Because Russia still controls vast untapped petroleum resources. The surprising Russian interest in the resolution of overlapping claims stemmed from a political consideration: resolving a long-standing disagreement that offered other states--Arctic and non-Arctic alike--an opportunity for intervention.

Professor Wang Chuanxing: Last but not lest important, with China's further involvement in the Arctic affairs, as you mention, there are great potentials for the two great countries, China and Russia, to cooperate. Hence, in your opinion, on one hand, in what aspects does Russia expect from China in the bilateral cooperation in the Arctic Region investment in the infra, structures, buying energies/resources, making use of the Northern Sea Route, or/and adding drives/dynamics to Russia's development? And on the other hand, does Russia have geopolitical calculations on China's (possible) geopolitical calculations on the Arctic?

Professor Arbakhan Magomedov:

Russia needs allies in Arctic policy for support Russian Polar strategy nowadays. The point is that according to international law, Russia does not have a monopoly on Northern Sea Route (NSR). No country can block the movement of commercial ships through their territorial waters. The status of the NSR as a special Russian zone

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with a special transit regime means only that the Russian authorities can establish an insurance regime for ships there, provide search and rescue operations, and offer ice breakers to accompany ships. Therefore, it would make sense to find serious partners to complete the NSR as well as Russian polar policy whole. I convinced that working with China and signing a special agreement on jointly exploiting the NSR as a perspective project. The main issue is not only that China has money. At China's 18th Communist Party Congress, it was announced that China is a great naval power. The country's budget has set aside a large sum to develop its naval programs. The NSR could take approximately one-fifth of China's external trade through a scheme in which China ships its products to Europe and on the way back pick up raw materials in Russia.



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A New Dimension in Sino-American Security: Chinese and United States Interests in the Arctic

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September 2014

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China is a country very close to the Arctic whose changes are profoundly impacting China's social and economic developments. China, therefore, has to know well these changes and naturally pays tremendous attention to the Arctic affairs.

--**Gao Feng**, the Special Representative for Climate Changes, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, 21 May, 2013¹

The Arctic region is the last global frontier and a region with enormous and growing geostrategic, economic, climate, environment, and national security implications for the United States and the world.

-- **John Kerry**, U.S. Secretary of State, 16 July, 2014²

Though seemingly detached from its national and international strategic and economic objectives and ambitions, Beijing's interest in the Arctic has been increasing over the last two decades. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) possesses the largest conventionally powered ice breaker in the world The Snow Dragon, it and a second large ice breaker under construction of a similar size, it has undertaken region in the region, it has a permanent research station in the Svalbard islands (Spitzbergen), is interested in partnering the with Danes for mineral rights in Greenland. In April 2012, in pursuit of its Arctic objectives, China submitted an application for observer status to the Arctic Council an international body composed of Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Russia, with representation from various non-governmental groups from the region. Beijing was granted in May 2013, along with India, Italy, Japan and South Korea.³

On 20 June 2014, the Ministry of Transportation stated that it would issue The Guide to the Shipping in the Arctic Northeast Route in August in the same year.⁴ On 25 July 2014, a senior official of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) addressed, in a joint Sino-Russian Conference of Scientists, the powerful impacts of the retreat of Arctic sea ice on the weather over all of China, emphasizing the importance of Sino-Russian collaboration in the Arctic research.

Since it acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867, the United States has been an Arctic nation. During World War II the America moved military forces into the territory to deal with the threat from Japan built a highway through Canada to reinforce its position. During the Cold War, it deployed substantial forces, including air defence units as part of its containment and deterrent posture directed against the Soviet Union. And more recently the U.S. has deployed Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capabilities in response to the threat from North Korea.

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In May 2013 the White House issued its strategy for the Arctic.⁵ It was followed by the release of the United States Coast Guard's strategy for the region.⁶ And in February 2014, the US Navy (USN) had published the United States Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014–2030.⁷ That same month, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the position of Special Representative for the Arctic would be established, noting that “The great challenges of the Arctic matter enormously to the United States, and they hit especially close to home for Alaska.”⁸ On 16 July 2014 former U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp was appointed to the post. “With the team we're building at the State Department” Kerry sated at the time, “we will make sure that the United States is in the strongest possible position to meet these challenges and seize these opportunities.”⁹ This flurry of diplomatic and military interest comes just as the United States prepares to assume the Chair of the Arctic Council.

What had once been the final frontier of the rising America's nineteenth century continental expansion appears to have become an important domain and “global frontier” for U.S. homeland and international security in the twenty-first.

The United States' Arctic policy is multifaceted and may be partly motivated by that of China. While not directly linked to China's interest in the region, American concerns about Beijing's growing interest in the Arctic could well join the growing list of frictions between the two countries over a wide range of issues, from human rights and trade to regional and global issues of security. At present, the Arctic is not a high priority for either the United States or China. But both countries are preparing for the changes that will result from the year-round navigation through the North West Passage (NWP) between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans that is expected by 2030.

Will this emerging crossroad between North America, Europe and East Asia turn out to be a well-regulated global commons or a region of international competition with conflicting national claims and rising security concerns?

This paper examines the growing attention of China and the United States in the Arctic and explores their motivations and strategies in the region. It argues that China's interest in the Arctic is an extension of its growth in economic power since Deng Xiaoping's 1978 market-oriented reforms, which ended China's isolation from the West that had existed since the Communist national victory in 1949. The reasons for China's commitment to the Arctic are complicated, ranging from nationalistic pursuit of a recognized share in international waters and diplomatic manoeuvres to commercial interests and the emergence of unexpected opportunities. The complexity behind China's commitment to the Arctic reveals a series of challenges and uncertainties that the People's Republic of China has been facing since its birth.

The Origins of China's Arctic Exploration

David White observes that the fundamental principle of China's Arctic policy was a degree of nationalism that demanded for China both influence and access to the international waters of the Arctic.¹⁰ China is therefore “sensitive and prickly about any hint or whiff of possibly being excluded from full access to the Arctic and full influence in the formation of new Arctic governance regimes.”¹¹ This interest in the region is a relatively new development as China had shown no interest in the Arctic prior to the end of the Cold War. This was somewhat surprising as this was an era during which the region was one of the nerve centres in the West-East nuclear standoff. Rather than the Arctic, the focus of China's nationalistic pursuit of a recognized share in international waters and land during the Cold War had been the Antarctic. It was at the bottom of the

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world that China had developed its initial skills and expertise in cold weather research and exploration on both land and sea. The agency responsible for organizing China's Antarctic exploration was guojia nanji kaocha bangongshi (the State Office for Antarctic Exploration and Research (国家南极考察委员会办公室), established within the SOA in 1979. When China's programme of Arctic exploration began, this office was expanded as the CAA (Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration) within the SOA.¹²

The SOA was established in 1964. It was an outcome of the integration of China's maritime surveying agencies, including those from the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), in 1964. The SOA's principal missions in the beginning were to survey China's bordering seas for coastal defence and to oversee the planned long-range rocket tests in the South Pacific.¹³ After Deng Xiaoping initiated his market-oriented reform in late 1978, the SOA's priority shifted to the civilian aspects of state-building. In 1979, its agenda was refined and articulated using the slogans "chabian zhongguo hai (Survey China's territorial seas completely), tingjing san da yang (March into the three oceans — the Pacific, the India and the Atlantic) and dengshang nanjizhou (Land in the Antarctic)."¹⁴ The idea of conducting research in the Antarctic originated with Zhu Kezhen in 1957, when Western countries, the Soviet Union and its eastern European allies were establishing their stations in the Antarctic. Zhu was a geographer and vice-dean of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. His rationale for China's involvement was that "China is a daguo (big power) and has to have a global ambition and build up its global studies."¹⁵ Severely restrained by China's limited resources at that time, Zhu was not able to realize his plan until 1984, when China established its first Antarctic station, an event that was widely celebrated in China and was regarded as a symbol of China's increased international status.

In striking contrast to the rhetorical reports about China's first Antarctic expedition disseminated to the Chinese public, the initial Antarctic research was marginal in terms of its actual value which was not surprising given the low priority assigned to it by the SOA, whose primary attention was focused on China's coasts and near-seas and on increasing its expertise in marine surveying through collaboration with Western and Japanese research institutions.¹⁶ This was a period for China that was comparable with the Renaissance in the West. Following the catastrophic Cultural Revolution the Chinese began to embrace Western concepts and practices in the way that western Europeans had learned about the ancient Romans and Greeks from the Arabs centuries before. One of the concepts that the SOA introduced to China during the 1980s was the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a concept that Chinese scholars first learned of from scholars of the former Soviet Union.¹⁷ Still recovering from the lawlessness of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, the concept of the rule of law embodied in UNCLOS was very appealing to Deng and his peers at that time. This factor and the knowledge and regulated practices gleaned from western and Japanese institutions resulted in the SOA becoming an ardent supporter of UNCLOS in China. The SOA support for UNCLOS in turn convinced Chinese leaders to incorporate it into their policies as well with one caveat inserted in 1996 pertaining to the practice of "lawfare," one of China's "three warfares."¹⁸

It was not long before the SOA leaders began enjoying the first fruits of their efforts to join the international scientific community. They were granted "Pioneer Status" in deep-sea exploration by UNCLOS in February 1991 when the "Preparation Commission for the International Seabed Authority" and the "International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea" registered the "China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association." The Preparation Commission also secured for China the allotment of a 150,000 square kilometre mine site in the northern Pacific.¹⁹ By that time, the SOA had identified seabed minerals as a kind of strategic reserve and began investing in related fields, conducting some technological research and

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developing programme in addition to its support of the Preparation Commission.²⁰ Being encouraged by the promising prospective of seabed mining and China's roles in the Preparation Commission, the SOA referred to its participation as "a reflection of China's national interests and rights and of its significant contribution to the [international] efforts to establish a new order of rationale and fairness in exploiting the international seabed resources."²¹

The SOA's commitment to seabed mining coincided with a set of events inside and outside of China that altered the SOA's domestic and international circumstances that would provide the necessary experience and skill sets to generate and implement a comprehensive Arctic policy. The SOA's increased commitment to seabed mining reflected its loyalty to Deng's market-oriented reform. In order to solve China's economic difficulties, financial crisis and to prevent impending social turmoil from being, Deng was determined to abandon Mao Zedong's policy of self-imposed isolation. The isolationistic policy cut off China's traditional ties with the international market and consolidated the Communist rule, but the result was domestic poverty at the price of poverty. Deng's reforms were intended to revive China by restoring its ties with the outside world, specifically its pre-1949 maritime-oriented economy. Deng's reform thus put the legitimacy of the CCP's rule of Stalinism and Maoism at risk and encountered various kinds of resistance within the CCP officialdom. The SOA proved to be a vanguard agency in overcoming the Communist hardliners' resistance through promoting China's maritime interests. It served as an effective source of expertise and coordination for the realization of the maritime component of Deng's reforms. The SOA's influence and capabilities were so strong that they were responsible for maintaining the momentum of the maritime reforms through the period of uncertainty immediately after the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. It was during this period that the Communist hardliners attributed the students' pro-democracy movement to Deng's reforms and were attempting to discredit and destroy them.²²

In addition, the SOA leaders exploited opportunities to obtain up-to-date Soviet technology and equipment at low prices immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the Arctic lost the military value it had had during the Cold War and became open to international exploration, the SOA successfully expanded its Antarctic programme into the Arctic region²³ and purchased an icebreaker, the Snow Dragon, from Ukraine in 1993. In addition to this essential step in Arctic exploration, the SOA also learned from its previous experience the value of international collaboration during its Antarctic explorations.

The Policy Split: The SOA and the PLA

At the same time that the SOA was pursuing the goal of securing national maritime interests at home and abroad based upon a strategy of international engagement and collaboration, other agencies within the government were pursuing policies and objectives that would come into direct conflict with them and reflect a puzzling discontinuity of vision and purpose with the CCP. The experiences, goals and objectives of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the same period of development as the SOA were such that the results and consequences of their experiences resulted in a perspective and philosophy that was almost the exact opposite of that of the SOA.

The First Gulf War in 1991 had demonstrated that all of the PLA's equipment and operational doctrines were obsolete. In addition, as the Soviet threat disappeared, the PLA lost its built-in adversary. In the meantime, the crackdown on the Tiananmen protest removed any hope for peaceful unification with Taiwan in the foreseeable future. As the island was in the process of rapid democratization, it became highly possible that the pro-independent Democratic Progressive Party would come to power in Taiwan and seek international

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recognition of Taiwan's de facto independence. As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) saw itself as the sole saviour of the Chinese nation, it regarded the Taiwan issue as its unfinished cause of national unification. As a result, Taiwan's potential announcement of independence would jeopardize the legitimacy of the CCP's rule over China. The CCP therefore had to try to prevent this scenario. As a result, the PLA had to shift its primary attention from the traditional continental defence to maritime operations and build up naval and air forces powerful enough to restrain Taiwan. The issue of Taiwan therefore gave birth to the PLA's new strategy, the Military Strategy of the New Era (MSNE).²⁴ This strategy was based on the prediction that China's security interests were shifting from the traditional continental defence to potential conflicts over Taiwan. As Taiwan was relevant to the security interests of the United States, China's military pressure against the island would lead to intervention by the US. The United States, China's de facto ally against the former Soviet Union, became China's potential opponent. The PLA's concern about intervention by the United States proved well founded in 1996, when the United States sent an aircraft carrier battle group to the Taiwan Strait during a PLA war game against Taiwan. This event then prompted the PLA to develop its anti-access (access denial, or A2) capacity.²⁵ As a component of its long-range A2 forces, the PLA began to quietly build up a high-seas fleet, which included refurbishing an unfinished ex-Soviet aircraft carrier.

By the time Russian explorers planted their national flag on the seabed near the North Pole in August 2007, a symbolic action that nonetheless sparked international interest over the Arctic, China had made significant progress in the development of its economy, engagement with regional and global institutions (ASEAN, SCO, UN and WTO), the establishment of an international diplomatic presence and the modernization and re-orientation of its military to the maritime domain. It had acquired several of the trappings of great powers: a nuclear energy and weapons capability, a space programme that included the development of a space station, high technology industrial and manufacturing capability and its first aircraft carrier. The double-digit annual economic growth it had experienced since 1980 enabled the Chinese government to sustain the massive expenditures necessary to bring about the comprehensive modernization of its military power simultaneously with its transition from a manpower intensive to a technology intensive force.

The explosive growth resulting from Deng's reforms that provided the capital for the transformation of the PLA had fundamentally altered China's economic landscape and its relations with the rest of the world. Similar to the pre-1949 economic pattern for China, the majority of economic capacity and a growing element of the population was concentrated in the coastal areas of the country. On the eve of the financial crisis in September 2008, approximately 10% of China's economic activities²⁶ were related to overseas trade and this proportion was expected to grow as the Chinese economic policy of global engagement and collaboration paralleled that of the long-standing SOA strategy, as the SOA had planned in 1994.²⁷ China had become the second-largest oil consumer in the world, next only to the United States, and was the largest oil importer in the world, with over 50% of its oil requirements coming from the Persian Gulf. China also continued to purchase US governmental bonds lavishly and helped the US government sustain the American markets for Chinese products. This strategy not only maintained China's economic growth and employment but also bound the United States financially to China and significantly improved China's diplomatic position. In addition, the overwhelming victory by the pro-unification Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party) in Taiwan's presidential and parliamentary elections in February 2008 relieved the PLA from the pressure of an imminent cross-Strait war. As the potential for war with Taiwan became increasingly remote, China's territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, a legacy of the Nationalist government, become prominent. A hard-line policy in the disputes, which could be

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supported by China's steadily increasing military capabilities naval and air strength, reflected China's achievements in the three preceding decades and was also a kind of powerful glue between the two Chinese states across the Taiwan Strait. But this policy would damage China's relations with Japan and with Southeast Asia countries that are either allied to or supported by the United States, and may end up creating a diplomatic impasse.

Opportunities in the Arctic

The melting of the Arctic sea ice and the escalating competition among the Arctic countries offered China an opportunity to actively participate in the international efforts to prepare for a navigable Arctic, which would be a significant geopolitical development. The SOA responded actively to international competition sparked by the Russian flag-planting. An analysis of research articles published on the Arctic reveals that the SOA began a research programme sometime in late 2007 or early 2008. This programme involved a number of universities²⁸ and looked at legal issues related to the Arctic routes, the potential impacts of Arctic climate change on northern China, the commercial value of the Arctic routes, the potential influence of the Arctic routes on Russia and northeastern China, China's Arctic goals and an appropriate strategy, and the technical requirements for commercially viable vessels in the Arctic.

Chinese researchers agreed that China had a large stake has interests that are significantly influenced by events and developments in the Arctic in the Arctic even though it is not an Arctic country. Over two-thirds of China's territory is immediately impacted by the winter storms originating from the Arctic. And the Northern Sea Route is a shorter and safer route from China to both Europe and the east coast of North America.²⁹ It would free China from its dependence on the southern route. Chinese researchers predicted that the Northern Sea Route would alter the landscape of international maritime shipping, making the Arctic the pivot of intercontinental transportation. This shift would directly affect China's economic outlay and become a driving forcing for economic growth in northern and northeastern China.³⁰ It was therefore very much in the national interests to study climate change and understand exactly what the environmental, political, economic and security implications are for both the region and China. It is also in China's interest to influence events and developments in the region whenever and wherever possible.³¹

Chinese researchers paid particular attention to Russia's Arctic policy. They assessed possible opportunities in China-Russia economic cooperation and potential impacts of the gradual retreat of the Arctic sea ice on Sino-Russian relations. A few researchers predicted that, as Arctic trade increases, Russia will redefine its agenda of economic development and shift its priority from Europe to the Pacific. Russia will therefore link itself economically much more closely with China. They concluded that the Northeastern Route along Russia's Arctic coast would facilitate the integration of the economies of China and Russia and, finally, alter the geopolitics of the world.³² One of the researchers even reached the conclusion that those who control the Arctic will control the world.³³

The increasingly navigable Arctic means tremendous commercial opportunities. Chinese researchers investigated the infrastructure for shipping along Russia's Arctic coast as well as available icebreakers and other vessels suitable for Arctic navigation.³⁴ They observed that the infrastructure is outdated and the icebreakers are aging. In addition, there are far fewer experienced Arctic navigators than will be needed for the growing market. The researchers concluded that Arctic navigation is a huge emerging market and that Chinese investors and industrialists should take action to exploit the opportunities in the Arctic.

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The Approach to the Arctic Ice

The arguments presented in the Arctic research projects mentioned above echo the SOA's consistent policy of facilitating China's maritime-oriented economy, educating the Chinese public about the ocean and developing a number of cutting-edge maritime technologies as well as enhancing international cooperation. The SOA was successful in having them listed in the National Twelfth Five-year Plan (2011–2015), which included "actively conduct[ing] polar study research projects."³⁵ In the SOA's own five-year plan (2011–2015), the first in its list of tasks was "intensifying the Research and Development in [maritime] survey and obtaining key technologies" with the purpose of "support[ing China's] new maritime industries of strategic importance,"³⁶ one of the high-tech fields listed in China's 863 Programme, a national high-tech development programme started in 1986.³⁷ In addition to the surveying technology, the category of "maritime technology" includes "the exploitation of maritime resources" of seabed oil and gas fields and seabed mining.³⁸ Although the Twelfth Five-year Plan and the 863 Programme do not mention that these technologies are essential to Arctic exploration, the Arctic was an important item in the SOA's own Twelfth Five-year Plan. In addition, the SOA warned in one of its reports that the deteriorating ecological environments in China's near seas will be the bottleneck in China's maritime economy.³⁹ Nevertheless, in another report of the same period, the SOA predicted that China's "maritime economy will have become matured by 2030,"⁴⁰ creating an obvious contradiction to the "bottleneck" warning. And the solution to this contradiction must be the development of the key technologies listed in the SOA's five-year plan, ocean survey and seabed mining. Although these technologies were not developed specifically for the Arctic, they could be used in the Arctic with some revisions. They will therefore help improve China's position in the Arctic when they become available and are listed as a component of China's Arctic strategy by Chinese researchers.⁴¹

In addition to economic and technological means to promote China's interests in the Arctic, Chinese researchers also explored each Arctic country's Arctic policy, the prominent issues in Arctic politics and the related issues of international law.⁴² Chinese researchers recognized the territorial disputes among the Arctic countries (Canada, the United States, Russia, Norway and Denmark). With Canadian experts' help, Chinese researchers explored the Canada-US Arctic disputes over the Northwest Passage and the environmental risks involved in Arctic shipping.⁴³ Based on their research on some significant aspects of Arctic affairs, the researchers suggested that the Chinese government should take a cautious but active approach to the Arctic issue.⁴⁴ They asserted that Chinese scholars and the government know little about the Arctic and that situation has handicapped the Chinese government's efforts to develop an Arctic policy that could coordinate the related agencies and organizations.⁴⁵ One of them suggested that the Chinese government and enterprises increase their investment in research on the human aspects of Arctic affairs, an effort that he referred to as a part of "the construction of China's soft power."⁴⁶

An essential element of China's "soft power" development is its commitment to effective international cooperation and to international law. Because China is not an Arctic country, Chinese researchers agree that China has to depend on international cooperation and international law to claim and protect its national interests in the Arctic. They observed that the foundation of the relevant international law was the Svalbard Treaty (1925), on which China built its first Arctic station, and the UNCLOS. Because the Arctic is relevant to China's national interests, China should with its current status as observer on the Arctic Council. One of the methods proposed to achieve this goal is to increase and be active in participating in Arctic affairs so that it can be a "lawmaker" in the future rather than being satisfied China's investment in research in Arctic technologies,

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including seabed mining and oil exploration as discussed previously, in addition to increasing trade and investment in the Arctic countries. Another method is to use China's rapidly growing naval power.

Chinese researchers paid attention to the territorial disputes among the Arctic countries and their military deployments and exercises in the region. One researcher advocated for China to deploy its nuclear-powered submarines in the Arctic. They described these symbolic events in a way that suggested that China could improve its position in the Arctic politics through naval deployments, ignoring the difficulties in logistics.⁴⁷ They interpreted the Arctic countries' symbolic military exercises as a reflection of the Arctic's military value.

However none of researchers mentioned the change in the Arctic's military value during and after the Cold War. Nor did they take into account the MSNE, a strategy that is intended to intimidate Taiwan and to let the United States think twice before entering into dispute with China for the sake of Taiwan. They did not explain the contradiction between China's dependence on international law and international cooperation in the Arctic and its insistence on bilateral negotiations in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Nor does any article review the evolution of the SOA's history and its explorations in the Antarctic and the Arctic or its connection to Deng's successful economic reform. Nothing was written about the impacts of China's institutional deficiencies (such as its fiscal institution) on China's Arctic policy, particularly on China's pursuit of participation in the international governance of the Arctic. While Chinese researchers did identify China's interests in the Arctic and the potential opportunities and benefits presented by the retreat of the Arctic sea ice, they did not address these in the context of the bigger picture of international politics and Deng's market-oriented reform since 1978. Without exploring these contexts, it is not surprising that China's Arctic research remains fragmented and has not produced a coherent Arctic strategy.⁴⁸ After China was granted observer status on the Arctic Council in May 2013, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that China's efforts in the Arctic involved many agencies and ministries of the Chinese government but that their efforts could not be coordinated because of the absence of a coordinating agency.⁴⁹ Without achieving consensus on some prominent issues in China's maritime policy, such as the MSNE, the task of coordinating China's Arctic projects will be daunting, particularly when added to the formidable challenges facing Xi Jinping arising from the anti-corruption campaign, the rise of terrorism, the economic slowdown and the potential resulting social problems.

The complexity and discontinuities of China's Arctic policy may simply be representative of the CCP's overall style of governance as it has evolved over time. The competing domestic interests of the various policy stakeholders will keep the policy and its outcomes in a state of flux that consumes resources and produces less than optimal outcomes. While this is a deplorable state of affairs for a rising global power, it is but one of many critical issues faced by the President of China, Xi Jinping and the CCP and as such may not be effectively addressed or remedied in the near future. Until it is however, China and its people cannot and will not realize the full potential benefits of participation in the exploitation of the Arctic.

America's New Maritime Domain

When Secretary Kerry announced the appointment of Admiral Papp as the first United States special representative for the Arctic he noted that "President Obama and I are committed to elevating" Arctic "issues in America's foreign policy and national security strategy because the United States is an Arctic nation, and Arctic policy has never been more important, particularly as we prepare to Chair the Arctic Council in 2015."⁵⁰ Amongst the Arctic issues that have drawn American attention is China's growing interest and activities in the region.

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China specialists and the intelligence community in the United States watch the situation in China closely, including its military power, maritime strategy and Arctic policy.⁵¹ Since 2000, the Department of Defense (DoD) has submitted to Congress an annual report on the development of China's military power.⁵² Under President Barak Obama, the United States has paid increasing attention to East Asia and the Western Pacific. In the fall of 2011, the United States issued a series of announcements outlining its "pivot" toward this region, "rebalancing" of its overall global strategic posture.⁵³ This rebalancing policy was in response to the growth of China's economic and military power. Yet just as the U.S. was shifting its focus toward the waters of the Asia-Pacific region in response to rising Chinese power there, China was increasing its interest in waters close to the American homeland, which among other things resulted in an increase in its investment in Arctic research.

American and other Western observers noticed China's growing interest in the Arctic and its unusual ways of expanding its global influence. These approaches, developed by the People's Liberation Army's General Department of Politics, were referred to as legal, psychological and media "warfares." In a DoD research project led by David Halper, completed in May 2013, these three "warfares" were interpreted as the extension of China's "embracing of [an] Asymmetric War into [the] new realm."⁵⁴ And the purpose of the "three warfares" included "facilitating China's global reach"⁵⁵ and seeking "nothing less than to revise the global legal regime and replace it with one having Chinese characteristics."⁵⁶

The DoD project team observed China's efforts to become involved in Arctic governance by applying to and being accepted as an observer at the Arctic Council, because of the Arctic's potential value in shipping and mining. They remarked that China had adopted a comprehensive approach to participating in Arctic affairs and was "engaging coastal states en masse and other Arctic stakeholders bilaterally on a range of issues including trade, culture and investment, tourism and technology."⁵⁷

It is not too speculative to argue that China's active engagement in the Arctic affairs has reinforced America's interests in this region since 2009. In a recent report, National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change, the Military Advisory Board of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), a body composed of sixteen 16 retired generals and admirals from the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps assessed the impact of climate change on American national security interests. With regard to the impact of the global warming on the Arctic the Board recommended that, "The United States should accelerate and consolidate its efforts to prepare for increased access and military operations in the Arctic":

DOD and other U.S. government agencies should build on and accelerate plans recently put forward in Arctic strategic planning documents. The Arctic is already becoming viable for commercial shipping and increased resource exploitation. The time to act is now. To expedite crisis response and requirements generation, the Arctic region should be assigned to one CCMD. To provide the United States with better standing in resolving future disputes in the Arctic, the U.S. should become a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁵⁸

It is still unclear what its future commercial⁵⁹ and strategic importance will be. As Ronald O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service observed in a report to Congress, "The Arctic has increasingly become a subject of discussion among political leaders of the nations in the region. Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is also increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue."⁶⁰ With the US slated to assume the Chair of the Arctic Council in 2015, the region's potential importance may receive more international attention.

In 2010, then-US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, noted in a memorandum on the USN's

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Strategic Objectives for the Arctic that "...the potential for conflict in the Arctic is low."⁶¹ From the American perspective, the Pentagon's 2011 Unified Command Plan gave "singular advocacy responsibility for Arctic capabilities" to the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) because it has "the only US Arctic territory within its AOR" (Area of Operations).⁶² Its commander told Congress that year that "I have elevated the Arctic to the status of a key focus area."⁶³

In May 2013 the White House released a National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which is intended "to position the United States to respond effectively to challenges and emerging opportunities arising from significant increases in Arctic activity due to the diminishment of sea ice and the emergence of a new Arctic environment."⁶⁴ It was accompanied by the US Coast Guard's Arctic Strategy, whose aim "is to ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic."⁶⁵

In early 2014 the Wall Street Journal reported that the opening of the Northwest Passage was presenting "challenges for the U.S. military." It cited the American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Greenert, who observed that "The inevitable opening of the Arctic will essentially create a new coast on America's north."⁶⁶ The CNO stressed that the Navy's primary job would be "to ensure freedom of navigation" and that it remained to see "what's the level of combatant ship presence that we need." While noting that that he is "not in a big hurry, I don't need another domain to go to," Greenert did acknowledge that the Arctic "could be a domain of significance."⁶⁷

In February 2014 the USN issued its Arctic Roadmap, 2014–2030, which stressed that,

The Navy will continue to have a significant leadership role in the Arctic Region to enable the joint and interagency community to operate in this hard-to-reach, isolated, and harsh environment. Through its global reach capability and worldwide command and control, Navy leadership will support joint and interagency efforts, enhance information sharing, and develop enterprise solutions that can be employed across United States Government and allied partner agencies operating in the Region.⁶⁸

Consistent with the trend since the end of the Cold War, the USN assesses "the military threat environment in the Arctic Region has diminished significantly and the risk of armed conflict in the Arctic Region is projected to remain low for the foreseeable future."⁶⁹ The Roadmap directs the Navy's involvement in the Arctic for the near term, the present to 2020, the mid-term 2020 to 2030 and the far term, after 2030, "placing particular emphasis on near-term actions necessary to enhance Navy's ability to operate in the Arctic Region in the future. In the near-term, there will be low demand for additional naval involvement in the Region." It judges existing capabilities as "sufficient to meet near-term operational needs."⁷⁰

Given its Asia-Pacific shift, a continuing call on assets throughout the world and the fact that the United States Coastal Guard (USCG) is the lead American maritime force in the region, as the US Navy Arctic Roadmap acknowledges, "The Navy will continue to provide capability and presence primarily through undersea and air assets. Surface ship operations will be limited to open water operations in the near-term. Even in open water conditions, weather factors, including sea ice, must be considered in operational risk assessments." It allowed that "should conditions permit it may the Navy may employ ice strengthened Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships to conduct Navy missions."⁷¹

As part of its near term activities, the USN expects to increase participation "cold weather exercises" such as it did in 2010 with Canadian and Danish forces as part of Canada's annual military exercise Natsiq and in 2011 when it joined Norwegian and Russian forces in the Barents Sea off the north coast of Norway. As Rear Admiral

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Jon White, Director, Task Force Climate Change and Oceanographer and Rear Admiral William McQuikin, Director of Navy Strategy and Policy Division recently noted, "We expect this type of multi-national exercise participation to take place with greater frequency in the coming years as we build experience in Arctic operations."⁷²

Another indication of the new interest which the United State is showing in the Arctic is the initiation of an Arctic Regional Studies Group (ARSG) and an Arctic Security course at the United States Navy War College (USNWC) and the holding of an Arctic Strategy and Policy Seminar (ASPS) at NWC in May 2014. Six USN officers took the course along with international students from Canada, Denmark and Norway. The seminar was the "capstone event for the Arctic Security course, providing an opportunity to educate and develop leaders and help define the future Navy and its associated roles and missions in the Arctic." As the director of the ARSG observed, "This will foster an active and growing community of joint and naval leaders charged with planning and operating in the Arctic today and in the future."⁷³

The Arctic and U.S.-Canada Defence and Security Relations

In one important respect the increased American interest in the Arctic is not new. Since the early days of the Cold War, the U.S. has taken an interest in the region in the context of providing for the direct strategic defence of the United States first from Soviet air and the missile attack. This necessitates very close collaboration with Canada under the auspices of the bi-national North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) established in the late 1950s. For most of the Cold War, especially with decline in the Soviet air threat and the advent of intercontinental missiles, the American and Canadian Arctic regions were something of a strategic backwater. This has changed with the rise in the region's economic potential and, since 9/11, with the emphasis upon homeland security and defence. In 2002 the United States established USNORTHCOM a joint combatant command whose Area of Operations (AOR) is North America, including the Arctic territories of both the United States and Canada. While the two commands are different, (USNORTHCOM being a solely American command with Army, Air Force, Navy and U.S. Coast Guard components and NORAD is bi-national with a predominately aerospace mission), the Commander of USNORTHCOM is 'dual-hatted' as the Commander of NORAD. Thus although the United States approaches Arctic security issues from a broad international perspective, in terms concrete measures to advance American security interests in the region, the bilateral Canada-U.S. context is of particular, and growing importance.

As with the United States, Canada has approached the potential growing importance of the Arctic from both national and multinational perspectives. Ottawa has expressed both broad sovereignty claims reaching to the North Pole and held fast to the view that the North West Passage is part of sovereign internal Canadian waters. Similar to American assessments, Canada sees the potential for armed conflict in the region as low: "In 2009, Canada's then-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk, said: 'If someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to rescue them.'"⁷⁴ Along with Washington, Ottawa stressed the need for co-operation and collaboration amongst the Arctic nations on matters such as environmental protection and resource development.

While Canada has adopted an international perspective on the Arctic from a purely defence and security policy perspective, however, it would appear that Ottawa is also approaching the region in a bilateral context. Indeed, Canada has shown some reluctance to engage NATO, as a collective defence organization, with regard to Arctic issues, particularly as it concerns Russia. One Canadian analyst has observed that "Canada bristles at

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NATO military activity with an Arctic focus” because of its potentially provocative implications.⁷⁵As Michael Byers relates: “The Cold War ended more than two decades ago and Russia is now a member of the WTO, G20, Council of Europe, and Arctic Council. In January 2010, behind closed doors, Stephen Harper reportedly told the Secretary General of NATO: ‘Canada has a good working relationship with Russia with respect to the Arctic...’”⁷⁶

While wary of involving NATO, yet given the United States’ and Canada’s growing and Canada’s critical interests in the Arctic, there have been several proposals that would, drawing on the NORAD-USNORTHCOM relationship, make NORAD the locus of Canada-US Arctic co-operation. In one case NORAD’s maritime warning role would be expanded, and- relying on the air defence radars of the North Warning System- would acquire the task of “Arctic All-domain Awareness.”⁷⁷ For this to happen, NORAD would first need to solidify its maritime warning role. Since the 2006 renewal NORAD has a new responsibility for “maritime domain awareness” that has taken it beyond its exclusively aerospace tasks. Given that the United States Navy tends to approach maritime domain awareness from a global, forward projection perspective and that the fact that in both the United States and Canada responsibility for maritime homeland security and defence is already shared by a wide range of military and civilian organizations, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the United States Coast Guard and the Royal Canadian Navy, it is unclear from the beginning what specific role NORAD would play. It can be said, though, that NORAD officials are quite aware of a key structural limitation. The command is a passive recipient of maritime information and cannot “task” others to provide it. NORAD officials have been considering a series of proposals to address this. If they eventually are approved by the two defence establishments, i.e. if NORAD receives “tasking” authority of some kind or other, it will be a strong signal that the command’s role in maritime domain awareness will endure and strengthen. At the same time, should NORAD’s new maritime role not significantly expand, or should it eventually be decided to forego even a modest maritime role for the bi-national command, bilateral maritime homeland security relations between the U.S. and Canada including those in the Arctic region, will still continue through existing linkages between respective national agencies.

Indeed, because of the sensitivities in both countries over the Arctic, either or both nations might prefer to leave such matters out of the hands of a bi-national command, although imply providing for enhanced information sharing, expanded cooperation and joint assessment of the Arctic would not truly challenge the sovereignty or freedom of maneuver of either country. As an example, in December 2012 the United States and Canada entered into an agreement that “expanded their security relationship by promoting closer cooperation in peacefully opening the Arctic.” A Tri-Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation was signed by US Army General Charles Jacoby Jr., the former Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, and Canadian Army Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare, commander of Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), the Canadian command whose responsibilities include the defence of Canada and defence co-operation with the U.S., during a meeting of the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board of Defence. As explained by US Department of Defense, “The agreement emphasizes that the Arctic is not a region of conflict, but rather a place where nations can work together peacefully and the US and Canadian militaries will support other departments and agencies in response to regional threats and hazards when requested and directed,.... all to promote a safe and secure Arctic region.”⁷⁸

Also signed at the time was the Tri-Command Training and Exercise Statement, which is meant to expand “cooperation in the training and exercise realm” while recognizing “the shared security interests and budget constraints facing both militaries...” According to the DoD, this agreement “is aimed at enhancing joint and

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combined readiness in support of safety, security and defence missions between the Canadian and U.S. militaries.” In particular, it will build on the Vigilant Shield and Determined Dragon exercises, which bring the three commands together to exercise their ability to protect the US and Canadian homelands and support civil authorities in the event of a natural or manmade disaster. The new agreement will formalize these exchanges and encourage more cross-border training in ways that strengthen both countries’ defence plans”⁷⁹

As it increases its interest in the Arctic, the United States is also looking to its continued involvement in European security with NATO and partner countries. In June 2013, United States European Command (USEUCOM) participated in an exercise along with USNORTHCOM and CJOC to enhance understanding of Arctic nations’ capabilities for “coordination,” address “safety and security concerns” and “promote a Framework for International Cooperation in the Arctic,” and “strengthen Arctic Partnerships.”⁸⁰ With allies Denmark, Iceland and Norway members of the Arctic Council, along with Sweden, Finland and Russia, the future of this northern most part of NATO’s northern flank will be of growing concern to the Alliance as whole.⁸¹

Conclusion

The principal challenge to the United States is the constraint on its resources resulting from its global commitments. These commitments prevent it from allocating a great deal attention and resources to the Arctic, given its global commitments including the pivot to the Asia-Pacific area where it seeks to counter China’s growing influence and power while continuing its involvement in European security and in the Middle-East. In America’s favour is the fact that in the Arctic, Washington can leverage already existing and extensive co-operative bilateral security ties with Canada and its multilateral links with Europe through NATO. And while other overseas commitments and fiscal realities will limit the amount of resources in terms of assets and operational attention that the U.S. Navy will be able to devote exclusively to the Arctic, the proximity of the region to the American homeland means that the U.S. Guard will continue to take the lead in providing America with a presence there. This is especially the case in meeting non-military challenges such as resource exploitation, environmental protection, law enforcement and search and rescue.

In contrast to the United States, China must build its capabilities, international ties and influence in Arctic affairs from scratch. For Beijing, more so than for Washington, the Arctic is indeed a new domain. At the same time Beijing has proven its adaptability to the Arctic situation and its determination to establish its position. China is not an Arctic member state and thus has had to adopt the approach of multilateralism and depend on international collaboration. But this approach has rewarded China with observer status in the Arctic Council, a reflection of the Arctic member states’ consensus about China’s right to a voice in Arctic affairs. However, each Arctic member state has its own national interests and priorities, which sometimes conflict with those of the others. The maritime boundaries over the continental shelves extending beyond the territorial seas and the Exclusive Economic Zones have yet to be fully defined. Indeed even between Canada and the United States, these boundaries and the status of the Northwest Passage under UNCLOS, remain a point of contention.

China could increase its influence in Arctic affairs by exploiting the divergences, and even frictions, among the Arctic countries, in addition to using international law and China’s economic power, as one of its Arctic researchers articulated.⁸² But this would require taking the risk of being aligned with one at the expense of others. Much greater potential risks are China’s territorial disputes with its neighbours in the South and East China Seas and China’s refusal of international arbitration.⁸³ These territorial disputes and China’s rejection of arbitration do nothing to enhance China’s credentials as a potential mediator in Arctic affairs. Instead, they

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reinforce the suspicion that Beijing selectively uses “provisions in UNCLOS and other international legal conventions for specific unintended purposes.”⁸⁴

The criticism of Beijing’s interpretation of the UNCLOS and other international conventions is only a tiny component in a series of disputes between China and the United States. Among their primary disagreements are issues concerning military transparency, Taiwan, human rights, copyright piracy and the exchange rate of the RMB (China’s currency). These issues relate to China’s current political, military and economic institutions on which the People’s Republic is built, and so they will not be resolved in the near future. The US-China quarrels are actually reflections of the collision between two institutions, founded respectively on America’s liberalism and China’s despotism. And China’s commitment to Arctic affairs and America’s subsequent response are extensions of the two countries’ growing frictions elsewhere.

But like Washington, Beijing also has other commitments, especially in its own region where it now finds a greater American interest. Global-scale friction between China and the United States was a scenario that Deng Xiaoping did not envisage at the end of the 1970s when he began his market-oriented reform through a gradual abolition of the Stalinist command economy and visited the United States seeking access to its technology and market as well as political and military support against the Soviet Union. Deng’s reform saved his Communist regime from sharing the fate of his Eastern European comrades in 1989 and produced a level of prosperity that China had not seen since the eighteenth century. It also enabled China to afford its expensive Antarctic and Arctic program. Deng’s reform was indeed successful.

The success of Deng’s reform did not come without cost, however. The price was the Communists’ soul of Marxism. Deng pragmatically reshaped to his own needs the anti-capitalist Marxist philosophy on which the People’s Republic was built, transforming the People’s Republic into a Communist state without Communism. In order to adapt to the post-Cold War situation and the challenges posed by Taiwan’s potential declaration of independence, Deng’s successors resorted to nationalism and economic growth to maintain their legitimacy. One of the outcomes of this new approach was the PLA’s Military Strategy of the New Era (MSNE), which started its historical transition from a traditional strategy of continental defence to one of maritime defence. Twenty-one years after the implementation of the MSNE, the PLA navy and air force had made tremendous progress, providing China with more options for defence. Nevertheless, the MSNE is irrelevant to and even incompatible with Deng’s market-oriented reform on which China’s Arctic policy of international collaboration and international law is built. Moreover, whether the MSNE could help maintain peace in the western Pacific or whether it would make the situation more volatile is dependent on many factors. Among them is the outcome of Taiwan’s presidential elections, which is out of China’s direct control. And the possibility of China’s overestimation of the Arctic’s military value in international politics and Chinese scholars’ expectations for China’s future naval deployments in the Arctic could complicate Arctic politics significantly and would hardly be welcome.⁸⁵ The increasingly navigable Arctic will promote trade between China and Europe and North America, but it will not help China reduce its growing tensions with the United States and its allies in East Asia.

In sum, both the United States and China are showing greater interest in the Arctic, a region close to the U.S. even as they confront each other in the western Pacific, which is for China of greater concern than the Arctic is for the United States. The U.S. cannot keep China out of the Arctic any more than China can keep the United States out of the western Pacific. In neither region is either country looking for a confrontation. However the proximity of the Arctic to the U.S., and several of its key allies, along with the additional concern about Russia, makes the Arctic a particularly sensitive area for Washington in an era of global warming and expected

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increased international activity. Thus the Arctic domain is likely to add a new dimension to the already complex and uncertain relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China.

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极地国际治理

北极开发的四重风险

苏平 (同济大学极地 & 海洋国际问题研究中心讲师、美国约翰·霍普金斯高级国际研究学院访问学者)

蔡鑫 (上海政法学院讲师)

北极融化的冰雪、丰富的自然资源以及连接欧亚的新航道使得北极开发炙手可热。然而北极“开发热”背后蕴藏着巨大风险，北极恶劣的气候条件、脆弱的生态环境、薄弱的基础设施建设、以及世界能源市场的冲击都对北极开发形成了有力的挑战。

一、北极开发的气候风险

极端气候条件是北极开发首当其冲的风险。北极地区每年大部分时间为冰雪所覆盖，即使在冰雪部分消融的夏季，仍然面临低温、飓风、海冰、浓雾和极夜的影响。根据皮尤美国北极项目组的资料显示，北极地区冬季的气温可低至 -40°C ，有记录的最低温度是 -68°C 。低温容易折损设备，尤其在飓风和巨浪作用下，船只和设备很容易覆盖冰雪，形成安全隐患。不仅如此，北极海冰破坏海上建筑物和船只，限制海上运输和供给。同时北极长时间的雾霾和极夜也会降低能见度，极端气候条件对于北极航行和资源开采都提出了极高的要求。为了保障北极开发的安全，北极国家一方面积极研发适应极寒气候条件的开采技术，一方面研究制定相应的技术运行标准。

二、北极开发的基础设施风险

北极开发缺乏机场、公路、港口、管道和破冰船等配套的基础设施，而建设这些基础设施的费用又十分昂贵。美国战略与国际研究中心欧洲事务部主任希瑟·康雷(Heather Conley)指出，将阿拉斯加北坡地区的自然资源运到市场，每100英里道路的建设，需要4亿到6亿美元，将阿拉斯加的天然气运到消费市场可能需要650亿美元的建设投资，从西华德半岛到费尔班克斯建立500英里的通道运送矿产资源需要23亿到27亿美元之间。除了新的基础设施建设，阿拉斯加现有交通设施因为冻土解冻而遭破坏，大概有450英里的高速公路需要重建或者改道。航海和航空的基础设施费用更高，包括深水港、破冰船和后勤补给船、飞机、机场建设等，一艘破冰船可能耗资10亿美元，北极深水港的费用正在评估当中。

三、北极开发的市场风险

由于世界能源市场的冲击，北极石油和天然气短期内商业化开采存在困难。北极80%的油藏为海洋石油，建立油气储存装置、铺设长输管道均受浮冰漂移的影响。常规石油资源的生产成本很低，一般为每桶不足10美元到40美元。在运用强化采油技术之后，这一成本可能提升至每桶20至80美元。深海和超深水海域资源每桶开采成本则高达65美元。与此相比，北极的石油资源开采成本则更显昂贵，每桶生产成本在40至80美元之间。更有美国地质学家认为，北极石油开采难度高，如果每桶开采成本为100美元，可以开采25亿桶，如果成本提升至300元每桶，才可以开采41亿桶，这还是税前的成本价。得克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校能源研究所副所长阿维泽塔克(Aviezer Tucker)认为非传统能源将重绘世界能源和政治版图。页岩气的出现迅速降低了全球天然气的价格，从北极输送天然气的成本相对于页岩气来说不具竞争力。在这种情况下，尽管各国争相圈地北极，但油气商业开采仍依赖市场价格的支撑。

四、北极开发的环境风险

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北极开发自始至终面临着来自环北极国家、政府间国际组织、非政府组织和原住民等多方的阻力。阿拉斯加州政府计划修建公路运输北极资源,然而遭到当地社区和环境组织的强烈反对,因为这条道路将切断北美驯鹿迁徙的路线,影响原住民的生存捕猎。由于害怕鱼群资源枯竭对北极脆弱的生态系统造成影响。北太平洋渔业管理委员会2009年决定取缔从白令海峡到美加争议海洋边界地区20平方英里地区的商业捕鱼,这一地区包括楚科奇海和波弗特海。根据美国国家海洋和大气局的观点,过去的四十多年里,鱼群为了生存已经北迁,如果鱼群迁徙再次发生,某些鱼类将从美国水域消失。

我国目前在北极的科学外交、资源外交以及参与北极治理模式都获得广泛认可,为进一步参与北极开发打下良好基础。然而,也应充分认识到机遇同时伴随着高风险,北极特殊的气候条件对于北极开发的设备、开发时间都提出高要求,油气资源开发成本高于市场价格将影响商业开发,脆弱的北极生态环境促使北极国家制定严格的船只建造、开采设备设计、设备操作、培训搜救标准。需从研发适应北极气候条件的技术装备、成本预算以及环境保护等多角度,为进入北极做好充分准备。



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极地国别政策

新西兰与罗斯属地

何 柳 (武汉大学中国边界与海洋研究院讲师、国家领土主权与海洋权益协同创新中心研究人员)

【摘要】作为领土要求国,新西兰在南极罗斯属地的领土主权利益是其南极国家利益最核心的问题。自英国创建罗斯属地之后至《南极条约》签订以前,新西兰在这一问题上的立场经历了二战以前的无所作为到战后的犹豫不决和支持南极“国际化”。20世纪90年代中期以后,新西兰逐渐在领土主权问题上显示强硬立场,并通过一系列南极活动加强其南极存在,合法化其领土主张,维护其在罗斯属地的领土利益。

【关键词】新西兰; 罗斯属地; 领土主权; 南极

罗斯属地(Ross Dependency)是新西兰在南极地区声称拥有的领土,其范围包括南纬60°以南,东经160°至西经150°之间所有的岛屿和领土,总面积为45万平方公里。1841年,英国探险家詹姆斯·克拉克·罗斯(James Clark Ross)爵士在其南极探险过程中发现了一个从南大洋最易到达南极大陆的深海湾,并将其命名为罗斯海。1923年,英国颁布枢密令,创建罗斯属地,同时将其行政管辖权移交给新西兰总督。

作为领土要求国,主权利益是新西兰南极国家利益最为核心的问题。新西兰对南极旅游、资源开发、生态保护等事务的关切都源于其“门户国家”的地理位置,也源于其对罗斯属地的领土要求。那么,英国为何要创建罗斯属地,又是运用何种方式将该领土责任交付新西兰;新西兰在罗斯属地问题上的立场经历了怎样的变化,其在维护领土主权方面有哪些具体举措及表现。本文试图探讨并回答上述问题。

一、历史背景: 英国涉足南极大陆并提出领土主张

早期英国在南极的利益集中在南大西洋的福克兰群岛。鉴于其重要的战略价值,1843年英皇制造对福克兰群岛及其属地提出了主权声索。自1892年起该地区正式成为英属殖民地。英国对南极半岛和次南极岛屿的发现及声索从17世纪下半叶开始直到19世纪初期。在这一个多世纪的时间里,英国人分别发现了南乔治亚岛、南设得兰群岛、南奥克尼群岛、南桑威奇群岛和南极半岛。这些发现及随后英国海员们的航行共同建立了英国对南极半岛和次南极岛屿的发现权¹。

20世纪初,英国对南极大陆的声索则是在经济利益的驱使下对捕鲸业的管制和养护。19世纪捕鲸炮等新的捕鲸技术的发展和运用使得北大西洋区域的鲸鱼已几近灭绝,北半球的捕鲸船只开始远赴南大西洋从事捕鲸活动。由于南极水域拥有丰富的须鲸资源,捕鲸公司从鲸油和鲸须制品中迅速获取了高额利润。越来越多的捕鲸公司受利益的驱使意欲前往南大西洋作业。20世纪初,英国在南大洋拥有占绝对优势的制海权,于是1905年,挪威政府在国内捕鲸业者的施压下,向英国政府问及次南极和南大西洋的南极地区的地位问题。英国对此的答复是:这些地区是由早期英国探险家们发现的,因此应是英国的属地。随后,英国认为有必要通过一些管制捕鲸的举措来展示国家权力,并以此来支持其尚在酝酿当中的领土主张。1906年,福克兰群岛总督颁布了一项法令,无许可证禁止捕鲸,并对捕获的每一只鲸都征收使用费²。为使其对捕鲸业的管理合法化,同时巩固和明确早期英国对于南大西洋和南极部分领土的声索,1908年的英皇制造正式宣布对位于南大西洋的南乔治亚岛、南设得兰群岛、南奥克尼群岛、南桑威奇群岛以及格拉汉姆地(Graham's Land)拥有主权,并将其命名为福克兰群岛属地³。

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随着越来越多的捕鲸公司涌入南大西洋作业,被猎杀的鲸鱼数量不断攀升。为避免重蹈北大西洋地区鲸鱼濒临灭绝的覆辙,福克兰群岛属地在1908年颁布了新的管制措施,除了颁发许可证、征收使用费之外,还通过限制允许捕获的鲸鱼数量和保护幼鲸来养护捕鲸产业可持续的发展。然而上述措施收效甚微,所以为了捕鲸业更长远的发展,英国于1917年颁布了新的英皇制诰,声索更大范围的南极海岸线,包括西经 20° 至 50° ,南纬 50° 以南和西经 50° 至 80° ,南纬 58° 以南的所有领土⁴。这次提出的领土要求不但包含有更多由其他国家发现的海岸线,还包括了延伸至南极点的一大片尚未发现的南极内陆⁵。1917年的英皇制诰是英国的领土主张从南大西洋和福克兰群岛延伸至南极大陆的重要举措,也是英国对南极大陆声索的开始。

一战结束之后,英国开始对南极地区普遍的介入,主要的表现有:一是殖民地部于1919年成立了一个顾问机构“探索委员会”,其实体构成包括三艘游弋于南极水域的船舰和一个建在南乔治亚岛的实验室,其职责是协调各方面的调查,研究南极和次南极地区的经济资源,监督往来于南极水域的调查游轮。二是殖民地部国务大臣米尔勒勋爵(Lord Milner)及次长埃默里(Leopold Amery)对南极的经济和战略价值异常关切。二者都是怀有大英帝国愿景的帝国主义者,都认识到南极大陆周围丰富的生物资源和矿产资源,同时也意识到南大洋是连接澳大利亚、新西兰、南美和南非的贸易通道,对南大洋南部边界的控制可以护卫英帝国内部的联系,因此积极支持采取措施加强和扩展大英帝国的版图。1920年,英国制定出未来的南极政策,即最终控制整个南极。

二、罗斯属地的创建及其法律基础

在历史上,新西兰与南极之间唯一的联系仅在于:早期的探险家们利用其地理位置之便,将其作为前往南极的中转站;殖民地政府出于对帝国探险事业的支持,给予到访的探险家们一定的财政支持。1920年2月6日,英国殖民地部致电新西兰政府:英国出于捕鲸和战略目的的需要,意欲控制整个南极罗斯海。作为英联邦自治领,新西兰需要协助控制罗斯海海岸附近地区⁶。虽然英国的政策与新西兰的对外责任是相抵触的,但在二战以前新西兰并不寻求独立自主的对外政策,保持帝国内部的从属地位并服从于英国的政策更有利于实现新西兰的利益。因此,新西兰政府同意取得对罗斯海地区的控制权。

1921年2月,新西兰、澳大利亚的代表和埃默里在伦敦商定:澳大利亚和新西兰各自的控制范围应以东经 160° 为界,以西为澳大利亚的扇形,以东则为新西兰扇形。未占领地区的所有权一般由永久占领而产生,但这个先决条件在南极显然不可能实现。所以殖民地部在1921年3月的《控制南极备忘录》中制定的南极主权的法律依据是:主权可以是在发现的基础上进一步由控制手段的颁布和实施来确立。英国向新西兰提供了两种确立主权的方式,一种是依据《1895年殖民边界法令》颁布一道枢密令,但需经过自治领议会冗长的审批程序;另一种是使用君主特权颁布英皇制诰⁷。新西兰政府可以自行决定采用哪种方案来宣布罗斯海地区是英国的领地和新西兰的属地,但此后新西兰迟迟未颁布任何法令来确认对罗斯海地区的领土主权要求,直到捕鲸问题再度出现。

1922年6月,挪威人拉森(C. A. Larsen)向英国提交了一项专营许可证申请,计划前往罗斯海捕鲸(注释:虽然罗斯海有种类及数量繁多的须鲸,但该地区气候十分恶劣,又缺少合适的锚地,捕鲸船只无法停泊,新西兰的海事处也不提倡在其次南极岛屿附近从事捕鲸活动,所以此前挪威和英国的捕鲸公司很少在罗斯海地区作业。但是拉森计划使用两艘装备有加工设备的捕鲸船、一艘支援船和十艘蒸汽捕鲸船,以巴雷尼群岛(Balleny Islands)或南极大陆为泊地前往罗斯海捕鲸。)。这份申请相当于默认并支持英国在罗斯海地区的主权和领土主张。殖民地部将拉森的请求移交给新西兰政府,建议给予捕鲸许可证。新西兰政府于1922年12月21日颁布了许可证,其措辞清楚界定了英国的所有权存在于东经 160° 与西经 150° 之间的区域,同时规定挪威公司将在罗斯海或其附近的英属领海作业。通过颁布这一许可证,英国展示了其在这一地区的领土利益以及管理南极捕鲸业的决心。

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拉森的申请让主权问题更为紧迫,因为捕鲸许可证的颁发具有一个假定的前提,即:罗斯海岸地区是未经宣布的英属领地。所以,当务之急是需要颁发英皇制诰来正式确立英国对该地区的控制。但是在1922年7月,殖民地部内部的法律意见书开始质疑这一程序。假如这一地区是未经宣布的英属领地的话,它似乎适合《1887年英国殖民地法案》第6款的定义:任何由非割让或非攻克而获得的或不在英国议会管辖之下的英国领土被定义为“英国殖民地”。该法案第3款将立法权委托给该领地内的3个或3个以上的人民,对此殖民地部想将立法权授予新西兰总督。上述这些问题被移交英国皇家法律官员们来解决,他们的答复是简短而模糊的:发现本身只能产生不完全的或者“尚未生效”的所有权,尽管如此,殖民地部宣称该地区是英属领地也是正确的。因此,最后的结论依然是这一地区是英国的“殖民地”。根据法案第2款,皇家特权可以将枢密院的职权委托给新西兰总督,通过这一做法可以使第3款无效。因此,正确的程序是依据英国殖民地法案颁布一道枢密令。后继的法律意见书认为,因为规避了第3款,所以“英国殖民地”这一定义是有问题的,因此声索的法律基础也是不牢靠的⁸。

1923年7月30日,殖民地部颁布枢密令,宣布罗斯海海岸和南纬60°以南,东经160°到西经150°之间毗连的岛屿和领土作为英国的领地,由新西兰总督代为行使管辖权。至此,罗斯属地正式形成。罗斯属地的创建是新西兰与南极联系的肇始,其建立类似于是英国强加于新西兰的领土责任,新西兰是以整个大英帝国的名义管理罗斯属地,并不专门是为了自治领的利益。实际上,此时的罗斯属地对于新西兰而言并不具有特别的价值,创建罗斯属地一事也没有在自治领内部引起太多关注。

三、新西兰在罗斯属地问题上立场的演变

(一) 罗斯属地创建后至《南极条约》签订前

罗斯属地创建后至二战以前,新西兰只是英国南极政策的执行者,仅仅发挥“橡皮图章”的作用。1926年的帝国会议上,英国授意新西兰总理戈登·考斯特(Gordon Coates)采取措施向罗斯属地以东地区扩张。然而,1927年以后,南极国际政治日益复杂,美国和挪威对南极地区的不断介入导致英国主宰南极计划受挫,更使得新西兰在罗斯属地的地位复杂化:1928年11月,理查德·伯德带领一支美国私人探险队驾驶飞机飞越了罗斯属地东部。1929年,伯德命名、考察并声索了罗斯属地以东的大片领土,称其为玛丽伯德地(Marie Byrd Land)。这次探险直接挑战了英国主权向罗斯属地以外地区延伸,并被认为是美国领土声索的前奏。此后,美国对南极主权声索举棋不定的态度逐渐发生了逆转:1926至1930年之间,挪威政府鼓励克里斯滕森捕鲸公司在罗斯属地和福克兰群岛属地之间作业,同时从事一系列兼具商业、科学调查和领土兼并性质的探险,更进一步授权其吞并包括有争议的布韦岛(island of Bouvet)在内的罗斯属地东面领土。

1930年至二战爆发前夕,南极领土声索冲突逐渐升级,阿根廷、法国、挪威、澳大利亚等国在南极的竞争进一步加剧:自1904年起,阿根廷就在南奥克尼群岛建有一个气象站,并在1927年知会国际邮政局其在福克兰群岛的权利,挑战英国在该地区的领土要求;澳大利亚于1933年对除法国属地之外的罗斯属地与东经45°之间领土正式提出声索。这其中也包括了挪威感兴趣的地区,由此引起挪威的不满;法国对阿德利地的声索从之前的限定其沿岸转变为对东经136°到142°之间扇形的声索⁹。

二战爆发前夕,各国在南极的争夺又出现新的情况:1938年,法国和英联邦国家签订飞行权利互惠条约,承认现存声索的合法性,并分配了南极领空的法律权利;德国和日本在南极水域增加了捕鲸舰队的数量,并且不愿遵守1931年国际捕鲸公约中对减少捕获量的规定;1938年11月,希特勒决定派遣“士瓦本号”舰船在澳大利亚南极属地和福克兰群岛属地之间的地区活动。其舰载机执行了航空测绘,并在挪威船“挪威号”此前探测过的地区投下了地标。针对德国的探险活动,挪威于1939年1月颁布公告,宣布挪威的领土扇形位于东经45°到20°之间(澳大利亚南极领土和福克兰群岛属地之间的空地),但未明确其扇形的南北界限。此后,英国、挪威和澳大利亚相互承认了各自的南极边界¹⁰。美国也对南极地区的

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关注度日益提高。1938年,罗斯福总统命令重新审视美国的南极政策,并授意林肯·埃尔斯沃斯等探险家:个人代表美国提出声索比较合适。新西兰政府对这些罗斯属地之外的国际纷争持缄默的态度。所以,这一阶段官方对罗斯属地的关注不多,甚至在正常的管理方面都很少有所行动。

第二次世界大战的爆发影响了南极的国际政治与新西兰在南大洋的活动。战时多数声索国和美国正忙于欧洲和远东的战争,无暇顾及南极地区。而德国海军在南极和南大洋动作频频:击沉盟军的船舶,在澳大利亚和新西兰的港口布雷,捕获挪威的捕鲸船队,将凯尔盖朗岛作为其在南大洋的行动基地¹¹。此前,新西兰主要强调南极和南大洋的资源管理,在领土问题上持中立的态度。但德国海军的一系列活动促使新西兰对南大洋海上航线的地缘政治价值进行更加明确的评估,并转而强调资源权利和领土占领。1941年,新西兰在奥克兰和坎贝尔岛群上建立了观察哨,以防其被德国军队占领。

二战结束后,世界非殖民化进程迅猛发展,民族独立运动高涨。在此背景下,新西兰的独立意识增强,开始奉行独立自主的政策,并开始关注本国在南极的利益。战后一段时期,罗斯属地对新西兰而言只是一个无足轻重的议题,同时又受限于科学投入的巨大成本,新西兰政府在罗斯属地问题上没有明确的立场和态度。一方面,1955至1958年新西兰参与了英联邦横越南极远征活动。英联邦的这一远征行动借“科学考察”之名,在南美和其他国家领土竞争的情况下,旨在促进英联邦国家的领土主权要求,提高国际政治、科学合作和国家声望。另一方面,彼得·弗雷泽和沃特·纳什等新西兰的政治领袖则认为南极应远离领土主权纷争,并交由联合国管理。1956年,纳什总理提出南极应成为一个在联合国管理下的“世界领土”。1957年,新西兰政府再度建议南极应成为“世界公园”。这种主张南极“国际化”的观点也是南极国际政治大环境的反映。冷战开始之后,英国、阿根廷、智利对南极半岛及周围岛屿归属权的纷争在不断加剧。美国对南极的态度被两组关系所左右:其一是与英国的“特殊盟国关系”,其二是以《泛美互助条约》为纽带的与拉美国家之间的军事同盟,所以美国从积极推动自身领土主张转向考虑构建一种新的国际体系来管理南极事务,英国倾向于以现存声索国为基础由多国共同管理。新西兰政府受英国的影响,在赞成国际化的同时,也反对交由联合国来解决¹²。

1957年7月至1958年12月的国际地球物理年期间,67个国家的1万多名科学家在两极地区进行了地球物理、大气物理、地质、矿产、地理、生物等多学科的科学考察和国际合作。12个国家在南极大陆建成了40多个常年考察站,在南极大陆周边岛屿建成了20个常年站,此外还建有仅供夏季考察的度夏站。新西兰也于1957年参与英国横越南极远征时在罗斯属地建成一个接待站点,后于1959年成为永久科研基地斯考特站。二战以后各殖民地掀起民族独立运动浪潮,英国急于处理与主权相关的法律纰漏,这其中就包括《1887年英国殖民地法案》。在这一法案基础上颁布的创建罗斯属地的枢密令因为规避了第3款,所以在法律基础上存在漏洞,并且引起了广泛的争议。因此,1945年9月,英国殖民地部向新西兰政府问及是否需要颁布新的枢密令,由此引发了对罗斯属地法律地位的重新审视¹³。新西兰政府认为采取措施加强声索的有效途径是在罗斯属地建立至少一个永久站点。因此,建立斯考特站固然有科学研究的目的,但更重要的是为了弥补新西兰对罗斯属地法律所有权的不充分,加强新西兰对罗斯属地的领土主权要求。

(二) 新西兰的主张与《南极条约》的签订

在1959年华盛顿会议召开之前,新西兰外交部及新西兰南极协会¹⁴等民间团体都对纳什总理提出的“南极国际化”的构想持批判立场,并向总理施压迫使其保持对罗斯属地的声索。

1959年10月15日至12月1日,美国、阿根廷、澳大利亚、比利时、智利、法国、日本、挪威、新西兰、南非、苏联、英国等12国在华盛顿举行会议协商解决南极问题。华盛顿会议上,新西兰是唯一一个愿意考虑放弃领土主权要求的国家,其官方对于南极大陆领土主权纷争以及罗斯属地的主张有以下几点:

第一,解决领土争端的唯一方案是一个放弃国家权利和领土主张的协议。具体而言是:声索国放弃本国的领土主张,然后在此基础上建立一个南极国际管理体系。只有各方放弃声索,该体系才能实现完全有效的协调和管理各国的南极活动,确保南极地区的永久中立,有序、合理、公平地解决南极资源的最终利

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用问题¹⁵。但在现阶段暂时无法实现上述目标,因此为了确保各国在南极的和平合作不受纠纷的影响,新西兰将接受一个“冻结”现存法律现状的较为简单的体系¹⁶。

第二,如果各方就建立一个更广泛的南极国际体系达成一致的话,新西兰就会考虑放弃本国在南极的权利和对南极的领土主权要求;但放弃领土主张并不意味着新西兰在任何方面质疑自身对罗斯属地所有权的有效性,也不意味新西兰不愿继续承担其对罗斯属地管理的责任¹⁷。但如果美国提出领土主张或建立一个国际体系的提议失败,新西兰将保留对罗斯属地的领土主张。

1959年12月1日,12国最终签订了《南极条约》,确立了南极地区的法律地位,即:暂时“冻结”各国的领土主张、用于自由科考与国际合作、非军事化。条约用冻结各国利益诉求,搁置政治争议的方式暂时性地解决了南极领土纷争的问题,缓和了南极地区的国家冲突,保证了科学考察和国际合作的永续开展。从政治层面看,《南极条约》的签订对新西兰是有利的。条约对南极法律地位的“冻结”使新西兰既保留了对罗斯属地的领土主权要求,同时又无需论证其正当性,

也不必将巨额经费开支投资在南极项目上,并以此来保护其在罗斯属地的权利。

四、新西兰维护罗斯属地领土主权的举措及表现

从90年代中期以后,新西兰在领土主权问题上开始出现强硬立场,主要表现为在南极事务上采取一系列维护主权的举措:1995年,国家党政府发布了《战略目标声明》;1996年,在科学和工业研究部(DSIR)解散之后,成立了新西兰南极局(Antarctica New Zealand),重新安排了南极后勤和科学经营管理;以渔业和旅游业为代表的商业活动也从这一时期开始扩大。1996年,罗斯海出现了第一艘捕捞南极犬牙鱼的新西兰渔船。此后,新西兰政府每年从罗斯海渔业中获利2千至3千万纽币。本节从官方政策声明、南极活动、南极存在等三个方面检视新西兰维护和实现领土主权的途径与表现。

(一) 官方政策声明

从90年代中期发布第一个战略目标之后,新西兰历届政府都公开宣称并强硬地维护其在罗斯属地的战略利益,并通过科学考察和商业活动监管等议题,行使及合法化其领土主张。

1995和2002年国家党和工党政府分别发布两份战略利益声明继续承认和宣示新西兰在罗斯海地区的利益:1995年,国家党政府通过的新西兰在南极的《战略目标声明》(1995 Statement of Strategic Objective)中第一点即声明:“维护新西兰在罗斯属地的长期利益及承诺”¹⁸;2002年工党政府修订并发布了新的《新西兰南极战略利益声明》(2002 Revised New Zealand Statement of Strategic Interest),这一份纲领性文件一直沿用至今。它所声明的7点内容集中体现了新西兰在南极,尤其是在罗斯海地区战略利益。其中第二点内容是“维护其在罗斯属地的长期利益、承诺和可靠的存在”¹⁹。

虽然上述两份文件分别是由两个不同政党制定通过的,但都非常明显地强调维护新西兰在罗斯属地的存在。

新西兰外交与外贸部(New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade)是最重要的南极政策制定和决策机构之一,其官方网站上开宗明义地宣称:“自1923年以来,新西兰一直保持对罗斯属地(也即南纬60°以南,东经160°到西经150°之间所有的岛屿和领土)的主权。罗斯属地在宪法上是新西兰的一部分。”²⁰在行政管理方面,新西兰每年任命罗斯属地的政府官员来代表政府行政机关来执行管理工作。罗斯属地的官员也是斯科特站的高级职员。“他们有权在罗斯属地采取所有必要或权宜的措施,来执行法律和现行的法规”²¹。在法律体系方面,新西兰本土法律的适用范围延伸至罗斯属地。例如,新西兰的民法也适用于罗斯属地的民事行为;根据1977年新西兰公民法,任何出生在罗斯属地的公民都是新西兰公民。在新西兰法律中具体规定了罗斯属地领海之外建立专属经济区的事宜²²。

从上述官方对罗斯属地主权、管理以及法律系统的规定都可以看出来新西兰的领土主张和签订《南极条约》之前是一样的。官方也明确宣称,在《南极条约》签订之后,新西兰没有义务放弃自己的权利或主

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张。新西兰对罗斯属地的主张虽然是被冻结的,却是不可置疑的。但在实际从事南极活动时,官方使用“罗斯海地区”来代替“罗斯属地”这个措辞,用以模糊并避免主权争议²³。

(二) 科学活动

自从1996年成立以来,新西兰南极局一共制定和发布了三份名为《新西兰南极和南大洋科学》的科学战略。2012年4月发布的最新的科学战略中规定了2010-2020年新西兰南极科学研究的方向和优先发展的三大领域:气候、生态系统、海洋系统。其中明确规定,新西兰的南极研究虽然不排除其他地区的研究,但主要集中在罗斯海地区的陆地、海岸和海洋²⁴,并再次重申“新西兰在罗斯海地区有重要的利益”²⁵。2008年,与南极活动相关的主要政府机构总结了新西兰在南极的核心战略科学利益,包括:调查研究全球气候变化进程,调查南极生物安全及南极生物资源勘探等问题,探索海洋环境中生物多样性的问题,管理南极海洋资源,处理好人类对南极的影响关系。但其中最重要的战略科学利益是,关注罗斯海地区²⁶。因此,新西兰的南极科学战略利益和南极科学活动集中在罗斯海地区。

新西兰的南极活动包括后勤、教育、旅游项目等,但大多数还是新西兰南极局科学战略中制定的野外工作和科学活动。支持和领导高品质的南极与南大洋科学可以保护和理解生物多样性、养护和可持续管理海洋生物资源、倡导环境整治;最重要的是,可以维护新西兰在南极的“可靠的存在”(credible presence):通过从事高品质(high quality)的科学,取得南极科学方面的领先地位,成为南极条约体系内和全球范围内在科学领域重要的角色,进而又通过“可靠的存在”来维护其在罗斯属地的利益。正如官方所说的:自从1957年斯科特科考站建立以后,新西兰就开始在南极从事科学活动。此后的50多年以来,新西兰南极研究项目通过提供在罗斯属地的“可靠的存在”来巩固、支撑新西兰的南极利益²⁷。

(三) 历史文化活动

在南极探险的“英雄时代”,斯科特(Robert Falcon Scott)和沙克尔顿(Sir Ernest Shackleton)等早期的探险家们都以新西兰作为进出南极的“门户”²⁸,确切的说,是从新西兰前往浮冰较少且最容易接近南极大陆的罗斯海,再从罗斯海开始探索南极的征程,最后又返回新西兰。这些探险的历史自然也成为新西兰历史和文化遗产的一部分。新西兰通过文物修复和维护、南极旅游、邮政服务等历史文化活动来增强与罗斯海地区的联系,加强新西兰人的南极意识,通过使他们认识到南极是新西兰历史和文化遗产的一部分来加强主权意识,维护领土利益。

新西兰政府非常积极地维护和修复早期探险家们在罗斯海地区留下的文物遗产,这项工作主要由南极遗产信托机构(Antarctic Heritage Trust)来负责。2011年至2012年,该机构的“罗斯海遗产修复计划”(Ross Sea Heritage Restoration Project)维修了4个遗址和大量与最早的探险家们有关系的手工艺品²⁹。

新西兰的南极旅游项目分两部分,一是罗斯属地的海上旅游,体验南极的自然环境和极端气候,参观游览早期探险家们的临时营房;二是本土的南极体验,例如位于基督城的国际南极中心,坎特伯雷博物馆的南极展览等等。

此外,新西兰还通过发行罗斯属地的邮票来表达领土主权。早在20世纪初斯科特和沙克尔顿南极探险的年代,新西兰就开始发行纪念邮票,并于1957、1994、2012、2013年以罗斯属地地图,海豹、帝企鹅、蓝鲸、南极磷虾等动物和冰架、火山等景观为主题,迄今共四次发行罗斯属地的邮票。

(四) 军队的使用

新西兰的国防军(New Zealand Defence Force)在罗斯海地区主要用于两个方面:一是使用军用飞机提供通信、空中支援等后勤保障,以帮助新西兰南极局南极作业的日常运转;二是调度海军、空军来监控罗斯海的非法捕鱼。

南极局与国防军有长期、成功的合作关系,国防军对南极的科考工作做出了重大贡献。2011年夏季,新西兰皇家空军派遣了4架B757军用飞机到麦克默多海峡(McMurdo Sound),这4架飞机主要用于运载

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游客和支持后勤保障³⁰。

1999年,新西兰首次使用皇家舰队旗下的巡防舰(Te Kaha),皇家空军(Orians),巡视监控南纬60°至74°之间区域的非法捕鱼活动³¹。此后继续调度军队来监控渔业。

使用军队来提供后勤保障一方面是出于民用的目的和经济成本的选择;但是,军队作为一个主权国家的标识,其在罗斯属地的存在与作业也具有宣示主权的意涵。

(五) 南极存在

斯考特站建成于1957年1月20日,是南极大陆最早运营的站点之一,其后又在1976至1977年和2005年至2007年间分别进行过重建和维修。其建立的初衷是为了支持英联邦横越南极远征活动,1959年成为科学研究的永久站则是为了加强新西兰的南极存在进而加强对罗斯属地的领土主张。

斯考特站拥有8个由钢板建造、并衬有聚氨酯泡沫的现代化建筑。所有建筑物的外观都被漆成绿色,其寓意为“绿色斯考特”,也即环境保护的理念。近年来,为减少人类活动对于南极环境的影响,新西兰将斯考特站所有的垃圾都进行了细致地分类整理。金属、塑料和电池等可以回收再利用的废弃物都会被运回新西兰;食物垃圾、纸类和未处理的废木料都用高温焚化炉烧毁³²。

斯考特站最多可容纳85个人以及与南极生存至关重要的住房安全、后勤设备,同时也具备专门的实验场所,电脑网络和卫星通信链路,工程和机械车间,并设有一个停放物资、运载工具和野外设备的中心³³。其8个建筑物之间都由走廊或者通道连接,方便不同部门的科考人员们可以在内部自由活动;然而一旦发生火灾,各建筑之间则可以及时、完全地封闭,避免火势蔓延。这些建筑物都是腾空而建,以便积雪可以从底部被风带走。此外,斯考特站内部装饰均选用白色和绿色与外部环境相配合,其整体氛围和生活环境既温暖、舒适又轻松、环保。

五、总论

20世纪20年代,英国出于经济利益和战略意图的考虑,根据《1887年英国殖民地法案》创建了罗斯属地,并将其行政管理权交给具有地理之便的新西兰。面对这一类似于强加的领土责任,在此后相当长的一段时期内,新西兰在罗斯属地问题上无所作为,政府没有采取任何措施加强对罗斯属地的管理和控制。二战之后,随着独立国家意识的觉醒,新西兰日益关注本国在南极的利益,并在1957年参加国际地球物理年和英联邦横越南极远征活动期间,在罗斯属地建成了斯考特站,以此来加强其南极存在和对罗斯属地的领土主权要求。及至1959年《南极条约》签订之时暨华盛顿会议召开期间,新西兰力主南极“国际化”,同时愿意考虑放弃对罗斯属地的领土主张。在接受《南极条约》“冻结”领土主权纷争的安排之后,主权问题逐渐让位于南极环境保护和资源管理等议题。然而从90年代中期以后,新西兰在领土主权问题上开始出现强硬立场,主要通过发布战略利益声明、科学考察活动、历史文化活动、调度军队支持后勤和监管商业活动等方式来行使并合法化其领土主张,维护其在罗斯属地的领土利益。

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¹ 对南极大陆的发现并非英国独有,也很可能是美国人在捕猎海豹的过程中最早发现了南极半岛。美国、苏格兰、英格兰和法国的船只至少从1819年起就开始在南极半岛地区捕猎海豹和鲸鱼。一种推测认为美国捕鲸船长纳撒尼尔·帕尔默(Nathaniel Palmer)早于英国皇家海军的布兰斯菲尔德(Edward Bransfield)发现了南极大陆。

² Hugh Logan, *Cold Commitment: the development of New Zealand's territorial role in Antarctica, 1920-1960: a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1979, p.9.*

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- ³ Malcolm Templeton, *A Wise Adventure: New Zealand in Antarctica, 1920-60*, Wellington: Victoria University Press in association with the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2000, p.16.
- ⁴ Hugh Logan, *Cold Commitment: the development of New Zealand's territorial role in Antarctica, 1920-1960*: a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1979, p.14.
- ⁵ 此处英国出于方便运用了“扇形原则”, 然而此原则是否适用于南极是存疑的。
- ⁶ Hugh Logan, *Cold Commitment: the development of New Zealand's territorial role in Antarctica, 1920-1960*: a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1979, p.5.
- ⁷ Hugh Logan, *Cold Commitment: the development of New Zealand's territorial role in Antarctica, 1920-1960*: a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1979, p.24.
- ⁸ Hugh Logan, *Cold Commitment: the development of New Zealand's territorial role in Antarctica, 1920-1960*: a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1979, pp.31-32.
- ⁹ Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics in Antarctica: views from the Southern Oceanic Rim*, University of Cambridge, 1997, pp.162-163.
- ¹⁰ Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics in Antarctica: views from the Southern Oceanic Rim*, University of Cambridge, 1997, p.163.
- ¹¹ Malcolm Templeton, *A Wise Adventure: New Zealand in Antarctica, 1920-60*, Wellington: Victoria University Press in association with the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2000, p.76.
- ¹² Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics in Antarctica: views from the Southern Oceanic Rim*, University of Cambridge, 1997, p.165.
- ¹³ Hugh Logan, *Cold Commitment: the development of New Zealand's territorial role in Antarctica, 1920-1960*: a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1979, p.94.
- ¹⁴ 新西兰南极协会是成立于1933年的私人组织, 其主要目标是: 促进新西兰内部对南极的兴趣; 鼓励他国的探险队经过新西兰; 支持建立新西兰南极研究项目。该协会拥有《南极新闻简报》和《今日南极》等出版物, 并致力于提升一种观念, 即新西兰对南极地区负有特殊的责任, 呼吁在罗斯属地上建立有效、永久的占领。该协会所作的努力有效地提升了新西兰公众对于南极地区的兴趣和关注。
- ¹⁵ Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, *The Conference on Antarctica*, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960, p.11.
- ¹⁶ Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, *The Conference on Antarctica*, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960, p.12.
- ¹⁷ Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, *The Conference on Antarctica*, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960, p.10.
- ¹⁸ Debs Martin, 'We Run The Ice': *A Critical Geopolitical Gaze on New Zealand's Relationship with the Ross Sea Region, Antarctica: a Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Geography at the University of Canterbury*, University of Canterbury, 2003, p.212.
- ¹⁹ New Zealand's strategic interests in Antarctica, 2002 Revised New Zealand Statement of Strategic Interest, <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Antarctica/1-New-Zealand-and-Antarctica/1-NZ-Strategy-in-Antarctic.php>.
- ²⁰ New Zealand and Antarctica, <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Antarctica/1-New-Zealand-and-Antarctica/index.php>.
- ²¹ The Ross Dependency, <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Antarctica/1-New-Zealand-and-Antarctica/2-The-Ross-Dependency.php>.
- ²² The Ross Dependency, <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Antarctica/1-New-Zealand-and-Antarctica/2-The-Ross-Dependency.php>.
- ²³ 新西兰南极局首席执行官 Lou Sanson 于 2003 年 2 月接受访问时说, 我总是提到罗斯海地区, 我不提罗斯属地。新西兰对罗斯属地是有领土要求的, 但是依然是被冻结的。我想如果我一直到处谈论罗斯属地, 会令在该地区工作的其他国家感到不安。
- ²⁴ New Zealand Government, *New Zealand Antarctic & Southern Ocean Science, directions and priorities 2010-2020*, 2012, p.8.
- ²⁵ New Zealand Government, *New Zealand Antarctic & Southern Ocean Science, directions and priorities 2010-2020*, 2012, p.8.
- ²⁶ Anne-Marie Brady edited, *The Emerging Politics of Antarctica*, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, p.155.
- ²⁷ New Zealand Government, *New Zealand Antarctic & Southern Ocean Science, directions and priorities 2010-2020*, 2012, p.2.
- ²⁸ New Zealand and Antarctica, <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Antarctica/1-New-Zealand-and-Antarctica/index.php>.
- ²⁹ Antarctica New Zealand, *Annual Report 2011-2012*, 2012, p.13.
- ³⁰ Antarctica New Zealand, *Annual Report 2011-2012*, 2012, p.7.
- ³¹ Debs Martin, 'We Run The Ice': *A Critical Geopolitical Gaze on New Zealand's Relationship with the Ross Sea Region, Antarctica: a Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Geography at the University of Canterbury*, University of Canterbury, 2003, p.53.
- ³² Anne-Marie Brady edited, *The Emerging Politics of Antarctica*, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, p.154.
- ³³ New Zealand Government, *Antarctica New Zealand Profile*.

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焦点关注

我与北极原住民的亲密接触

潘敏

(同济大学极地与海洋国际问题研究中心副主任)

2014年,我在加拿大女王大学做访问学者,6月1-15日,联系导师海生(Peter Harrison)教授安排了我去加拿大北极原住民——因纽特(Inuit)民族自治区首府伊魁特(Iqaluit)做调研。这里完全是个陌生的世界:独特的自然环境和人文环境,让我这个做5年多因纽特民族研究的人也为之震惊。因此,借《东方早报》与大家分享我的经历和感受。在阅读我的北极行之前,我需要说明的是,因纽特人就是我们中国人熟知的爱斯基摩人(Eskimo),爱斯基摩人是印第安人对他们的称呼,意思是“吃生肉的人”,显然含有贬意。因纽特语中的Inuit意思是“真正的人”或“土地上的主人”。2004年,因纽特人发布了一个声明,自此以后所有的官方文件都称Inuit。

(一)

2014年6月1日,两个多月前我就在天天盼望着这一天的到来——我的伊魁特之行。认识我的人都知道,这次去伊魁特对我的意义和重要性:我研究加拿大北极原住民——因纽特人已有5年多时间了,但一直都是纸上谈兵,这是我第一次去他们的居住区,即将亲眼目睹这个神秘的民族和这块冰天雪地的世外桃源到底是什么样子,激动心情绝对不亚于中5000万元的彩票。

在去之前,我做了很多准备,除了在网上查看各种资料外,还问了一些去过那里的人,每个人的第一反应都是:“那里的物价非常贵”,其中一个朋友告诉我,他从收音机上听到,大白菜28加币一棵,人民币差不多160元(后来得知,没那么贵,一棵2公斤的大白菜大约70元人民币),真是挺吓人的;出发前两周,我跟即将要住在一起的女地质学家张舜新老师通了电话(她是中国人,已经在伊魁特工作,生活了八年。在见到她之前,关于她的情况,我只知道这么多,但她流利的普通话让我安心了不少。她是我这篇游记的主角之一,她喜欢我叫她舜新,在后续的几篇中我将这样称呼她),她也建议我买点新鲜的水果和中国人喜欢吃的绿叶子菜之类的,因为那里要么很贵,要么根本就买不到。在各方面的建议下,出发前一天,我备足了这半个月的口粮(买了4棵大白菜),争取不在那里花冤枉钱,而且Canadian North飞往那里的班机有三件70磅的免费行李,这大概是全世界唯一可以带这么多行李的航班。

伊魁特是加拿大因纽特民族的自治区——努纳武特准省(Nunavut Territory)的省会。1999年4月1日正式成立,加拿大联邦政府、西北准省和因纽特民族达成协议,将原来的西北准省一分为二成两个省:西北准省和努纳武特准省,专门为加拿大的因纽特人建立了自治区。全省面积大约有180多万平方公里,占加拿大国土面积的23%,是目前加拿大国家面积最大的省份,该省跟欧洲大陆面积差不多。2013年努纳武特准省的人口大约为34,000人,其中因纽特人大约占85%(加拿大总共大约有5万多因纽特人)。有心的读者可能会问,为什么叫准省?加拿大省一级行政机构有10个province和3个Territory,二者在资源管理权限上有一定的差别。Province全权管理本省的资源开采和税收管理,而Territory只有部分管理权。目前努纳武特地区正在跟联邦政府协商权力下放(devolution)的问题。

伊魁特的地理位置是北纬63.88度西经68.44度,严格意义上不在北极圈内,但加拿大人习惯上将其国家北纬60度以北地区称为北极地区。因此,伊魁特市还没有完全的极昼和极夜的现象,即24小时都有太阳或都没有太阳的现象。我6月1-15日在那里,大约是北半球日照时间最长的一段时间,伊魁特一天里大约有20个小时能见到太阳,但差不多24小时都有光,因此这里很多人夏季睡不好觉。我出发前,舜新一再叮嘱我买个眼罩,睡觉时戴着,否则很难入睡。我没有听她的话,吃了不小的亏:在那里半个月几

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乎每天晚上很少能连续睡上2个小时的时候，总被窗外的光弄醒。

伊魁特位于巴芬岛 (Baffin Island) 东南的弗罗比歇湾 (Frobisher Bay) 顶部。巴芬岛面积 50.75 万平方公里，是加拿大第一、世界第五的大岛；是中国的台湾岛面积 (3.6 万平方公里) 的 14 倍。1615 年，探险家威廉·巴芬第一个成功环绕巴芬岛航行，此岛即以他的名字命名。巴芬岛北边和东边隔巴芬湾、戴维斯海峡 (Davis Strait) 与格陵兰岛相望，西南边是哈德逊海峡 (Hudson Strait)，海峡的另一边是加拿大因纽特人的另外一个聚居地——努纳维克 (Nunavik，在魁北克省的北部)。巴芬岛周围的这些水域是西北航道的组成部分。

从渥太华乘飞机到伊魁特三个小时，但机票的价格跟渥太华飞往上海差不多，而且没有高速公路和火车通往那里，飞机是唯一将人运到那里的交通工具。南方大型商船只能在夏季大约 3 个月的解冻期来到这里，一般情况下，6 月最后一个星期，商船到来，10 月第一个星期离开。舜新最近告诉我，今年天气变冷，7 月中旬了，船还没来。伊魁特人在夏季会备足一年用的燃油和其它能储藏的物品。高昂的运输费和恶劣的天气使得加拿大南方人都很少有人有机会去那里，遑论我们这些非加拿大子民了；这也部分解释了为什么那里的物价这么贵了，用飞机运到那里的东西，能便宜吗？！

(二)

伊魁特原来叫 Frobisher Bay，1987 年才改为这个名称，Iqaluit 因纽特语的意思是“有很多鱼的地方”，2001 年获得市的级别，这完全因为它是省会的缘故。7000 人左右，在中国跟乡政府所在地的人口差不多，但却是努纳武特省最大的城市。伊魁特市三面环山，一面临海，是一个建立在沿岸基岩上的小镇。站在小山坡上，可以俯视小镇的全景：照片中间楼房密集的地方是市中心，省政府、市政府和联邦政府的一些机构都集中在这里，东边是这里最大的超市——North Mart，超市的东边是居民区，再往东边是一块墓地；周围山上的房子都是近 10 年来修建的，因为风景好，房价很贵；但我有点纳闷：冬天呼啸的北极风在山上不是更大吗？

这个海也叫 Frobisher Bay，冬季和夏季都很好看。冬季一望无垠，厚厚的冰上全是雪，既结实又不滑，人们可以在冰上驾驶雪地摩托车，狗拉着雪橇在冰上飞跑；夏季，水天相应，让人们分不清天和哪个更蓝，人们可以在海上划船，捕鱼。舜新说我来得最不是时候，冰开始融化，有的地方已经不安全了，在我到达的前几天，就有人掉到冰窟里，幸好有人路过相救。从我的安全考虑，舜新建议我不要尝试在不结实的冰上行走；但这时冰又没有完全融化，我没有亲眼目睹水天相应的景色。

距离伊魁特市三公里的地方，有个因纽特人的社区，叫 APEX，有一条简陋的公路将两个地方连接起来，这是距离伊魁特最近的一个社区了，要到其它社区就必须包直升飞机了。APEX 是一个很著名的遍布北美的公司——哈德逊湾公司 (The Hudson's Bay Company) 的发源地。1670 年 5 月 2 日该公司成立于此，是北美最早成立的商业股份公司，它曾占据了北美洲的大片土地，控制着英属北美地区绝大部份的皮草贸易，还承担了早期北美大陆的开发业务。在欧洲人征服北美的过程中，哈德逊湾公司扮演了举足轻重的角色。屹立在海湾的旧址，凝视远方，沧桑而又庄重，似乎在向人们讲述它那辉煌的历史。

细心的读者一定好奇照片上花花绿绿的建筑物。我也是！一下飞机，我就被那里五颜六色的建筑物吸引：大红、深红、蓝色、绿色、黄色，什么颜色都有，我从来没见过到哪个城市有这么多颜色的建筑物。舜新告诉，因为这里没有树、没有花、没有草，除了白色的雪、蓝色的天和灰色岩石，就没有其他颜色了，于是就建造各种颜色的房屋来点缀点缀。这就是人类的智慧：大自然缺少的颜色，人工补上。这里的建筑物有一个重要的特点，就是“悬”在空中。由于要预防永久冻土融解和抵御风暴，每个建筑物都座落在一个平台上，这个平台是由数十个直径 4.5 英寸深达地下基岩 20-30 英尺的钢管支撑的。远处望去，伊魁特犹如“悬”在空中的现代化都市。最近落成的一座的教堂严格意义上讲是现代建筑，但它保留了因纽特冰屋传统建筑的风格。

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伊魁特全年最高温度在7月份,平均最高气温是12摄氏度,最低是4摄氏度;最低温度的1月,平均最高气温是-22.8摄氏度,最低是-30.9摄氏度。这几年来,气候反常,冬天更冷,夏天更热。2013年每个月都下了雪。常年低温,使得这里的植被主要是藻类、苔藓、地衣等低等植物分布,但夏季的时候也有一些灌木状的植物紧贴着岩石表面着生。飞机快降到机场的时候,我拍了张照片,完全是裸岩,岩石和雪,褐白相间,6月份竟然一点绿意都没有!这是我见过的真正的不毛之地。但是,夏季,这里会长出一种颜色非常鲜艳的淡紫色的小花(Purple Saxifrage),是Nunavut的省花。很有幸,我看到了这北极春天最早的花之一。

植物在这里不能生长,就意味着这里没有农场,没有菜园,超市见到的所有农副产品,哪怕一根葱都是用飞机从南方运过来的;没有植物也意味着陆地上没有什么动物,这里也不圈养什么家畜或家禽,从南方运饲料到这里来饲养它们,不如从南方养大宰好运过来,后者成本更低。整个巴芬岛上除了驯鹿、狼、狐、北极熊,鸟等屈指可数的几种动物外,我很少听说过其他动物。可是近几年来,巴芬岛上的动物越来越少,舜新(地质学家)说,这两年夏季她出野外的时候从直升机上往下看,一连两个小时,几乎见不到任何动物。有人说这是气候变暖所致,有人说是飞机的噪音吓跑了它们,也有人说动物们到其它地方找食物了,例如人们发现格陵兰的驯鹿增多了。

(三)

当我把在伊魁特拍的照片放到微信朋友圈分享时,我被问及最多的两句话是:“跟你合影的是中国人吗?”“那里有这么多人吗?”。各位读者,当你看到这两张照片时,是不是也有类似的疑问?而且,我在伊魁特也曾两次被问:“Are you Inuk?”(Inuk是Inuit的单数形式)。当你看完下面的文字后,就不足为怪了。

因纽特人是亚洲蒙古人的后裔,据说大约在5,000年(一说是8,500年)前后,其祖先穿越横跨西伯利亚和阿拉斯加的陆桥来到美洲大陆。大约4500年前来到加拿大北极地区,4000—4500年间来到格陵兰岛。他们这么大规模远距离迁移,主要因为后冰川时期气候变暖,其主要食物麋牛(musk ox)和驯鹿(caribou)北迁,也就是说,他们是尾随着其猎物而来的。

因纽特民族是北极原住民族中分布地域最广的民族,他们生活在从俄罗斯的楚克其半岛(Chukchi Peninsula)、美国的阿拉斯加、加拿大北部、格陵兰岛东南沿海等广大地区。现在因纽特人总人数大约有20万人。根据语言、环境、文化等因素,我们可以将因纽特人分成密切相关的两支,第一支是尤皮克(Yupik),生活在阿拉斯加西南部沿海、努尼瓦克和圣劳伦斯岛和楚克其半岛东南部的狭小地带,现在大约有38,000尤皮克人,其中25,000人生活阿拉斯加,13,000人生活中俄罗斯,尽管尤皮克语与因纽特语同源,但是尤皮克人与因纽特人交流不多,彼此并不十分了解,而且在文化方面差异也比较大;第二支是生活在阿拉斯加北部、俄罗斯东部的因纽皮特人(Inupiat)以及加拿大、格陵兰的因纽特人,习惯上我们统称这些人为因纽特人,现在总共大约有160,000人,其中2000人生活在俄罗斯,52,000人在阿拉斯加,50,000人在加拿大,58,000人在格陵兰。尽管生活在北极这片辽阔土地上的因纽特人有语言和文化的某些差异,但真正让人惊奇的是他们之间的相似性,当您从格陵兰岛东部海岸向西穿过加拿大和阿拉斯加,再旅行到西伯利亚海岸,你会发现他们有相似的面孔,相似的生活方式,相似的经济形态,似乎找不出他们之间本质性的差别。

因纽特人生活区域气候恶劣,飞机发明之前,外来者很难到达北极东北和中部地区,这也使他们因祸得福,冰天雪地成了他们天然的屏障,阻挡了因纽特人与欧洲殖民者面对面的交锋,而这场交锋有可能使他们种族灭亡。印第安人就经历了这场血战,最后的结局是大部分人被屠杀,剩下的部分被赶到了几个居留地,长期过着与现代社会隔绝的生活。直到19世纪,加拿大的因纽特人才与欧洲、北美的捕鲸者有了比较密切的互动,但是那时的外来者大多生活在几个居住地,对因纽特人的影响不大。因此这种接触并没

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有从根本上改变因纽特人的生活及其社会的经济和文化。

但因纽特人另一个聚居地——格陵兰岛，早在1720年代就成为丹麦的殖民地，先于其它地区的因纽特人与欧洲人接触。因纽特人大约在1200年由加拿大的西北准省来到格陵兰岛，后来岛上其它居民相继消失，因纽特人几乎成了这个地球上最大岛屿的唯一主人。1721年，一位名叫汉斯·埃基德的传教士开始执行丹麦对格陵兰的家长式殖民统治。1814年，丹麦获得格陵兰的主权。二战期间，由于德国占领丹麦，切断了格陵兰岛的因纽特人与丹麦之间的联系，而美国则把格陵兰作为空军基地往欧洲转运作战物资，因此，在社会和经济联系方面，因纽特人更多地接近美国和加拿大。

战后，因纽特人又回到了丹麦人的统治之下。1953年丹麦政府颁布法律，结束格陵兰的殖民地地位，使其成为该国的一个组成部分，至此，因纽特民族才获得了丹麦国家的公民权。1979年，格陵兰建立起内部自治政府，但外交、防务和司法仍由丹麦掌管。之后，因纽特人更加积极主动争取自治权。2008年11月格陵兰举行自治全民公决，获得了四分之三民众的支持。2009年6月21日，格陵兰岛正式获得自治。自治后，格陵兰政府拥有天然气资源管理权、司法和警察权，并有部分的外交事务权，但丹麦王国在格陵兰的防务和外交事务上还拥有最终决定权，格陵兰语将成为官方语言。格陵兰岛因纽特民族的自治运动取得了辉煌的成就。加拿大因纽特民族的自治运动也同样精彩，后文详述。

(四)

大约在公元1000年前后，因纽特人已分布于现在加拿大北极地区的西部和东部以及魁北克和拉布拉多的北部地区。16世纪早期，欧洲的渔民和捕鲸人每年都会穿越大西洋到加拿大东海岸进行渔业活动。尽管那时他们也常常与当地原住民进行交流，但其对因纽特人社会和文化的影响还微乎其微；尽管也有一些民族如欧洲的维京人曾试图在此安营扎寨，繁衍后代，但最后还是没有逃脱被北极凛冽的寒风吞噬的命运。从16世纪末到19世纪中叶以前，因纽特人几乎成为加拿大北极地区唯一的主人。由于气温低，食物短缺，人口规模不大，增长缓慢，但基本上维持了资源和人口之间的平衡。

到了20世纪，欧裔加拿大人开始大规模进入北极地区，毛皮贩卖商、传教士以及加拿大皇家骑警队穿梭于加拿大北极地区。与早期的捕鲸者不同，这些人在北极地区有个永久的居住地，但在第二次世界大战前，加拿大当局将注意力集中于西北极地区的印第安人居住区，在东北极的因纽特人生活区域人数并不多。相较于加拿大其它原住民族，或许是因为没有来自外部的开发压力，因纽特人从来没有跟白人政府签过条约，不曾被赶进保留区，也比较没有面对同化的压力。因此，在20世纪50年代前，因纽特人的经济模式和政治组织形式没有发生根本性的变化。

但20世纪五六十年代，加拿大联邦政府有计划将因纽特人从魁北克和拉布拉多地区迁移到高纬度北极地区，大多是在今天的努纳武特准省内。这次大规模迁移有个专有名词称“再安置”。“再安置”起因于二战后，因纽特人与南方人频繁接触，被染上了各种流行病，流行性感冒、肺结核、小儿麻痹症时不时地在因纽特人社区蔓延，加拿大人为此而义愤填膺，要求联邦政府派遣医疗设施进驻因纽特人的居住地区。于是加拿大政府尝试着以医疗、教育以及建立新居为手段，进行所谓的“实验性迁村”。但是“再安置”被一些学者认为是对因纽特人“高纬度流放”。努纳武特地区，气温比魁北克地区低得多，极夜，因纽特人对这里的地形不熟，而且可供捕猎的野生动物也不多。搬迁来的因纽特人不得不独自面对不熟悉的环境，政府很少给予支持。这是加拿大历史上最悲惨的一章，因纽特人永远也不会忘记。

“再安置”是对因纽特民族文化一次最大的破坏。再安置后因纽特人由原来的散居变成了在社区中的聚居。居住方式的改变导致了因纽特人谋生方式的变化，我们知道因纽特人一直以来的维生之道是狩猎，但再安置计划把他们聚拢在一起，并发给垦殖地，这完全是按照农业文明来改造狩猎文明。聚居和垦殖进一步导致了原来的社会组织管理模式的解体。因纽特民族原来的组织方式是由扩大家庭组成狩猎群体再组成社区共同体，完全不同于近代民族国家的组织模式；其管理方式是长老制，也与近代以来的科层制管理

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模式大相径庭。这些导致了因纽特民族的文化断裂，造成了社会的严重失范。

1980年代，因纽特人开始对联邦政府的这次再安置重新评价，他们否认主流观点，认为联邦政府将因纽特人迁移到北极高纬度地区是为了加强在这一地区的国家主权，1987年，因纽特人向联邦政府索取1000万加元的补偿。但是和解的道路是漫长的，联邦政府一直否认其动机和意图。直到进入21世纪哈珀总理执政时，联邦政府的态度才有所转变。2010年8月18日，加拿大印第安与北方事务部部长约翰·邓肯在魁北克北部的伊努朱亚克向因纽特人道歉：承认联邦政府当时再安置因纽特人的政策是出于削减因纽特人的福利以及曾强加加拿大北极地区的领土主权，对此，联邦政府表示歉意。联邦政府的姿态使“再安置”总算画上了令人满意的句号。

但是“再安置”有个非常积极的意义，那就是将因纽特人集中到一起，形成了努纳武特26个社区的基础，锻造了因纽特的民族精神，为因纽特人团结一致争取民族自治运动创造了良好的条件。更为重要的是：因纽特作为一个民族展现在加拿大的历史舞台上。几千年来，因纽特人在与地球上最残酷的自然环境作斗争的历史中形成了他们坚忍不拔的精神，正是这种精神使他们在加拿大这个多民族的国家里重新赢得了他们的自尊，保留了他们独特的文化，获得了联邦政府和加拿大国民的认可。

(五)

“爱斯基摩”印第安语就是“吃生肉”的意思，尽管因纽特人不喜欢这个称呼，但他们确实靠着“吃生肉”在北极地区顽强地生存下来了，而且在伊魁特期间，我亲眼目睹了“吃生肉”的场景，而且还奋不顾身地跟他们一起吃了一回生肉。

在伊魁特副市长的推荐下，6月13日一大早，我来到Iqaluit Dropping Center。这是专门为因纽特人无家可归者提供聚会和活动的地方，实际上是个因纽特人的活动中心。我一进门，里面好多人啊，很热闹：四、五个人蹲在地上，忙着在吃什么东西，周围还坐着六、七个人，有说有笑。我一进门，向一个大爷说明了我的来意；一个大姐得知我是中国人，很潇洒地坐到桌子上，脱下鞋，递到我面前说，“My shoes are made in China”（我已经不奇怪了，在超市里，我已经发现很多衣服、鞋等是中国制造的。遥远的北极地区，也在销售中国商品，中国是“世界工厂”，名实相符）。另外一个问我要不要喝茶、咖啡或者水。我知道我来对地方了，今天一定能真正体验一回因纽特人的生活和文化。

来不及细看屋子里其它设施，我立即把目光投向蹲在地上的一群人，他们正在生吃鲸鱼。尽管是第一次亲眼目睹，但从大量文献资料上早知道这些事，并不感到特别陌生，我立即拿出相机做记录：他们每人手里拿着一把刀，从几块大的肉上切出来，有的直接放到嘴里，有的撒点盐再吃。一个大姐看到我，马上切一块让我尝尝；旁边一个大叔制止她，说我吃不了这个；但那个大姐坚持让我试试。我第一反应是拒绝，但一秒钟的犹豫后我立即接受。就是上刀山下火海，大姐我今天也豁出去了（我第一次生吃三文鱼，差点儿没把肠子吐出来。自那以后，我对生肉敬而远之，你们可以想象，我下了多大的决心吃这玩意儿，尽管有一秒钟的犹豫）！我拿了一小块白色的鲸鱼皮（也有黑色的，据说黑色的更有营养），小心翼翼地放到嘴里：没有什么味道，嚼不动，当时的感受。那位大姐问我味道怎样，我言不由衷地说很好吃。囫圇吞枣地下咽了下去，又要了一块，这次我撒了点盐，稍微好吃点。周围的人都好奇地看着我这个跟他们长得差不多的人，突然有个人问我是不是因纽特人。接着，又有一个大哥，切了一块血淋淋的东西，大概是鲸的肝脏吧，递给我，这回我可不敢尝了，太吓人啦！他们哄堂大笑。其中一个老大爷很夸张地举着一个大骨头，作出啃咬状，在我眼前晃悠，不知是得意还是笑话我胆小。

当这群人吃得正欢的时候，另外两个人又抬出来一个猎物，我一眼就认出是海豹。可怜的海豹，小小的脑袋，肚皮朝天，肚皮上有个洞，脖子上困着一根绳子。大概就是这根绳子将它从冰窟中吊出来，马上就要成为人们的口中食了。在我为这只海豹拍照和惋惜的时候，一位老太太和一位老爷爷拿着刀过来了，他们要剥海豹皮了。看着他们熟练的动作，就知道他们是剥皮行家，忘记问了，他们一年要剥多少只海豹。

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这时过来一个人告诉我,这只海豹是三天前在座的一位老爷爷捕到的,我赶紧把相机对着那位老爷爷。老爷爷很自豪地捋了捋很酷的胡子,朝着我憨厚地笑了笑。趁着两位老人在剥皮的时机(说实话,我不太敢看),我开始环视室内墙上的照片。其中一面墙上的照片吸引了我:几个人在剥一个很大动物的皮,显然不是海豹。我正在想这是啥猎物时,一个人走过来跟我说:那一年他们捕捉着到一只北极熊,全镇人开party庆祝。我很惊讶,北极熊原来这么大个啊。在电视上看北极熊时,很少有人做参照物,估计不出大小,这会儿真长见识了。在做访谈时,人们告诉我,能捕到一头北极熊是件很大的事,镇上每个人都会分到一块肉(这镇上有六七千人)。但近年来,越来越难捕到北极熊了,具体原因他们说不清楚,但他们坚信北极熊还会回来的。

到 Iqaluit 的第一天,我就向舜新提出要求要看北极熊。舜新肯定地告诉我这不可能,好多外地人在这里工作很多年了,也没见过北极熊。我很傻傻地问,有没有什么动物园之类的,圈养一只北极熊,舜新大笑,你以为这是在上海啊,还动物园呢!后来舜新把她在野外工作时捡到并收藏多年的一只北极熊的完整的头骨搬出来让我一睹风采,我捧着那只不知多少年前的北极熊头骷髅乐呵呵地拍了几张照片,总算圆了梦。世界上有几个人能捧到北极熊的头骨?!我很幸运,跟一位北极的地质学家住在一起,才会有这样的机会。

(六)

地球上其它地区的人一听说“吃生肉”,一定会龇牙咧嘴直摇头,认为这是野蛮、未开化民族的特征,是“周口店人”才会有行为。但是,在北极地区,前文提到,这里没有草、没有树,因纽特人根本没有柴火将食物烧熟来吃;同时这里也没有蔬菜和水果,直接吃生肉可以把动物身上的维生素吸收到人体内。如果把肉煮熟了,维生素分解了,长期得不到维生素,人就会得坏血病,因纽特人也就不可能生存下来了。吃生肉不仅帮助因纽特人摄取了维生素,而且消化得更慢,能得到更多的热量。因纽特人在外面打猎是没有时间观念的,追逐一个猎物,可能要连续十几个小时跟着猎物跑,找不到任何食物。吃一顿生肉可以在七八个小时甚至十几个小时内都不会由饥饿感。所以“吃生肉”对因纽特人来说生存下来的手段。久而久之,也就变成了他们的文化特征。所谓一方水土养一方人是也。

现在,尽管伊魁特大超市里有各种各样的蔬菜水果,猪肉羊肉牛肉鸡肉,应有尽有,但因纽特人还是喜欢他们自己传统的食物,海豹、驯鹿、鲸、北极熊、鱼等;现在伊魁特因纽特人的家里也配有电炉,可以把生的食物烤熟了再吃,但他们还是喜欢吃生肉。海豹、驯鹿的肉之于因纽特人犹如大米之于中国人,你能想象中国人没有大米吗?因此,只要天气适宜,因纽特人就会出去打猎,带回来的猎物,与大家一起分享;每逢一些重大的节日,政府就会拿出来很多海豹,先是剥皮比赛,看谁剥得又好又快;接着大家就开始吃了。照片是2012年努纳武特的省庆日(7月9日)的剥皮比赛和生吃海豹的场景。

细心的读者看到这句话“带回来的猎物,与大家一起分享”,一定很感兴趣,还有上一篇提到的:捕猎一头北极熊,全镇上的人都会分享到一块肉。猎获的肉食要在整个群体中分享,不仅仅是猎物,还有其它物品如工具和衣物,都与他人分享,而且是“无条件分享”,这是因纽特人一个很重要的文化特征。实际上,因纽特人正是以他们热衷于共享的特质与现代社会的人的贪婪成性形成鲜明的对照,后者小气吝啬、拼命扩大个人财产,不愿意与他人分享。

人类学家研究发现,因纽特人帮助所有需要帮助的人,向他们赠与食物、劳动力、设备等等,而且不期望立即得到回报,这种“冻土地带的法则”无处不在。历史上,因纽特人愿意让其他人享用他们珍藏的食物、衣物、雪橇、有时甚至毛皮。无论谁,只要他们迫切需要,都可以使用;当然,他们也期望,有朝一日当他们处于困境时,也能得到其他人的慷慨解囊。共同分享是在严酷环境中生存下来的关键要素。对因纽特人而言,共享是他们的行为准则。

无条件与他人分享自己的劳动成果,物品不为个人所积累,而是在社会中公平分配,为社会成员共同

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持有, 长期以往, 就不会养成贪婪自私的特性, 也不会花费那么多时间、消耗那么多资源、像现代人那样拼命积累、占有物质财富。我们知道, 现代人积累财富有多少是因为生存所需, 大多数财富成为一种“地位物品”, 是一种社会地位的符号。或许是现代社会资源的稀缺才导致人类积聚财富的欲望, 从这种意义上来说, 其它地区的人们也许没有因纽特人富有。

因为捕获的猎物与他人分享, 所以, 他们一般不会将吃剩下的猎物拿出去卖。但是, 由于部分因纽特人现在打猎已不用传统的狗拉雪橇了, 而是改用冰上摩托车(那里的人叫 ski-doo, 见照片, 舜新说, 这是我最帅气的一张照片了, 拿出来秀一秀), 这种工具非常贵, 大约要 3000 加币, 所以他们偶尔也会拿出一部分猎物来卖, 挣点钱来买这种工具, 尤其是靠打猎为生的因纽特人。小镇上只有一家小卖铺卖因纽特人的 country food, 非常贵(卖得少缘故?)。照片上的半条鱼(Arctic Char)和一块驯鹿肉分别 30 元多加币, 折合人民币大约 170 元左右。一般这个季节已经没有卖驯鹿肉了, 我很幸运, 竟然还有几块。我买了一块, 带到金斯顿(Kingston), 放在冰箱里, 一直没舍得吃, 但更多的原因是留着炫耀吧, 每当来个朋友, 我都将它捧出来, 在他们面前炫耀一番。

(七)

到伊魁特的第 4 天, 早晨起来, 阳光灿烂, 灿烂得有点刺眼(大概是能见度太高的缘故吧), 碧蓝碧蓝的天空没有一丝的云彩, 没有一点杂物, 怎么会有这么干净的天空?! 这是我在伊魁特仅有的两天晴天之一, 舜新一直跟我开玩笑说, 是我把不好的天气带到伊魁特来了。尽管气温在零度左右, 尽管风速有 25 公里/小时, 但丝毫不影响我出游的心情。下午五点一下班, 我和舜新回家匆匆吃点东西, 还不到六点就出门了。那天的日落时间在 10:30 左右, 你不用担心我们时间不够, 四个半小时, 足以游遍半个伊魁特市。

舜新的计划是带我去墓地。您知道, 墓地最能体现一个民族的文化特征和宗教信仰, 如果您到一个地方去旅行, 墓地是一定要去的。但我去墓地的目的是想弄清楚因纽特人的死亡年龄, 来验证我从文献资料上看到的观点: 因纽特青少年自杀问题非常严重。

墓地小镇的最东角, 背山临水, 看上去是一块风水宝地, 看来每个民族都差不多, 总希望过世的人也能生活得好一点; 而且墓地离居民的住房非常近, 最近的一户人家离墓地直线距离也就 200 米吧。这跟中国的文化不一样, 而与日本的文化较为相近。所以下文中提到有人在墓地里散步, 你不要大惊小怪。

大多数的墓碑是用两根木头搭成个十字架, 从这个我们可以得知, 现在因纽特人信仰基督教, 这应该是最近 200 年欧洲人到来之后的事(现在还有些因纽特人信仰萨满教, 相信万物有灵)。上面写着死者的姓名、出生和死亡的时间, 下面用几块石头围成个小圈, 圈里有的摆放一些食物, 有的摆放了打猎的工具。因纽特人不焚烧尸体; 舜新告诉我, 墓地下面埋的都是一具具尸体, 可不是什么骨灰设备, 而且还埋得非常浅, 因为这里几乎没有土壤, 地表只是很浅的沙子和碎石, 下面就是坚硬的基岩, 很难挖深。听到这里, 我有点毛骨悚然: 我联想到这里的气温这么低, 尸体很难腐烂, 我的脚下都是……。幸好有个人牵条狗在墓地里散步, 那条狗朝着我和舜新狂叫, 稍微赶走了我的恐惧感。

在来的路上, 我下决心要搞清楚因纽特人的死亡年龄, 当然最好的方法就是统计墓碑上的年龄。但是当看到密密麻麻的墓碑以及想到墓碑下的人, 我还是不愿意在这里久留, 匆匆拍了几张照片, 稍微看了十几个墓碑, 就撤了。4 张照片能看到死者年龄, 分别为: 23 岁、17 岁、36 岁、21 岁; 还有一张模模糊糊的, 好像是 64 岁。尽管我有充分的心理准备接受这串数字, 但当亲眼看到这墓碑上记录的一个个消逝的年轻生命, 我还是非常震惊和惋惜, 也深感到因纽特民族社会问题的严重性。

我早在文献资料上得知因纽特民族的自杀现象非常严重。根据加拿大卫生部称, 2001 年因纽特人平均自杀率为 135/100,000, 同期的加拿大全国平均水平是 12/100,000, 前者大约是后者的 11 倍(正常值为 5/100,000—10/100,000 之间)。因纽特民族有自杀的传统。在传统社会, 因纽特人在丧失劳动能力时,

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比如疾病、年龄大或丧亲，他们为自己成为家庭或部落群体的负担而感到内疚，并与家庭成员协商，在得到家庭成员的宽恕甚至是参与下自杀。这对资源丰富地区的人们而言有点匪夷所思，但对食物短缺的因纽特民族来说不失为一种有效的生存下去的方法（日本人也有这种传统）。因此，在因纽特民族的文化中，自杀实际上是一种被认可的积极的行为。

然而，从20世纪下半叶开始，随着因纽特民族的社会发生剧烈的变化后，新的自杀现象产生了。这时自杀的主要群体是青少年，他们的自杀动机模糊不清，通常与激烈的情感状态或酗酒相关联，并以一种突然的、出乎意料的方式出现。自杀年龄多集中于15-24岁之间，且60%是男性。学者把这种想象归结为文化转型：近代以来，欧洲文明扩张，其它文明被边缘化，因纽特民族也是其中之一。在这个过程中因纽特社会出现了严重的社会问题、青少年群体也表现出适应不良的状况，诸多因素相互作用，形成了恶性循环，最终导致了青少年自杀率居高不下的状况。

(八)

在伊魁特市的大街小巷你都能碰到照片上的东西：几块石头搭成的酷似人体的“建筑物”，这就是著名的 Inuksuit 或者 Inukshuit 或者 Inuksuk，相信读者对此也不陌生，它与狗拉雪橇、北极熊等一起构成因纽特的两大文化标志。下面就说一说 Inuksuk 和狗。

伊魁特大街上用石块搭成的 Inuksuk，有的很大，足有3米多高，商店里的艺术品则很小，可以在手心把玩。最有意思的是 Arctic College 的校门前搭了一排，总共7个，从小到大，一字排开，很有阵势；红色的 Inuksuk 图案被设计在 Nunavut 省旗的正中央；伊魁特的高等中学被命名为 Inuksuk High School；在纪念品商店，它成为各种纪念品上的商标，T恤衫上、帽子上、扑克牌上等等都有它。可见 Inuksuk 是多么的受到爱慕。

说得这么热闹，喜欢问问题的读者就会问，这玩意儿有什么用？前文提到过，北极地区没有树，野外除了石头啥都没有。因纽特人外出打猎，有时一连要跑好几天，很难辨认回家的路，所以每到一个地方，他们就顺手搭一个 Inuksuk，因此 Inuksuk 的作用就是指引回家的路，这有多重要啊！现在因纽特人已经会用指南针，不用再靠搭石头辨认方向了。但他们对 Inuksuit 还是情有独钟，喜欢到处搭一个，尤其是在野外，大大小小的 Inuksuk 给光秃秃的山上也增添点生趣。

在伊魁特，除了人，我见到的最多的动物就是狗了。那里的狗被称为“因纽特犬”。这种因纽特犬具有极地狼的血统，体型巨大且非常耐寒，在零下几十度时也能挤在一起安然入睡。而且因纽特犬长得非常漂亮，看过《零下八度》的电影吗？里面两只狗就是因纽特犬，连我这个最不喜欢狗从小就怕狗的人也想摸摸它们，总希望哪一天弄一只来养一养。

不用我说，大家都知道狗对因纽特人的重要性。在过去，如果没有狗，因纽特人就会寸步难行；而且这些忠实的猎犬还会给主人预报危险并帮助他寻找回家的路。除冬季拉雪橇、夏天驮东西外，因纽特人还用它们来拖船，充当纤夫；而且这种狗非常聪明，对主人忠诚度极高，经常为救主人而牺牲自己的生命。在因纽特人的生活中，因纽特犬发挥着巨大作用。实际上如果没有狗，因纽特民族根本无法在北极地区生存下来。我在调研中听说，20世纪五六十年代，联邦政府“再安置”因纽特人时（北极行（四）中详细说了再安置问题），其中有些因纽特人不愿意迁到新社区居住，政府就派人打死他们的狗队，这样因纽特人只有乖乖就范，到社区去居住生活了。

狗拉着雪橇，在白茫茫的雪地上狂奔，这是非常经典的照片，成了因纽特民族的文化象征。尽管现在有了冰上摩托车（ski-doo），没有狗，因纽特人也可以出行打猎了，但是养狗在伊魁特还是非常普遍的现象，但大多数家庭只养一条狗而不是一个狗队，狗种也不全是因纽特犬，而且养狗不是为了打猎或辨认方向了，跟其它地方的人养宠物差不多。我在伊魁特只见到了两支狗队，每支狗队大约有7、8只。尽管现在仍有一部分伊魁特的猎人依靠狗队作为交通工具去打猎，但狗队已逐渐成为伊魁特人的一种娱乐、运

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动工具。舜新告诉我，每年冬春之交伊魁特的因纽特人都组织一年一度的狗拉雪橇比赛；比赛的路线是从伊魁特到 Kimmirut（另一个因纽特人的居住区，位于伊魁特的西南），翻山越岭往返路程 350 公里。这段路程往返飞机只需要 70 分钟，但一个最快的狗队也要跑上 40 多个小时，甚至是两昼夜的时间。现在狗拉雪橇已成为因纽特文化的一部分，外面的人到那里来旅游，可以在雪橇上坐一回，体验一把因纽特的文化（从百度上搜索的狗拉雪橇的照片，大多是旅游这留下的照片）。但是我这次来没有机会去坐一坐。留点念想，以后再来吧。

照片上的一群狗，有 7 只，大概是一支拉雪橇的狗队；被主人拴在冰上，旁边还有个狗棚。我不明白，主人为什么把它们拴在外面，为着出行方便？家里地方小？或者怕吵得邻居不得安宁？我心生怜悯：这么大冷天，还把它们拴在冰雪上，多可怜啊，突然好想抱抱它们！但舜新告诉我，这些狗由于遗传和对寒冷环境的适应，体毛丰厚，只适应室外的寒冷，是不能圈养在室内的。站在岸上，隐隐约约传来它们的叫声，不知是吓唬我们还是它们见了人就高兴。舜新还告诉我，主人喂狗时，总是不让它们吃饱，这样它们才会拼命地拉着雪橇跑到目的地，大概它们认为目的地会有好吃地在等着它们呢。

这张照片上的主人正在喂狗，这群狗比较幸运，在陆地上，而且没有被拴住。看他们活蹦乱跳、精力旺盛的样子，多可爱啊！

(九)

进入 21 世纪以来，国际社会最热门的话题就是气候变化的问题了，而且两极地区首当其冲，气候变化最快而且受其影响亦最大。我们从媒体上听到一些信息：两极地区冰盖加速融化，北极航道快要全程通航，北极地区的动物热得纷纷北迁，北极原住民快没吃的了……；更有人制作一些夸张的短片：北极熊热得全身毛都掉光了，驯鹿受不了炎热的天气去卧轨了，猴子热得上吊自杀了……。我也因此受委托研究一个课题：气候变化对北极原住民生活的影响。这次去伊魁特，一个重要任务就是调研这个问题。

在伊魁特期间，我逮着人就问，气候变化对他们的生活有影响吗？几乎所有的人都异口同声告诉我，气候变化对他们的生活没有影响。他们告诉我，气候确实有变化，比如有时冬天更冷，夏天更热，或者反之。今年的夏天就非常凉爽，冰迟迟不融化，到 7 月中旬了，商船还没进港。但这些对他们生活影响不大，而且他们能适应；一位因纽特人猎手告诉我：气候变化跟我们有什么关系呢，天气适宜的时候，我们就去打猎，不好的时候，我们就呆在家里，等着天气好再出去；我就闹不明白了，为什么外面的人把气候变化说得那么可怕，好像我们都快饿死了。我还打破砂锅问到底：听说这几年，巴芬岛上的驯鹿少了，北极熊也不怎么光顾了，难道对你们没有影响？他们回答说，驯鹿是去别的地方寻食了，但它们隔几年还会回来的，我们的祖先告诉我们，他们也经常遇到这种情况，所以我们一点也不担心。只不过最近几年要跑到远一点的地方捕猎驯鹿；还有一位很有学问也见过外面世界的因纽特人告诉我：地球上所有的人、所有的国家都面临着气候变化问题，所有的人都要适应气候变化，为什么就单单认为我们不能适应变化而需要特别关注呢？她认为外面的人是 over-report 气候变化的问题了，每年那么多人花了那么多钱去开气候变化的会议，太不值得了。

如果气候变化对因纽特人的生活没什么大的影响，那我的课题如何进行下去？每次调研后整理录音时，我都非常纠结。直到访谈伊魁特前任市长后，我柳暗花明、豁然开朗。她告诉我：气候变化对我们的影响可以分为两个方面，一方面是气候变化本身，这对我们的影响不大，而且我们完全能否适应；我们民族在历史上多次碰到气候变化，我们有经验；另一方面是由于气候变化，外面世界对我们的关注，也即气候变化政治对我们的影响，这个影响非常大，远远超过气候变化本身。现在是渥太华、华盛顿甚至是更远地方的人在做北极地区的决策，我们生活的地区不再由我们做主，这令我们非常担忧。比如，北极熊要保护起来，不让我们捕捉，我们的食物来源受到很大的影响；欧盟禁止海豹皮进口，这对我们的经济产生不小的负面影响。

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其实,第二方面的影响远远不止这些。由于外面世界的人对气候变化的关注,越来越多的人涌入了北极地区。不仅有很多加拿大南方省份的人来这里工作和定居(我在伊魁特期间,就碰到一个白人到那里找工作),甚至其它国家的人陆续来到那里,我碰到了乌干达人、越南人,当然还有中国人。根据2011年加拿大的人口统计,伊魁特的原住民占61.2%(其中因纽特人占59.2%,印第安人和梅迪思人各占1%),白人34.3%,剩下的不到5%分别来自非洲、亚洲、拉丁美洲等国。外来人口的增加,显然会影响因纽特人的生活。当地人告诉我,这10年来,伊魁特市发生了很大的变化,这里出现了咖啡馆、酒吧,发源于安大略省遍及加拿大的著名的Tim Hortons就在那里开了分店,价格大约是南方的1.4倍;超市里商品琳琅满目;小汽车也满大街跑了;因纽特人学会了泡酒吧、喝咖啡,学会了吃面包、蔬菜、猪、牛、羊肉。我不想对这些变化做出道德上的评判,但外来文化的增加,生活方面的变化,会慢慢改变一个民族的特质,正如很多长者担忧他们的语言会逐渐走向消亡。

更为重要的是,气候变化使北极地区的油气矿产资源更容易获得,加拿大以及世界各地的大公司都将目光盯上了这一地区。目前尽管大多数公司还处于资源勘探阶段,但开采只是早晚的事。一旦北极地区的资源得到大规模开采,因纽特人的生活方式、社会结构乃至文化都将会发生更大的变化。



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极地研究学术动态

三位同济人参与我国第六次北极科考

“雪龙”号科考船今天(7月11日)从上海启航,赴北极执行中国第6次北极科学考察。记者了解到,此次128位科考队队员中,同济人占3席。我校兼职教授、国家海洋局东海分局巡视员潘增弟教授担任此次科考的首席科学家,另2人分别是我校海洋与地球科学学院研二女生梅静、环境科学与工程学院研一男生郑宏元。

潘增弟教授为极地领域研究专家,作为同济大学兼职教授,他长期以来参与海洋与地球科学学院人才培养工作,并与海洋学院相关教授在极地研究领域开展了密切合作。此次是潘教授第4次北极之行,此前他还参与过2次中国南极科考。

潘教授介绍,此次科考重点是执行“南北极环境综合考察”专项中的北冰洋区域现场考察任务,以了解北冰洋重点海域以及北太平洋边缘海重点海域海洋水文、海洋气象、海冰等基本环境信息,获取调查海域海洋环境变化的关键要素信息,为全球气候变化研究、北极航道利用、极地海洋数据库的完善等提供基础资料和保障。考察预计历时76天,总航程约1.1万海里。

梅静同学为海洋与地球科学学院王汝建教授指导的硕士研究生,此航次中她被编入“海洋地质组”,将协助在北冰洋区域地质采样工作,并对所采集的样品做初步处理。尽管这是她的极地首航,但对于极地研究她并非“新兵”。早在入校时,她就开始在王汝建教授指导下,涉足极地研究领域,圆满完成大学生创新训练计划项目,成果发表于中文核心期刊。上周她已在“雪龙”船上试航几日,接受相关培训,感觉很好。

王汝建教授课题组长期从事南北极古海洋与古气候学研究,他曾于2003年和2006年分别参与我国第2次北极科考和第23次南极科考,此后又有他的多位研究生、博士后研究人员分赴南北极参与科考。近年来,课题组对所获取的南北极的古海洋与古气候学记录开展了系统研究,已取得一批重要研究成果。

郑宏元为同济大学与中国极地研究中心联合培养的2013级硕士研究生,导师是环境科学与工程学院杨海真教授。尽管只是研一,但这已是郑宏元一年内第二次极地科考,去年他就成为我国第30次南极科考队员,今年4月凯旋。此次郑宏元主要承担“北极新型污染物赋存特征与源解析”的采样任务,并协助参与“雪龙”号上实验室的管理工作。

据介绍,近年来,杨海真教授、王峰博士与国家海洋局极地考察办公室、中国极地研究中心开展了相关合作,承担并出色完成了国家海洋局极地专项任务,所完成的对南极环境的综合考察与评估,为我国南极环境的综合评估、站基建设、标准制定提出了参考性意见。自2006年以来,环境科学与工程学院已有多批师生分赴南北极完成科考任务。

同济大学为极地事业作贡献的,还有建筑等学科。作为我国第29次南极科考队员,建筑与城市规划学院郝洛西教授于2012年11月赴南极开展了“LED照明的非视觉生物效应对人体生理节律的影响实验研究”,通过对度夏和越冬科考队员实施人工光环境的干预,探讨极地站区建筑适宜的自然采光和人工光环境的设计方法。

潘增弟教授表示,同济大学在我国极地科学研究中发挥着重要作用,参与的学科领域在不断拓展,相关研究成果为我国极地事业发展提供了有力支撑。

来源:新闻中心

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普京特使警告芬兰不要加入北约

2014 年 6 月 9 日, 普京特使就芬兰申请加入北约问题发出警告, 称芬兰加入北约可能会导致第三次世界大战。芬兰与瑞典都是北约和平伙伴关系国, 然而克里米亚加入俄罗斯之后, 芬兰和瑞典一起向北约递交了申请书。俄特使强烈建议芬兰不要加入北约, 认为芬兰加入北约不仅不会加强欧洲安全, 反而会削弱欧洲安全。

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/06/putin-envoy-warns-finland-against-joining-nato-09-06>

挪威投资 1700 万欧元建立新的边境控制站

2014 年 6 月 19 日, 挪威投资 1700 万欧元建立新的边境控制站, 替代三个小的边境控制站。2016 年还将更北端边境建立另一座新控制站, 完成挪威边境控制重组工作。

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/borders/2014/06/high-investments-better-border-control-19-06>

俄罗斯在巴伦支海上空开展军事演习

2014 年 6 月 19 日, 俄罗斯在巴伦支海上空开展空军军事演习, 动用超过 25 架各种类型的战斗机和轰炸机, 包括俄最新的战略轰炸机苏-34。

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/06/air-force-exercise-above-barents-sea-19-06>

挪威和俄罗斯共同研究沉没在巴伦支海的核潜艇 K-159

2014 年 6 月 23 日, 挪威和俄罗斯共派出 15 名专家评估沉没核潜艇 K-159 的情况, 挪威辐射保护局 (Norway Radiation Protection Authority, NPRA) 表示, 沉没的核潜艇内有大约 800 公斤核废料, 迟早会泄露, 评估打捞该核潜艇的环境风险非常重要。K-159 沉没的地方就在摩尔曼斯克的出口处, 非常接近世界最重要的产鱼区, 即使核泄露的谣言都可能摧毁挪威的渔业。

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/nature/2014/06/norway-and-russia-study-sunken-nuclear-sub-23-06>

摩尔曼斯克寻求新途径解决天然气开发问题

2014 年 6 月 24 日, 由于两年前俄罗斯天然气公司 (Gazprom) 推迟实施托克曼 (Shtokman) 天然气开采计划, 摩尔曼斯克目前仍然高度依赖昂贵且污染严重的重油, 其试图成为 Gazprom 北极天然气开采基础

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设施港的计划也迟迟难以实现。摩尔曼斯克州长上周与 Gazprom 总裁会晤拟重启该计划, 同时也在寻求其他能源公司开发该地区。

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2014/06/murmansk-seeks-new-way-out-gas-deadlock-24-06>

俄罗斯重建其北极空军基地

2014年7月3日, 俄罗斯投资60亿卢布重建其冷战后废弃的五个北极空军基地, 有望2015年10月完工。

俄罗斯地缘问题研究所(Russian Academy of Geopolitical Problems)所长 Leonid Ivashov 称, 俄罗斯重建其北极空军基地一方面为了保护俄在北极开发石油和天然气, 一方面保护北极大陆架划界。

<http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/07/arctic-sky-look-shelf-03-07>

中国在北极的熊猫外交

7月11日, 雪龙号第六次出征北极。《经济学人》就近年来中国的北极政策刊发评论文章。不少评论者认为中国租借熊猫给丹麦是为了北极以及格陵兰, 尤其是格陵兰的矿产资源; 中国对北方航道的估计过于乐观, 北方航道面临恶劣气候条件以及环境等诸多问题; 中国在北极的能源投资需与北极国家合作; 挪威允许黄怒波购买土地, 意味着挪威也想成为中国熊猫外交的对象。

<http://www.economist.com/news/china/21606898-china-pursues-its-interest-frozen-north-polar-bearings>

日本利用北极资源

2014年9月8号, 三井 O.S.K. (Mitsui O.S.K. Lines) 宣布从2018年开始, 日本主要航运公司通过北冰洋运输液化天然气, 将开始参与北极航道的利用。随着乌克兰危机日美欧与俄罗斯矛盾加大, 日本参与北极航线的关键点是与俄罗斯的长期信任。

<http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0001552886>

欧洲将建立欧盟北极信息中心

19个欧洲顶级机构建议建立欧盟北极信息中心, 其目的为收集分散的北极信息, 应对欧洲需求。2014年9月11号的布鲁塞尔研讨会上将通过“欧盟在北极, 北极在欧盟”报告, 发布此项目。

<http://www.ulapland.fi/news/The-top-Arctic-institutes-in-Europe-propose-establishment-of-the-EU-Arctic-Information-Centre-/10917/596f82ff-cc7c-47fc-818d-bd0cdfc45452>

(编辑: 苏平 李洋洋)

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The European Union and the Arctic

29-30 May 2015, Dundee, Scotland

Call for Papers

The School of Law, University of Dundee, UK and the K. G. Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea, University of Tromsø, Norway are pleased to announce the call for papers for "The European Union and the Arctic" (2015 EU-Arctic Conference).

Background

The EU is inextricably linked to the Arctic region by a unique combination of history, geography, economics and scientific achievements (COM (2008) 763 final). Three Arctic countries are EU Member States (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and the EU maintains close relations with Iceland and Norway through the European Economic Area. Canada, Russia and the United States are also strategic partners of the EU. The European Commission has set out the EU's interests in the Arctic and has proposed action around three main policy objectives: 1) Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population; 2) Promoting sustainable use of resources; 3) Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance (COM (2008) 763 final). However, the best way to ensure that the EU's interests are protected and that the policies it pursues are adopted has not been mapped out. While the EU is willing to pursue its involvement within the relevant international framework (e.g., the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Convention on Biological Diversity) on Arctic issues such as climate change, biodiversity, ecosystem-based management, persistent organic pollutants, marine protected areas, energy, fisheries, tourism, international navigation and indigenous people (JOIN (2012) 19 final), choices must be made as to which policy avenue to pursue. How these choices are to be made and which avenues are the best to pursue its policy objectives are some of the many questions which have yet to be fully addressed by scholars.

Call for abstracts

This conference will bring together academics and practitioners from relevant disciplines such as international law, international relations, political science and marine biology, NGOs, representatives from EU institutions and international organizations to discuss the EU's potential contribution to enhance Arctic governance. A roadmap for increasing the effectiveness of the EU's action in the Arctic will be drawn at the end of the conference. This conference is timely as the Council of the European Union recently (Council conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region, 24 May 2014) requested the European Commission and the High Representative to present proposals for the further development of an integrated and coherent Arctic Policy by December 2015.

Abstracts of no more than 400 words should be emailed to **Dr. Nengye Liu (n.x.liu@dundee.ac.uk)** by 15 January 2015. All abstracts will be peer-reviewed. Selected speakers will be notified by 31 January 2015. It is anticipated that an edited book of papers from the conference will be published in 2016.

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Confirmed Speakers

A number of speakers have confirmed their availability to speak at the 2015 EU-Arctic Conference. **Ms. Diana Wallis**, former Vice President of the European Parliament, will deliver the keynote speech. Other confirmed speakers include:

Tom Barry, Executive Secretary, Working Group Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Arctic Council

Prof. Timo Koivurova, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland

Marten Koopmans, EU/European Maritime Safety Agency Representative to the International Maritime Organization

Prof. Frithjof Kuepper, Chair in Marine Biodiversity, University of Aberdeen, UK

Prof. Suzanne Lalonde, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal, Canada

Daniel Simons, Legal Counsel, Greenpeace International

Dundee and the Arctic

Dundee, the fourth largest city in Scotland, is promoted as 'One City, Many Discoveries' in honour of Dundee's history of scientific activities and of the RRS Discovery (Robert Falcon Scott's Antarctic exploration vessel, which was built in Dundee and is now berthed in the city harbour). The Discovery is part of Dundee's history as the British whaling capital from about 1753 to 1914. Dundee whaling captains contributed significantly to surveying of remote regions in the Arctic and Antarctic. Another great Polar explorer, Ernest Shackleton, also chose Dundee built ships the 'Nimrod' and the 'Aurora' for his expeditions to the Antarctic. Conference participants will have the opportunity to visit the city's main museum and art gallery, McManus Galleries, for free to further discover Dundee's strong link with the Arctic.

Travel arrangements

Dundee is very easy to reach by bus, train and flight from Edinburgh, Glasgow or London. Generously sponsored by the Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship (Call FP7-PEOPLE-2012-IEF Proposal No 328806, Acronym: EuroArcticLab project) of the European Union and K. G. Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea, this event is free of charge for speakers. The conference will provide coffee, refreshments and lunch. The conference also plans to hold a reception on the main deck of the RSS Discovery. However, it is expected that selected speakers will cover their own travel and accommodation costs. Participants shall register with Ms. Vikki Watson (v.a.watson@dundee.ac.uk) by 1 May 2015. Further details will be emailed in January 2015.

Steering Committee

Nengye Liu, Marie Curie Fellow, School of Law, University of Dundee


Elizabeth Kirk, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Dundee

Robin Churchill, Professor of International Law, School of Law, University of Dundee

Tore Henriksen, Professor, Director of K.G.Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea, University of Tromsø



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